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The Political Constitution No More? 
 
Robert Brett Taylor 
 
 
Abstract 
The British constitution has recently undergone some dramatic changes which, according to 
leading constitutional scholar Vernon Bogdanor, signals the demise of the 'old' political 
constitution and its replacement with a 'new' more legal constitution.  The aim of thesis is to 
challenge the assertion that the British constitution is undergoing a fundamental transformation 
from a political to a legal constitution by conducting a thorough analysis of the extent to which the 
contemporary British constitution can still be said to resemble a political constitution.  This will be 
achieved through an exhaustive examination of three key areas of the constitution: the Royal 
Prerogative; Constitutional Conventions; and the Human Rights Act 1998.  In so doing, however, it 
is not the aim of this thesis to produce a simple either/or account of the British constitution, but 
instead to advance and provide evidence of a middle-ground between the two opposing schools of 
constitutionalism: complementary constitutionalism.  It will be argued that both the legal and the 
political constitutions share many common characteristics and disagree with one another 
primarily, although not exclusively, on emphasis.  No real world constitution, therefore,  was or 
ever will be solely legal or solely political in character.  A real world constitution is instead a 
complementary mixture of elements from both the legal and political schools which can be either 
primarily legal or primarily political in character.  As a result, it will be shown that the British 
constitution, although undisputedly more legal, nevertheless remains primarily political. 
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Chapter One 
INTRODUCTION 
1. Where is the British Constitution Heading? 
In the absence of a codified constitution, constitutional lawyers have long been interested, not 
only with unearthing the British constitution, but in charting its future course.  Contemporary 
public law discourse, however, has become dominated by an ongoing debate between two broad 
and seemingly opposed schools of constitutionalism – the legal and the political – both of which 
purport to provide the best framework from which compliance with constitutionalism can be 
achieved.  Broadly speaking, the legal school makes the case for greater judicial oversight of 
constitutional issues, advocating constitutional review of primary legislation and powers of judicial 
strike down, whilst the political school reinterprets the traditional tenets of the British constitution 
in light of civil republicanism to make the case for greater reliance upon political forms of 
accountability.  Determining the future course of the British constitution, therefore, has become 
increasingly polarised, with constitutional scholars seemingly fighting an ongoing battle for the 
very heart and soul of the British constitution.   
The British constitution has over the last half a century undergone some dramatic changes which, 
because they have ushered in greater reliance upon judicial forms of accountability, appears to 
signal the demise of the 'old' political constitution and its imminent replacement with a 'new' 
more legal constitution.  The aim of thesis is to challenge the assertion that the British constitution 
is undergoing a fundamental transformation from a political to a legal constitution.  In  so doing, 
however, this thesis will not produce a simple either/or account of the British constitution, but 
instead make the case for a middle-ground between the two opposing schools of 
constitutionalism: complementary constitutionalism.  Before discussing these aims in detail, along 
with the approach the thesis will take in order to achieve them, this chapter will first chart the 
various interpretations of and challenges to the British constitution since the late nineteenth 
century. 
 10 
2. The Traditional British Constitution 
As Vernon Bogdanor and Stefan Vogenauer argue, ‘[c]onstitutions are generally enacted when a 
constitutional moment arrives, following war, revolution, or colonial independence.’1  By contrast, 
it has often been said that evolution and not revolution, is the hallmark of the British constitution.2  
As Sir Ivor Jennings explains: 
The building has been constantly added to, patched, and partially re-constructed, so that it 
has been renewed from century to century; but it has never been razed to the ground and 
rebuilt on new foundations.  If a constitution consists of institutions and not of paper that 
describes them, the British Constitution has not been made but has grown – and there is 
no paper.3 
This is not to say, however, that the long road taken to reach the contemporary British 
constitution was an easy one.  As this quote by Leslie Wolf-Phillips illustrates, the British 
constitution could be seen as the end result of many constitutional battles:  
The course of British constitutional developments has seen a sequence of invasions and 
foreign overlords, the squabbling of petty monarchs, the struggle between the nobility 
and the king for supremacy, the later struggle for domination between the king and 
parliament, the recognition of the supremacy of parliament over the king, the decline in 
the influence of the monarch, the rise of the middle classes in terms of constitutional 
recognition, and, finally, the decline of the power of the House of Lords and the central 
place of a House of Commons elected on a basis of universal adult suffrage.4 
From the Norman Conquest, the Wars of the Roses, and the Reformation, to the Civil War, the 
Restoration, and the Glorious Revolution, the British constitution is unmistakably the culmination 
of many wars and revolutions.  Despite this, however, it is true to say that the British constitution 
from the Glorious Revolution of 1688, at least in comparison to its development prior, has been 
one of ‘[c]ontinuity rather than discontinuity.’5  Consequently, whereas the constitutional 
moments of other nations happened primarily during or after the Enlightenment, Britain’s 
occurred almost a century earlier.6  Therefore, as Adam Tomkins argues, many of the key 
‘institutional structures and arrangements of what after 1707 became the British constitution 
                                                     
1
 Bogdanor, V. and Vogenauer, S. ‘Enacting a British Constitution: Some Problems’ (2008) PL 38, 41. 
2
 Bradley, A.W. and Ewing, K.D. Constitutional and Administrative Law (15
th
 edn, Harlow: Pearson Education 
Limited, 2011), 31-32. 
3
 Jennings, Sir W.I. The Law and the Constitution [1933] (5
th
 edn, London: University of London Press, 1960), 
8.  See also King, A. The British Constitution (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), 1. 
4
 Woolf-Phillips, L. ‘A long look at the British Constitution’ (1964) 37(4) Parliamentary Affairs 385, 392. 
5
 King, n 3, 2. 
6
 For a comprehensive study of the Glorious Revolution see Harris, T. Revolution: The Great Crisis of the 
British Monarchy, 1685-1720 (London: Penguin Books, 2006). 
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were already largely in place by the end of the seventeenth century,'7 decades before many of the 
ideas encapsulated by other countries’ constitutions were conceived, yet alone implemented.8  
Consequently, by comparison to other nations, and regardless of any subsequent changes, the 
formal and substantive character of the British constitution remains strikingly different.9 
In the late nineteenth century, as a result of A.V. Dicey’s attempts to give an account of the British 
constitution’s formal and substantive characteristics, a new consensus on the constitution was 
eventually reached – what this thesis dubs the ‘traditional’ British constitution – that ultimately 
came to dominate political and judicial thinking during the first half of the twentieth century.10  In 
Dicey’s account of the constitution in an Introduction to the Study of the Law of the Constitution, 
he proclaimed that ‘the dominant characteristic of our political institutions’ was the doctrine of 
parliamentary sovereignty:11  
[T]hat Parliament ... has, under the English constitution [sic] the right to make or unmake 
any law whatever; and, further, that no person or body is recognised by the law of England 
as having a right to override or set aside the legislation of Parliament.12 
Because of the ‘Unlimited Legislative Authority of Parliament,’13 there exists ‘no marked or clear 
distinction between laws which are not fundamental or constitutional and laws which are 
fundamental or constitutional.’14  As a consequence of this, the role of the courts under the 
traditional constitution is necessarily subservient.  As Dicey explained: 
The principle then of Parliamentary sovereignty may, looked at from its positive side, be 
thus described: Any Act of parliament, or any part of an Act of Parliament, which makes 
new law, or repeals or modifies an existing law, will be obeyed by the Courts.  The same 
principle, looked at from its negative side, may be thus stated: there is no person or body 
of persons who can, under the English constitution, make rules which override or derogate 
from an Act of Parliament, or which (to express the same thing in other words) will be 
enforced by the Courts in contravention of an Act of Parliament.15  
                                                     
7
 Tomkins, A. ‘Of constitutional spectres’ (1999) PL 525, 532-33. 
8
 Ibid, 533: ‘[I]t was in the blood of the seventeenth century, and not in the enlightenment idealism of the 
eighteenth, that the English constitution was forged.’ 
9
 King, n 3, 2. 
10
 See Stevens, R. The English Judges: Their Role in the Changing Constitution (Oxford and Portland, Oregon: 
Hart Publishing, 2002). 
11
 Dicey, A.V. Introduction to the Study of the Law of the Constitution [1885] (Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 
1982), 3. 
12
 Ibid, 3-4. 
13
 Ibid, 4. 
14
 Ibid, 37. 
15
 Ibid, 4. 
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This did not mean, however, that individual rights and freedoms were of little importance to the 
British constitution.  According to Dicey, the Rule of Law – ‘the security given under the English 
constitution to the rights of individuals’ – formed the second feature of the constitution alongside 
legislative supremacy.16  ‘[T]he right to individual freedom is part of the constitution,’ he claimed, 
‘because it is inherent in the ordinary law of the land.’17  The Rule of Law – which Dicey took to 
mean the predominance of regular law over arbitrary power, equality before the law, and the 
constitution being the result of the ordinary law18 – pervaded the constitution, however, not 
because of legislation, but because of judicial decisions over many centuries.  Unlike with other 
world constitutions, the rules of the British constitution, Dicey argued, ‘are not the source but the 
consequence of the rights of individuals, as defined and enforced by the Courts,’19 thereby leading 
Dicey to declare that ‘[o]ur constitution, in short, is a judge-made constitution.’20  The courts, 
however, although responsible for the evolution of the constitution into a bastion of individual 
freedom, do not play an active role in protecting individuals against the legislative actions of 
Parliament.  According to Dicey, the right to individual freedom, because it is so ingrained within 
the constitution, ‘can hardly be destroyed without a thorough revolution in the institutions and 
manners of the nation.’21    
3. The Constitutional Challenge 
Despite the dominance of Dicey, however, the desirability of the traditional British constitution, 
and its reliability as an accurate description of the contemporary British constitution, has been 
subject to sustained intellectual challenge.  Even during the height of the traditional British 
constitution, critics of Dicey were not difficult to find.  Dicey’s most notable critic, Sir Ivor Jennings, 
wrote extensively on the flaws of Dicey’s exposition, although Jennings himself was nevertheless a 
supporter of legislative supremacy.22  By the mid-twentieth century, however, criticism of the 
traditional British constitution took on a new dimension.  This was, it is submitted, as a result of 
the growth in world constitutionalism.   
                                                     
16
 Ibid, 107. 
17
 Ibid, 120. 
18
 Ibid, Chapter Four. 
19
 Ibid, 121. 
20
 Ibid, 116 
21
 Ibid, 120. 
22
 See Jennings, n 3, 117. 
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In the late seventeenth century, the term 'constitution' ‘applied only to the substantive principles 
to be deduced from a nation’s actual institutions and their development.’23  Over the last four 
hundred years this definition appears to have, for the most part, been widely accepted in Britain.  
In the late eighteenth century, however, both the newly-created United States of America and 
France adopted a new definition of a constitution that was strikingly different.  Under this new 
definition, a constitution was no longer descriptive but prescriptive; the constitution created 
government, defined its authority, set limits to its powers, and was contained in a single written 
document.24  Following the adoption of such constitutions in Italy, West Germany and Japan 
following the atrocities of the Second World War, British lawyers and lay persons alike increasingly 
came to view such constitutional arrangements as essential for securing limited government, the 
very essence of what has become to be known as constitutionalism: a normative political doctrine 
that ‘denotes a type of political regime constructed in accordance with certain principles or ideals, 
which principles or ideals are judged to be good in themselves and against which a given 
constitutional regime’s performance can be, and ought to be, judged.’25    
As a result, academic works on the British constitution have become increasingly critical of its key 
tenets,26 primarily the doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty and the fusion of powers, on the 
grounds that such institutional arrangements invite what Lord Hailsham in 1976 described as 
‘elective dictatorship.'  Although Dicey asserted that individual liberty was guaranteed under the 
constitution by virtue of the Rule of Law, the dominance of Dicey's reading of the constitution 
throughout the first half of the twentieth century – a supposed ‘golden age of liberty’27 – is now 
widely seen to have instilled a culture of judicial deference towards executive discretion that was 
maintained even at the expense of personal liberty.28  The human rights of individuals, therefore, 
as well as the entire structure of governance, are seen to be at risk from tyrannical governments, 
which may exercise wide and discretionary powers free from legal accountability and thus 
consequence.   As Anthony W. Bradley et al therefore note, ‘[e]ver since the American and French 
revolutions, it has become clear that a parliamentary majority may not be a bulwark of 
                                                     
23
 McIlwain, C.H. Constitutionalism: Ancient and Modern (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1947), 3. 
24
 See Ridley, F.F. ‘There is no British constitution: A dangerous case of the Emperor’s clothes’ (1988) 41 
Parliamentary Affairs 340.   
25
 King, n 3, 10-11.  See also Sajó, A. Limiting Government: An Introduction to Constitutionalism (Budapest: 
Central European Press, 1999), 9.  As he notes, constitutionalism is a concept which people did not refer to 
until the nineteenth century. 
26
 For a particularly scathing attack on the British constitution as a whole see Ridley, n 24. 
27
 Ewing, K.D. and Gearty, C.A. The Struggle for Civil Liberties: Political Freedom and the Rule of Law in Britain 
1914-1945 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), v. 
28
 See ibid, in general. 
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constitutionalism so much as a challenge to it.’29  As a consequence of this, a significant portion of 
academic writing on the British constitution has focused on re-interpreting its existing 
characteristics in the hope of satisfying the requirements of constitutionalism.30  The most striking 
example of this tendency has been with the exposition of common law constitutionalism, whereby 
the common law, because it embodies a substantive notion of the Rule of Law, transforms it into a 
de facto higher law for Britain, thereby legitimately empowering judges to grant protection to 
fundamental human rights against both the government and Parliament.31  
4. The Political Defence 
Not everyone, however, has been willing to accept the demise of the traditional conception of the 
British constitution.  In 1979, J.A.G. Griffith, in an attempt to challenge the then emerging change 
in attitude towards the traditional British constitution, made a renewed defence of what he 
dubbed the ‘political constitution.’32  In making his de facto case for the compatibility of the British 
constitution and its traditional tenets with constitutionalism, Griffith did not rely solely upon the 
Rule of Law as Dicey did,33 but also on democracy, arguing that accountable government can be 
better facilitated by leaving questions as to rights, not to judges under a Bill of Rights, but instead 
to democratically-elected politicians.  As Griffith noted: 
A further advantage in treating what others call rights as political claims is that their 
acceptance or rejection will be in the hands of politicians rather than judges and the 
advantage of that is not that politicians are more likely to come up with the right answer 
but that, as I have said, they are so much more vulnerable than judges and can be 
dismissed or at least made to suffer in their reputation.34   
                                                     
29
 Ziegler, K.S., Baranger, D. and Bradley, A.W. (eds) Constitutionalism and the Role of Parliaments (Oxford 
and Portland, Oregon: Hart Publishing, 2007), 7. 
30
 For example, Barendt, E.M. An Introduction to Constitutional Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998). 
31
 See primarily Allan, T.R.S. Law, Liberty and Justice: The Legal Foundations of British Constitutionalism 
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1993). 
32
 Griffith, J.A.G. ‘The Political Constitution’ (1979) 42(1) MLR 1. 
33
 Ibid, 15.  Griffith argues that, at the heart of the constitution, ‘Governments of the United Kingdom may 
take any action necessary for the proper government of the United Kingdom, as they see it, subject to two 
limitations.  The first limitation is that they may not infringe the legal rights of others unless expressly 
authorised to do so under statute or the prerogative.  The second limitation is that if they wish to change 
the law, whether by adding to their existing legal powers or otherwise, they must obtain the assent of 
Parliament.’  In other words, Griffith believes in the need for the existence of prior legal authority for any 
and all actions of the executive as established in Entick v Carrington (1765) 19 St Tr 1029, a commonly 
accepted principle of the Rule of Law.  For the Rule of Law in general see Fenwick, H.M. and Phillipson, G. 
Text, Cases and Materials on Public Law and Human Rights (3
rd
 edn, London and New York: Routledge, 
2011), Chapter Three. 
34
 Griffith, n 32, 19. 
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Since then, writers such as Adam Tomkins and Richard Bellamy have adopted a normative account 
of the political constitution, couching their reading of the political constitution in terms of civic 
republicanism.35  Civic republicanism contends that the common good of citizens is best realised 
through democratic self-government, civic virtue, deliberation, and popular participation in 
politics.
36
  At the heart of civic republicanism is Phillip Pettit's notion of 'freedom as non-
domination'
37
 which stipulates that 'we are not free if there is another who possesses the capacity 
arbitrarily to interfere with our interests or to restrain us.'38  For Tomkins and Bellamy, this 
distinctively republican-brand of freedom is best achieved – as it is under the British constitution – 
when government is held to account by political institutions, and when democratically-elected 
politicians, not judges, have the final say.39  Although Griffith did not go as far as to say that Britain 
had always been a political constitution, instead producing a largely descriptive account of the 
constitution,40 Tomkins’ work on the political constitution appears to suggest just that.  For 
Tomkins, traditional English public law, the period between 1870 and 1970, was based on the 
political constitution,41 the height of Diceyan thinking.  The accuracy of this claim, however, 
appears dubious.  Although Dicey’s reading of parliamentary sovereignty remains intact under this 
new political paradigm, his essentially liberal justifications for it have now been replaced with 
republican ones.42  The political constitution, if anything, appears nothing more than a republican 
reinterpretation of the traditional constitution.  Regardless of this, however, it is now accepted 
that, defending the ‘traditional’ British constitution and its many tenets, now means defending, 
not Dicey’s constitution per se, but the ‘political’ or ‘republican’ constitution. 
5. The Political Constitution No More? 
During the ongoing war of attrition between legal, common law, and political constitutionalists, 
the British constitution has undergone some significant constitutional changes.  The last forty 
years of British history have been witness in particular to unprecedented judicial expansionism.  
                                                     
35
 See Bellamy, R. Political Constitutionalism: A Republican Defence of the Constitutionality of Democracy  
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007); Bellamy, R. ‘Republicanism, Democracy, and 
Constitutionalism’ in Laborde, C. and Maynor, J. (eds) Republicanism and Political Theory (Oxford: Blackwell 
Publishing, 2008); Tomkins, A. Public Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003); and Tomkins, A. Our 
Republican Constitution (Oxford and Portland, Oregon: Hart Publishing, 2005). 
36
 See Tomkins, Our Republican Constitution, ibid, 44 and Honohan, I. Civic Republicanism (London and New 
York: Routledge, 2002), 1. 
37
 Pettit, P. Republicanism: A Theory of Freedom and Government (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1997). 
38
 Tomkins, Our Republican Constitution, n 35, 47. 
39
 See Chapter Two, 38-44. 
40
 Griffith, n 32, 19: ‘[T]he constitution is no more and no less than what happens.’  
41
 Tomkins, Public Law, n 35, 21. 
42
 On criticisms of Dicey’s liberal conception of the Rule of Law see Ewing and Gearty, n 27, 7-10. 
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Although their role in constitutional matters was marginalised from 1900,43 the judges since the 
1970s have undergone what Robert Stevens describes as a ‘practical and psychological 
transformation.’44  As Stevens observes, litigation was revived, legal aid was expanded, English 
judicial review was rediscovered in order to hold the executive to account,45 and judicial 
responsibility for adapting the common law to meet the needs of society was reclaimed.46  This 
renewed judicial vigour reached unprecedented heights in R (on the application of Jackson) v 
Attorney-General,47 when several Law Lords openly questioned the relevance of parliamentary 
sovereignty, stating obiter that the doctrine was no longer without limits.  Lord Steyn, for example, 
argued that: 
 The classic account given by Dicey of the doctrine of the supremacy of Parliament, pure 
 and absolute as it was, can now be seen to be out of place in the modern United 
 Kingdom.  Nevertheless, the supremacy of Parliament is still the general principle of our 
 constitution.  It is a construct of the common law.  The judges created this principle.  If 
 that is so, it is not unthinkable that circumstances could arise where the courts may 
 have to qualify a principle established on a different hypothesis of constitutionalism.  In 
 exceptional circumstances involving an attempt to abolish judicial review or the ordinary 
 role of the courts, the Appellate Committee of the House of Lords or a new Supreme 
 Court may have to consider whether this is a constitutional fundamental which even a 
 sovereign Parliament acting at the behest of a complaisant House of Commons cannot 
 abolish.48   
Similarly, Lord Hope noted that '[p]arliamentary sovereignty is no longer, if it ever was, absolute ... 
It is no longer right to say that its freedom to legislate admits of no qualification whatever,'49 
whilst Baroness Hale went as far as to say that '[t]he courts will treat with particular suspicion (and 
might even reject) any attempt to subvert the rule of law by removing governmental action 
affecting the rights of the individual from all judicial scrutiny.'50 
Despite this, however, much of the judiciary's increasing prominence within the constitution in 
recent decades has been fuelled, not by the courts, but instead by Parliament.  This can be seen 
most strikingly with Britain’s entry into the now European Union.  Following the decision of the 
House of Lords in Factortame (No. 2),51 s 2(4) of the European Communities Act 1972 (ECA), now 
                                                     
43
 See Stevens, n 10, Chapter 2. 
44
 Ibid, xiii. 
45
 Ibid, xiv. 
46
 Ibid, 44. 
47
 [2005] UKHL 56. 
48
 Ibid, [102]. 
49
 Ibid, [104]. 
50
 Ibid, [159]. 
51
 R v Secretary of State for Transport, ex parte Factortame (No. 2) [1991] 1 AC 603.   
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amended by the European Union Act 2011, gives EU law, not only direct effect,52 but also 
precedence over domestic law, even in the face of inconsistent parliamentary legislation, 
irrespective of when it is passed.53  As a result, judges may now disapply any Act of Parliament 
they deem to be in conflict with EU law, ‘their own British version of American judicial review.’54  
The New Labour reform package of 1997, which included legislation to affect greater human rights 
protection55 and for the devolution of power from Westminster to Scotland, Northern Ireland, and 
Wales,56 can also be seen to further expand the role of the judiciary within the constitution.  The 
Human Rights Act 1998 (HRA), for instance, ascribed a new role for the judiciary under ss 3-4 in 
reviewing the compatibility of legislation to the Convention Rights, albeit without the ability to 
declare incompatible legislation invalid, as well as a new ground for the judicial review of 
executive action under s 6.  In addition to this, devolution appears to have established a sub-
national constitutional framework that departs significantly from the traditional Westminster 
model.  None of the devolved assemblies are accorded the unlimited sovereignty enjoyed by the 
Westminster Parliament because their authority, as well as its limits, is derived from each Act of 
Parliament that created them, making them de facto written constitutions.57  This is reaffirmed by 
that fact that the Supreme Court, whose general duty it is to enforce the will of Parliament as 
expressed in statute, has the power to strike down legislation passed by the devolved assemblies, 
regardless of the fact that the devolved assemblies are democratically-elected and the Supreme 
Court is not;58 thereby arguably elevating the status of the Court to de facto guardian of the Rule 
of Law and the constitutional settlement within those devolved jurisdictions.59    
                                                     
52
 The European Communities Act 1972, s 2(1): ‘All such rights, powers, liabilities, obligations and restrictions 
from time to time created or arising by or under the Treaties, and all such remedies and procedures from 
time to time provided for by or under the Treaties, as in accordance with the Treaties are without further 
enactment to be given legal effect or used in the United Kingdom shall be recognised and available in law, 
and be enforced, allowed and followed accordingly.’ 
53
 Section 2(4): ‘[A]ny enactment passed or to be passed, other than one contained in this part of this Act, 
shall be construed and have effect subject to the foregoing provisions of this section.’ 
54
 Stevens, n 10, xiv. 
55
 The Human Rights Act 1998. 
56
 The Scotland Act 1998, the Northern Ireland Act 1998, and the Government of Wales Act 1998 
respectively. 
57
 See Bradley and Ewing, n 2, 47: ‘[I]t might be said that three of the four countries that make up the United 
Kingdom each now has a written constitution.’ 
58
 This power is prescribed for by s 33 of the Scotland Act 1998, s 149 and Schedule 9 of the Government of 
Wales Act 2006, and s 79 and Schedule 10 of the Northern Ireland Act 1998. 
59
 See AXA General Insurance Limited and others v The Lord Advocate and others [2011] UKSC 46, [51] (Lord 
Hope): ‘[T]he rule of law does not have to compete with the principle of sovereignty ...  We now have in 
Scotland a government which enjoys a large majority in the Scottish Parliament.  Its party dominates the 
only chamber in that Parliament and the committees by which bills that are in progress are scrutinised.  It is 
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The cumulative impact of these changes has persuaded leading constitutional scholar Vernon 
Bogdanor to proclaim that the traditional constitution is now in the process of being replaced by a 
new and more legal constitution.  As Bogdanor notes in his 2009 book The New British 
Constitution: 
The New British Constitution has a large but limited theme – the creation of a new British 
constitution and the demise of the old, the replacement of one constitutional order by 
another ...  We have been living through an unprecedented period of constitutional 
change, an era of constitutional reform which began in 1997 and shows no sign of coming 
to an end ... 
 The New British Constitution suggests ... that Dicey’s analysis, which perhaps offered a 
 reasonably accurate account of Britain’s constitutional arrangements in the past, has 
 been made irrelevant by the constitutional reforms since 1997, and by Britain’s entry 
 into the European Communities in 1973.  We are now in transition from a system based 
 on parliamentary sovereignty to one based on the sovereignty of a constitution, albeit a 
 constitution that is inchoate, indistinct and still in large part uncodified.60 
Judicial expansionism, where it results in greater protection of human rights and more 
accountable government, is a welcome development for legal and common law constitutionalists 
that has the potential to make up for the perceived shortcomings of the traditional British 
constitution's attachment to parliamentary sovereignty.  For political constitutionalists, however, 
judicial expansionism, regardless of whether it is spearheaded by the courts or by Parliament, is 
cause for concern.  Adam Tomkins, for example, would contend that political accountability is not 
only more democratic than legal accountability, but also more effective at preventing 
governments from abusing their power.61  Greater reliance on the courts, therefore, 'endangers 
both democracy and effectiveness.'62  In light of these ideological differences, therefore, can the 
changes which have occurred over the past forty years really be seen to signal the replacement of 
the 'old' political constitution with a 'new' more legal one? 
Janet Hiebert certainly believes that although political constitutionalists continue to defend their 
model of constitutionalism over the claims of their legal rivals,63 they have nevertheless 'had to 
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resign themselves to the popularity of this juridical form of constitutionalism'64 and to 'their 
inability to transform constitutional paths already taken.'65  Although this suggests that political 
constitutionalists may now believe the political constitution to be lost, political constitutionalists 
have in fact remained steadfast in their belief that the political constitution remains.  Keith Ewing, 
for example, has recently argued that '[f]ar from being eclipsed by recent constitutional reforms, 
the British species of political constitutionalism remains in rude health, in part because this recent 
period of re-balancing the constitution in the direction of the legal has been a conspicuous 
failure,'66 whilst Colin Turpin and Adam Tomkins' have observed that ‘there is a very great deal of 
the ‘old’ constitution that remains.'67  Indeed, when one examines the constitution more closely, 
one can see that Turpin and Tomkins' rebuttal to Bogdanor's claim is not without cause.  Many of 
the reforms have been piecemeal, with much of the constitution remaining untouched by reform 
altogether.68  Many of the above mentioned reforms have sought also to complement the 'old' 
constitution, not to challenge it.  Parliamentary sovereignty, for example, is expressly preserved 
under the HRA,69 as well as in relation to EU law as a result of s 18 of the European Union Act 
2011,70 whilst the devolved assemblies of Scotland, Northern Ireland, and Wales remain formally 
subordinate to the sovereignty of the Westminster Parliament.71  Lord Neuberger, the President of 
the Supreme Court, has also challenged the rhetoric of the House of Lords in Jackson, arguing that 
Parliament, because it is democratically elected, remains sovereign.72  Consequently, despite the 
unprecedented growth in judicial authority over the past forty years, the British constitution has 
yet to experience an American-style Marbury v Madison moment.73  As a result, it is submitted 
that Bogdanor’s claim that Britain is in the process of attaining a 'new' and more legal constitution 
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at the expense of its 'old' political is unduly premature.  In order to give precision and force to this 
claim, however, one must conduct a closer and more thorough examination of the contemporary 
British constitution. 
6. Aims and Objectives 
The aim of thesis, therefore, is to challenge the assertion by Bogdanor that the British constitution 
is undergoing a fundamental transformation from a political to a legal constitution by conducting a 
theoretically-informed analysis of the extent to which the contemporary British constitution can 
still be said to resemble a predominantly political constitution.  This will be achieved by examining 
the British constitution with reference to the substantive and formal characteristics of the two 
broad schools of thought on constitutionalism – the legal (including common law 
constitutionalism) and the political – which will be outlined in detail in Chapter Two.  The benefits 
of such an approach are explained in full by Graham Gee and Grégoire Webber.  As they note:74 
[W]e employ models to help make sense of real world constitutions.  The explanatory 
framework supplied by a constitutional model involves an appeal to some idea or group of 
ideas ... it enables us to adopt a critical stance with respect to the subject matter of 
analysis – here, the practices and institutions of a real world constitution.  We are then 
equipped to understand and evaluate this subject matter from the perspective supplied by 
the model.  But note that a constitutional model should never be wholly abstracted from 
that which it seeks to explain.  After all, constitutional theory, properly conceived, ‘does 
not involve an inquiry into ideal forms’ but rather ‘must aim to identify the character of 
actually existing constitutional arrangements.’75   
In adopting this approach, however, it is not the aim of this thesis to produce a simple either/or 
account of the British constitution, but instead to provide the first lengthy demonstration of a new 
middle-ground between the two opposing schools of constitutionalism: complementary 
constitutionalism.  
It is argued that elements of both the legal and the political schools, most notably their respective 
mechanism of accountability, are utilised under real world constitutions, and that the fusion of 
these legal and political elements is not necessarily haphazard or contradictory, but instead 
complementary.  Both legal and political methods of accountability support and sustain each other 
in order to achieve better government accountability than either methods could achieve on their 
own and thus a more balanced constitution.  This is made possible, it is argued, by the fact that 
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both the legal and the political constitutions share many common characteristics and disagree 
with one another primarily, although not exclusively, on emphasis.  No real world constitution, 
therefore,  was, or ever will be, solely legal or solely political in character.  A real world 
constitution is instead a complementary mixture of elements from both the legal and political 
schools which can be either primarily legal or primarily political in character.   
In considering the extent to which the British constitution can still be seen to resemble a political 
constitution, therefore, this thesis is in fact engaging in a quantitative and a qualitative exercise76 
to determine whether, on the whole, the constitution remains primarily, but not exclusively, 
political.  It depends, not only upon whether the constitution relies more upon political as 
opposed to legal methods of accountability, but also upon the effectiveness of such methods and 
the extent to which the legal methods of accountability used complement, rather than contradict, 
the underlying principles of the political school.   
7. Areas of Assessment 
Due to the space constraints of this thesis, it plainly cannot consider every aspect of the British 
constitution.  Instead, three specific areas of the British constitution have been identified for 
evaluation that, although each selected for different reasons, nevertheless collectively provide the 
clearest framework from which the claims of this thesis may be advanced and vindicated.  The 
chosen areas of discussion, considered in Chapters Three, Four, and Five respectively, are as 
follows: the royal prerogative, constitutional conventions, and the Human Rights Act 1998.  Given 
the multi-faceted nature of Britain's uncodified and largely unwritten constitution, it is conceded 
that different areas of the constitution may yield different results from those advanced by this 
thesis.  If, for example, judicial review were selected, one may find the judiciary's gradual 
expansion of judicial review over the last half-century as indicative of a firm shift away from 
political constitutionalism.  It is submitted however, that whilst different examples may produce 
different conclusions, the choice of the above three areas combined warrant the conclusion of 
complementary constitutionalism, and that this conclusion provides highly persuasive authority as 
to the general character of the British constitution. 
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I. The Royal Prerogative 
The royal prerogative is considered as part of this thesis because it constitutes a gap in 
accountability at the very centre of the British constitution that, until very recently, 
constitutionalism has failed to bring under control.  Despite the prerogative constituting an 
essential component of the constitution without which democratic government could neither exist 
nor function, it has historically operated free from effective scrutiny.  The existence of the 
prerogative, therefore, is an affront to both legal and political schools of constitutionalism.  As a 
consequence, the prerogative has increasingly found itself a target for reform.  Political 
constitutionalists wish to bolster Parliament's controls over the prerogative, whilst legal and 
common law constitutionalists, although in support of strengthening political controls, wish also to 
expand judicial controls.  However, despite this renewed interest in bringing the prerogative under 
control, even the most recent attempts at doing so have failed to completely plug the gap in 
accountability.  Through an assessment of both parliamentary and judicial attempts at bringing the 
royal prerogative under control, however, strong evidence of the British constitution's prevailing 
principles may be provided. 
II. Constitutional Conventions 
This thesis will include constitutional conventions – broadly defined as non-legal but nevertheless 
politically-binding rules of conduct – in its analysis for two reasons: firstly, because constitutional 
conventions remain the source of many of the most important rules of the British constitution;77 
secondly, because, despite the fact that constitutional conventions are the paradigmatic means of 
political controls upon government, they have never until now been thoroughly examined through 
the lens of political constitutionalism in academic literature.  This thesis will argue that, because 
their existence precludes the need for judicial controls, conventions acts as a political substitute 
for legally-enforceable rules.  When used in order to regulate the behaviour of democratically 
elected actors, therefore, conventions are of normative value to political constitutionalists 
because they are a means of achieving limited government without judicial interference in the 
political process.  Through an assessment of British conventions in light of their normative value to 
the political constitution, therefore, the constitutional significance of Britain’s heavy reliance upon 
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convention can be properly determined and persuasive conclusions drawn as to what extent the 
British constitution can still be said to remain predominantly political.   
III. The Human Rights Act 1998 
The HRA is included as part of this thesis because it is a deliberate instance of complementary 
constitutionalism which aims to strike a balance between parliamentary sovereignty and the 
judicial protection of rights.  It seeks to achieve this by encouraging Parliament to engage more 
with human rights and play an active role in their protection, thereby fostering a culture of rights 
within Parliament. Section 19, therefore, obliges a minister, when introducing a bill, to issue a 
statement indicating whether or not it is incompatible with the Convention rights, thereby 
encouraging governments to consider compatibility at the pre-legislative stage, as well as 
providing a platform from which Parliament may then scrutinise the government on human rights 
grounds.  In order to assist Parliament in this task, the Joint Committee on Human Rights (JCHR) 
was also created, which, as part of its broad mandate to consider human rights, routinely 
scrutinises Government Bills for compliance with human rights.  In order to provide further 
incentive for political compliance with rights, however, the HRA also empowers the courts to 
review the compatibility of legislation with the Convention rights, albeit in a manner which is not 
supposed to undermine either Parliament's role in the protection of rights, nor its right to the final 
say.  Under ss 3 and 4, therefore, Acts of Parliament are subject to review by the courts on human 
rights grounds but without the power to declare incompatible legislation null and void.  Instead, s 
3 empowers the courts to interpret legislation compatibly with the Convention rights ‘[s]o far as is 
possible to do so.’78  Where a compatible interpretation is not possible, the courts are then 
empowered under s 4 to issue a declaration of incompatibility which ‘does not affect the validity, 
continuing operation or enforcement of the provision in respect of which it is given.’79  
Determining the extent to which these political and legal mechanisms of the HRA have struck a 
complementary balance, therefore, should provide some significant insight into the extent to 
which the British constitution, despite its greater reliance upon legal methods of accountability, 
can still be said to resemble a primarily political one. 
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8. Membership of the European Union 
British membership of the European Union is one of the major constitutional developments over 
the last half a century that appeared to signal the demise of the 'old' political constitution and its 
replacement with a 'new' more legal constitution.  Adam Tomkins even describes it as '[t]he 
biggest challenge to the doctrine of legislative supremacy in recent years.'80  Whether or not 
British membership of the European Union can be reconciled with parliamentary sovereignty, 
therefore, is significant to whether the British constitution can be seen to remain primarily 
political as claimed by this thesis.  Despite this, membership of the European Union and its impact 
on the British constitution has been excluded from the main analysis on the grounds that it is an 
area of legal research which has already been extensively analysed.  Because of its obvious 
importance to this inquiry, however, the main issues will nevertheless be briefly addressed. 
By the time Britain finally became a member of the then European Economic Community (EEC) in 
1972, it was already an accepted fact that Community law should prevail over national law.  As the 
European Court of Justice in Costa v ENEL made clear: 
By creating a Community of unlimited duration, having its own institutions, its own 
personality, its own legal capacity and capacity of representation on the international 
plane, and, more particularly, real powers stemming from a limitation of sovereignty or a 
transfer of powers from the states to the Community, the Member States have limited 
their sovereign rights and have thus created a body of law which binds both their nationals 
and themselves ...  The law stemming from the Treaty, an independent source of law, 
could not because of its special and original nature, be overridden by domestic legal 
provisions, however framed, without being deprived of its character as Community law 
and without the legal basis of the Community itself being called into question. 
The transfer by the states from their domestic legal system to the Community legal system 
of the rights and obligations arising under the Treaty carries with it a permanent limitation 
of their sovereign rights.81 
In order to facilitate Britain's accession to the EEC, Parliament passed the ECA which, under s 2(1), 
gave direct effect to Community law.82  The courts were made chiefly responsible for the 
determination of the meaning and effect of Community law under s 3.83  Section 2(4), however, 
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stated also that 'any enactment passed or to be passed ... shall be construed and have effect 
subject to the foregoing provisions of this section.'  As Helen Fenwick and Gavin Phillipson 
therefore observe, in enacting s 2(4): 
 Parliament seemed to be suggesting that the courts must allow Community law to 
 prevail over subsequent Acts of Parliament.  This was evidently an attempt to suspend 
 the normal doctrine of implied repeal – instead of any later statute which conflicted 
 with EC law impliedly repealing it, such a later statute would have to be either 
 'construed,' that is, interpreted so that it did not conflict with EC law, or if it could not 
 be so interpreted, simply set aside ...  In other words, Parliament was quite clearly 
 seeking to bind its successors.84 
This reading of the ECA was confirmed in the decision of the House of Lords in Factortame (No. 2), 
where, as noted above, it was held that s 2(4) gave Community law precedence over domestic law, 
even in the face of inconsistent parliamentary legislation, irrespective of when it is passed.  As a 
result, judges may now disapply any Act of Parliament they deem to be in conflict with directly 
effective EU law.  Although it had long been held that Parliament was incapable of binding its 
successors,85 Lord Bridge nevertheless justified his reading of s 2(4) on the grounds that 
Parliament had voluntarily limited its own sovereignty.  As his Lordship noted: 
 [W]hatever limitation of its sovereignty Parliament accepted when it enacted the 
 European Communities Act 1972 was entirely voluntary.  Under the terms of the 1972 
 Act it has always been clear that it was the duty of the UK court, when delivering final 
 judgment, to override any rule of national law found to be in conflict with any directly 
 enforceable rule of Community law.86 
Because 'the established rule about conflicting Acts of Parliament, namely that the later Act must 
prevail, was evidently violated,'87 Wade has accordingly characterised the decision in Factortame 
(No. 2), 'at least in a technical sense, as a constitutional revolution.'88   
The extent to which the ECA, as interpreted in Factortame (No. 2), can be seen to signal an 'extra-
legal shift in the constitutional order,'89 however, is debatable.90  Although the supremacy of EU 
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law  may be seen to contradict the underlying values of the political school, it nevertheless 
remains a contradiction endorsed by Parliament.  In disapplying incompatible legislation, 
therefore, the courts are merely enforcing Parliament's will, thereby upholding the doctrine of 
Parliamentary sovereignty.  This argument has resonated amongst some political constitutionalists 
seeking to reconcile the decision in Factortame (No. 2) with the doctrine of parliamentary 
sovereignty.  As Tomkins argues: 
 [T]he conferment on domestic courts in the United Kingdom of a jurisdiction to hear and 
 to decide cases concerning Community Law ... is not a jurisdiction that the courts have 
 conferred on themselves.  Rather, courts in the United Kingdom possess this power for 
 one reason and for one reason only: namely, because parliament legislated it, in section 
 3(1) of the ECA 1972.91   
Building on this, Tomkins makes the argument that, in disapplying an Act of Parliament, a court is 
merely enforcing Community Law in their capacity as an enforcer of Community Law under s 3 
ECA, and not 'in its capacity as a court of English Law.'92  Because the doctrine of parliamentary 
sovereignty 'has never been a doctrine of Community Law, only of English law,'93 parliamentary 
sovereignty is neither a barrier to the disapplication of an Act of Parliament, nor evidence of the 
doctrine's demise.  As Tomkins therefore concludes: 
 [I]t remains the case that under English law nobody has the power to override or to set 
 aside a statute, but it is no longer the case that English law is the only law that is 
 applicable in England.  Since 1 January 1973 there have been two legal systems operating 
 in this country, not one, and the doctrine of the legislative supremacy of statute is a 
 doctrine known only to one of those two systems.  This is not a revolution: it is rather the 
 incorporation of a new legal order into a very old country.94 
If supremacy of EU law within Britain is indeed derived from Parliament and not from Community 
Law itself – a claim later reaffirmed by s 18 of the European Union Act 201195– it appears likely 
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that the courts would follow clear and express words by Parliament indicating a desire for any 
incompatible legislation to prevail over EU law.96  As a result, the supremacy of EU law over 
domestic law, despite any contradiction with the political school, must be taken as yet another 
example of complementary constitutionalism. 
However, although Parliament may theoretically be able to override Community law with express 
words, it has never to date passed legislation with the intention of expressly overriding 
Community Law in favour of national law.  As a result, Community law may be seen to have 
supremacy in practice.  As Fenwick and Phillipson note: 
 [S]ince in practice it is highly improbable that such express words would be used, it 
 appears to be impossible for Parliament to depart from the principle of the primacy of 
 Community law unless it decides to withdraw from the Community.97   
Although the likelihood of Britain leaving the EU may have once appeared remote, recent 
developments within Parliament suggest that a referendum on British membership may be held 
within the next few years.98   This therefore demonstrates that Parliament, even if it has lost the 
final say on matters of Community law, 'still retains its ultimate sovereignty.'99  As Fenwick and 
Phillipson therefore conclude: 
 [W]here Community law conflicts with domestic law, the traditional doctrine of implied 
 repeal will not be applied but, although the doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty has 
 been greatly affected, it is arguable that it would revive in its original form if the UK 
 withdrew from the EU.100 
Even if Britain were to remain a member of the EU, however, Parliament would retain the final say 
on every other matter not related to Community Law.  The judicial enforcement of Community 
Law would also fail to render the use of political methods of accountability within the constitution 
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unnecessary.  Britain can continue to exhibit a preference for political as opposed to legal methods 
of accountability irrespective of judicial supremacy in relation to Community Law.  As a result, the 
British constitution, despite its membership of the EU, could still be said to remain primarily, but 
not exclusively, political in nature. 
9. A Primarily Political Constitution 
Although there has been an increased reliance upon legal methods of control under the British 
constitution, the analysis of the above three areas will demonstrate that the constitution 
nevertheless continues to rely primarily upon political as opposed to legal methods of 
accountability and guarantees of democracy.  It will show also that, even where there has been an 
increased reliance upon legal methods of accountability, such reliance can often be seen to be in 
conformity with the underlying values of the political constitution, and thus evidence of 
complementary constitutionalism.  As a result, this thesis will argue that the British constitution, 
although undisputedly more legal, nevertheless remains primarily political.   
 
 29 
Chapter Two 
COMPLEMENTARY CONSTITUTIONALISM 
1. The Dichotomy of Law and Politics 
Constitutionalism as a concept has been the topic of extensive academic discussion for centuries, 
crossing several academic disciplines.
1
  Although the meaning of the term remains contested,
2
 its 
main aim appears relatively uncontroversial: limited government.  Eric Barendt, for example, notes 
that ‘[a]dherence to the principles of limited constitutional government is often referred to as 
constitutionalism,’
3
 whilst Gordon J. Schochet identifies ‘limited government’ as being one of the 
fundamental principles of constitutionalism,
4
 along with Anthony King.
5
  Unsurprisingly, however, 
the meaning of limited government is itself subject to various interpretations, all of which turn on 
what is meant by the term ‘government.’   In the literal and most narrow sense, government refers 
only to the executive branch.  In the broader meaning of the term, it refers not only to the 
executive branch but also the legislative (if not also the judicial).  As a result, the term limited 
government always means a limited executive, but sometimes also implies a limited lawmaker.  
Regardless of which meaning of government is adopted, however, its power must nevertheless be 
'limited.'  Although the term 'limited' implies that government power must be restricted, it is 
submitted that such a narrow definition fails to capture the broader underlying thrust of limited 
government, namely that government power should not be arbitrary but controlled.  By 
controlling government, one limits government. 
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Many different forms of constitutionalism have accordingly been proposed,6 all of which claim to 
be the best manifestation of the concept both substantially and formally.  The two most 
prominent models of constitutionalism are the legal and the political respectively.  Although the 
legal and the political constitutions can be seen to have much in common as a result of their 
shared belief that government power should be controlled – in particular an acceptance of at least 
a formal reading of the Rule of law7 and the partial separation of powers doctrine8 – the two 
nevertheless differ over the best way in which the institutions of state should be organised in 
order to achieve their shared goal.  The legal constitution holds that government power is 
antecedent to and therefore limited by a justiciable 'higher law' constitution, including entrenched 
rights.  The political constitution, by contrast, holds that, because we all reasonably disagree about 
substantive issues, including questions of rights, democratic participation in politics allows 
government power to be harnessed for 'good' ends, with government power kept in check by 
political rather than legal methods of accountability.   
The dichotomy of law and politics, as discussed in the previous chapter, has come to shape and 
inform much of contemporary public law discourse in Britain.  The debate has thus often taken the 
form of a choice between one of two seemingly irreconcilable positions: government controlled by 
law or government controlled by politics.  It is the aim of this chapter, however, to make the case 
for the existence of a middle-ground between the two opposing schools of constitutionalism: 
complementary constitutionalism.  It is argued that much overlap exists between the legal and the 
political constitutions with the two schools differing from one another primarily, although not 
exclusively, on emphasis.  As a result, a real world constitution can be seen to be a complementary 
mixture of elements from both the legal and political schools which can be either primarily legal or 
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primarily political in character.  The first half of this chapter, therefore, will discuss in greater detail 
the substantive claims of both the legal and the political constitutions.  The second half will then 
make the case for complementary constitutionalism by exploring in detail the overlap which 
occurs in real world constitutions between the legal and the political schools. 
2. The Legal Constitution  
2.1 Higher Law, Human Rights, and Constitutional Review 
The origins of legal constitutionalism can be traced back to seventeenth-century social contract 
theory.  Although contractarianism is subject to much theoretical variation, the core idea, as 
advanced by Thomas Hobbes,9 John Locke,10 and Jean-Jacques Rousseau,11 is that the people, in 
exchange for certain collective benefits, agree to give up some of their power in order to form 
government and ensure public order.12  For John Locke,  obedience by citizens to the laws of a 
state was conditional on the state not interfering with three natural laws or fundamental rights: 
Life, Liberty and Estate.  If the state infringes these rights, the contract is voided and the people 
can then revolt.13  Although these constraints upon the state envisaged by Locke were largely 
moral in character, they were translated by Thomas Paine into the language of law. 
Basing his hypothesis upon the recently enacted constitution of the United States of America – 
one of the first to be produced in light of John Locke’s liberal theory14 – and rejecting the 
descriptive definition of a constitution utilised in late seventeenth-century England, Paine, in his 
book Rights of Man, argued that ‘[i]t is not sufficient that we adopt the word [constitution]; we 
must fix also a standard significance to it.’15  For Paine, this ‘standard significance’ consisted of a 
number of requirements that a constitution must satisfy in order to justify it being called a 
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constitution.16  Crucially, he contended that a ‘constitution of a country is not the act of its 
government, but of a people constituting a government.’17  Paine also proposed that a constitution 
must be prescriptive in nature,18 asserting that, in creating government, a constitution also 
defined its authority, thereby imposing limits upon it.19  In order to fulfil such aims, it was also 
implied that the constitution must be contained within a single written document.20  As Paine 
noted, ‘[a] constitution is not a thing in name only, but in fact.  It has not an ideal, but a real 
existence; and whenever it cannot be produced in a visible form, there is none.’21  As a result, the 
social contract became the written constitution – a high-status contract between the government 
and the governed22 – and natural rights became legal civil rights.23 
The constitution is therefore entrenched 'higher law' that is 'superior to other laws'24 and 
incapable of change other than by constitutional amendment, with constitutional rights acting as 
substantive constraints upon the powers of the legislature and the executive.25  In the centuries 
that followed the Enlightenment, the rights commonly protected by such legal constitutions have 
steadily evolved and expanded and now overlap with human rights, although other rights may also 
be included.  The protection of human rights is now a widely accepted cornerstone of the legal 
constitution, as well as of the substantive theory of the Rule of Law discussed below.  
Fundamental to the identity of both, however, is not merely the inclusion of human rights as part 
of the 'higher law' of the constitution, but their protection and enforcement by an empowered 
judiciary.  Interestingly, however, one of the earliest examples of a legal constitution – the 
Constitution of the United States of America – makes no reference to the judiciary’s power of 
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constitutional review: to declare null and void acts of the executive or the legislature which they 
deem to be inconsistent with the provisions of the constitution.  The power of constitutional 
review was given to the American judiciary by themselves in the case Marbury v Madison.26  In a 
landmark decision, Chief Justice Marshall, relying heavily on the academic works of Alexander 
Hamilton, interpreted Article Six of the Constitution of the United States, which declares the 
constitution to be supreme law, as giving the judiciary a corresponding duty to uphold the 
supreme laws of the constitution and hence a power to annul laws inconsistent with it.27  Since 
then, the need for an empowered judiciary has become one of the most significant mechanisms 
for the protection of fundamental rights around the world,28 especially after the Second World 
War.29 
As a result, therefore, it is submitted that legal constitutionalism can be seen to advance three 
claims.  Firstly, that the constitution is entrenched 'higher law' that is antecedent to government 
and which imposes formal and substantive limits upon its power. 30   Secondly, that the substantive 
constraints upon government power should take the form primarily, but not exclusively, of human 
rights guarantees.31  Thirdly, that the court must have the power to review the constitutionality of 
both executive and legislative acts.32  Although constitutional review will normally necessitate a 
power of judicial strike down in order to make its enforcement of the constitution effective, it 
must be noted that some legal constitutionalists have accepted a compromise in the form of a 
dialogical Bill of Rights as discussed in Chapter Five.  A written codified constitution, although 
generally accepted, is not strictly necessary for a legal constitution.  As will be shown below, a 
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common law constitution could theoretically satisfy all three requirements without resort to a 
written codified constitution. 
2.2 Common Law Constitutionalism 
Developed over a number of years by Trevor Allan, Paul Craig, Sir John Laws, Dawn Oliver, and 
Jeffrey Jowell, common law constitutionalism is a British variant of the legal constitution.  It views 
the common law as both the 'foundation-stone and lodestar of the political community: that is, it 
both constitutes the political community and contains the fundamental principles that ought to 
guide its political and legal decision-making.'33  The motivation behind this is to make the British 
constitution compliant with not merely a formal reading of the Rule of Law, but a substantive one 
also.34  As Craig notes, the substantive theory of the Rule of Law: 
 [A]ssumes that citizens have moral rights and duties with respect to one another, and 
 political rights against the state as a whole.  It insists that these moral and political rights 
 be recognized in positive law, so that they may be enforced upon the demand of 
 individual citizens through courts or other judicial institutions of the familiar type, so far  as 
 this is practicable.  The rule of law on this conception is the ideal of rule by an accurate 
 public conception of individual rights.  It does not distinguish ... between the rule of law 
 and substantive justice; on the contrary it requires, as part of the ideal of law, that the 
 rules in the book capture and enforce moral rights.35  
As Thomas Poole argues, the common law constitution can therefore be seen to be underpinned 
by what he dubs ‘essentialist philosophy;’36 the protection of rights that are, as Oliver notes, 
‘fundamental to the human condition.’37  Although common law constitutionalists differ as to 
what these fundamental rights are, they all identify essentially liberal values.  Laws, for example, 
argues that '[t]he true starting point in the quest for the good constitution consists in ... the 
autonomy of every individual, in his sovereignty,'38 which, he notes, 'cannot be defined in terms of 
rights, though it gives rise to them.'39  Oliver identifies autonomy as one of the five fundamental 
'common values' alongside dignity, respect, status and security,40 whilst Allan recognises the 
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'traditions of liberty and tolerance.'41  In any event, such rights, Laws argues, are 'logically prior to 
the institution of democratic government.'42  Parliament, however, cannot be trusted to uphold 
the rights which underpin its legitimacy.  As Allan argues, '[i]mportant freedoms are at the mercy 
of a temporary majority of the House of Commons, generally manipulated by the executive 
government which cannot even claim the support of a clear majority of the electorate.’
43
  The 
courts, as a result of the fact that they ‘have no programme, no mandate, no popular vote,’
 44
 are 
therefore better suited to upholding the fundamental rights of the constitution, and should be 
able to do so even in the face of legislative intention to the contrary.45  In Britain, however, the 
substantive reading of the Rule of Law and its accompanying rights cannot find the legal force 
necessary to do this from a written 'higher law' constitution.  Common law constitutionalists, 
therefore, look to the common law.  As Allan explains: 
In the absence of a higher ‘constitutional’ law, proclaimed in a written constitution and 
venerated as a source of unique legal authority, the rule of law serves in Britain as a form 
of constitution.  It is in this fundamental sense that Britain has a common law constitution: 
the ideas and values of which the rule of law consists are reflected and embedded in the 
ordinary common law.46 
The effect of the Rule of Law, therefore, is to transform the common law into a de facto higher law 
for Britain, thereby providing the basis from which the courts may legitimately enforce 
fundamental human rights against both the executive and Parliament.  As Poole observes, 
common law constitutionalists can be seen to advance three arguments in support of their claim 
that the common law is the constitution.  The first argument is that the common law 'necessarily 
connects with basic moral principles in a  way that is not true of statute.'47  This is because the 
courts are under a duty to give precedence to autonomy in order to establish the moral 
                                                     
41
 Allan, T.R.S. Constitutional Justice: A Liberal Theory of the Rule of Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2005), 19.  See also at 18. 
42
 Laws, n 38, 629.  See also Jowell, J. ‘Beyond the rule of law: towards constitutional judicial review’ (2000) 
PL 671, 675: '[W]e have ... seen that our courts have begun to shift the boundaries of administrative law into 
the constitutional realm by explicitly endorsing a higher order of rights inherent in our constitutional 
democracy.  These rights emanate not from any implied Parliamentary intent but from the framework of 
modern democracy within which Parliament legislates.' 
43
 Allan, T.R.S. ‘Legislative Supremacy and the Rule of Law: Democracy and Constitutionalism’ (1986) 44 CLJ 
111, 116.  
44
 Sir John Laws ‘Wednesbury’ in Forsyth, C. and Hare, I. (eds) The Golden Metwand and the Crooked Cord: 
Essays on Public Law on Honour of Sir William Wade (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1998), 190. 
45
 See Allan, T.R.S. Law, Liberty and Justice: The Legal Foundations of British Constitutionalism (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1993), 282. 
46
 Ibid, 4. 
47
 Poole, n 33. 
 36 
foundation needed to justify their use of power without electoral support,48 whilst political 
institutions like the legislature by contrast  'cannot be trusted to consistently respect autonomy 
since it is their function to  decide upon and implement policies which further particular ends.'49  
The second argument is that common law, when compared with the majoritarian nature of 
parliamentary politics noted above, 'represents a superior site for public reason on account of the 
necessarily rational and individual-respecting nature of its decision-making processes.'50  The third 
argument is that common law is 'unique in that it embodies a matrix of principles which, on 
account of their evolutionary nature, necessarily connect with society's deep-rooted 
moral/political principles.'51  As Poole elaborates: 
 The argument emphasizes ... the continuity of the common law as a opposed to the 
 transience of legislation ...  [C]ommon law constitutionalists attempt to use history to 
 demonstrate how judge-made law, by virtue of its evolutionary and rational method, is 
 capable of acting as the guarantor of liberty in a way that cannot be true of legislation, 
 vulnerable as it is to the whim of those who happen to wield power.52 
As a result, the notion of a common law constitution, although still an untested theory, 
nevertheless demonstrates that the three principal characteristics of a legal constitution identified 
above – higher law, human rights, and constitutional review – are not necessarily dependent upon 
the existence of a written 'higher law' constitution.  A legal constitution, therefore, may be either 
formal or informal.  Consequently, any distinction between the legal constitution and the political 
constitution must be drawn in relation, not to their formal requirements, but to their substantive 
ones. 
3. The Political Constitution 
3.1 J.A.G. Griffith 
The pioneer behind the development of this peculiarly British theory of constitutionalism was 
J.A.G. Griffith.  In an attempt to counteract calls for the legal reform of the constitution prevalent 
in the 1970s, Griffith expounded what he saw as the virtues of the British constitution, thereby 
providing the first real blueprint of what he called the political constitution.53  He argued that 
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there were two fundamental objections to the reform of the British constitution: the political and 
the philosophical.54  For the former, Griffith made the following famous declaration: 
The fundamental political objection is this: that law is not and cannot be a substitute for 
politics.  This is a hard truth, perhaps an unpleasant truth.  For centuries political 
philosophers have sought that society in which government is by laws and not by men.  It 
is an unattainable ideal.  Written constitutions do not achieve it.  Nor do Bills of Rights or 
any other devices.  They merely pass political decisions out of the hands of politicians and 
into the hands of judges or other persons.  To require a supreme court to make certain 
kinds of political decisions does not make those decisions any less political.55 
Griffith was a moral relativist who argued, not only that people disagree over substantive 
questions of principle,56 but that no moral value could ever be objectively proven to be better than 
any other and thus more deserving of legal protection and enforcement by the courts.  He rejected 
the idea of the law as an inherently moral concept,57 and thus the notion of universal human 
rights58 – his philosophical objection to reform of the British constitution59 – characterising them 
instead as 'political claims.'60  As he noted: 
 [A]rguments advanced avowedly for the protection of human rights are often concealed 
 political propaganda.  Those for a written constitution, a Bill of Rights, a supreme court, 
 and the rest are attempts to resolve political conflicts in our society a particular way, to 
 minimise change, to maintain (so far as possible) the existing distribution of political and 
 economic power ... 
 It seems to me that to call political claims "inherent rights" is to mythologise and 
 confuse the matter.  The struggle is political throughout and moral only in the purely 
 subjective sense that I may think I ought to be granted what I claim.  Those in authority 
 may think I ought not to be granted my claim.  And there is no logic which says that their 
 view is more based on their self-advancement (rather than, say, the public good) than 
 mine is.61 
Because the law is made by those in authority – 'men and women who happen to exercise political 
power but without any right to that power which could give them a superior moral position'62 – 
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they accordingly 'impose no moral obligation of obedience on others.'63  Laws, Griffith argues, 'are 
merely statements of a power relationship and nothing more.'64  As a result, Griffith argued that 
the acceptance or rejection of 'political claims' was better left to politicians rather than judges 
because politicians 'are so much more vulnerable than judges and can be dismissed or at least 
made to suffer in their reputation.’65  In so doing, Griffith expressed his doubts over the 
effectiveness of judicially-enforced constitutions and Bills of Rights at curtailing authoritarianism, 
arguing that 'the responsibility and accountability of our rulers should be real and not fictitious.'66 
In the decades since Griffith's initial defence of the political constitution, the legacy of his work has 
been the subject of renewed academic debate,67 with several writers, most notably Adam Tomkins 
and Richard Bellamy, having taken up his mantle.  Whereas Griffith's account of Britain's political 
constitution is largely descriptive in nature – ‘the constitution is no more and no less than what 
happens’68 – both Tomkins and Bellamy's account of the political constitution is rooted firmly in 
the traditions of civic republicanism and the idea of 'freedom as non-domination.'  
3.2 Civic Republicanism and Freedom as Non-domination 
Civic Republicanism is a school of thought which believes that the common good of citizens is best 
realised through democratic self-government, civic virtue, deliberation, and popular participation 
in politics.69  At the heart of civic republicanism is the idea of 'freedom as non-domination.'  The 
architect of this distinctively republican-brand of freedom was Philip Pettit,70 who contrasts it with 
the liberal view of 'freedom as non-interference,' which he describes as 'the negative conception 
of freedom as the absence of interference ... the assumption that there is nothing inherently 
oppressive about some people having dominating power over others, provided they do not 
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exercise that power and are not likely to exercise it.'71  Pettit argues that, when one considers the 
plights of those individuals in society who live subject to another's will, it becomes clear that: 
 [U]nder an older, republican way of thinking about freedom, individuals in such a 
 dominated position are straightforwardly unfree.  No domination without unfreedom, 
 even if the dominating agent stays their hand.  Being unfree does not consist in being 
 constrained; on the contrary, the restraint of a fair system of law – a non-arbitrary 
 regime – does not make you unfree.  Being unfree consists rather in being subject to 
 arbitrary sway; being subject to the potentially capricious will or the potentially 
 idiosyncratic judgment of another.  Freedom involves emancipation from any such 
 subordination, liberation from any such dependency.  It requires the capacity to stand 
 eye to eye with your fellow citizens, in a shared awareness that none of you have a 
 power of arbitrary interference over another.72  
Fundamental to this, Pettit claims, is 'a conception of democracy under which contestability takes 
the place of consent; what is of primary importance is not that government does what the people 
tell it but, on pain of arbitrariness, that people can always contest whatever it is that government 
does.'73  Although emphasising the importance of democratic mechanisms of accountability in 
securing 'freedom as non-domination,'74 Pettit nevertheless argues that such mechanisms are not 
on their own sufficient.  They must be accompanied also by constitutional constraints in the form 
of rights-based constitutional review.75 
As will be seen below, although both Adam Tomkins and Richard Bellamy frame their normative 
readings of the political constitution in terms of republicanism – especially Pettit's notion of 
'freedom as non-domination' – each nevertheless does so differently, although not incompatibly, 
to one another, and both in a way which departs from Pettit's original thesis. 
3.3 Adam Tomkins 
Adam Tomkins' account of the political constitution echoes clearly Griffith's belief that Parliament 
is the preferred forum for the contestability of political claims by virtue of the fact that politicians 
are more accountable than judges for their actions.  In the opening remarks of his 2005 book 
entitled Our Republican Constitution, Adam Tomkins boldly proclaims the British constitution to be 
'a remarkable creation' and that '[i]t is no exaggeration to say that there is nothing quite like it 
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anywhere else in the world.'76  The constitution is unique and remarkable, he claims, because '[i]t 
uses politics as the vehicle through which the purpose of the constitution (that is, to check the 
government) may be accomplished.'77  As he notes: 
 At its core [the British constitution] lies a simple – and beautiful – rule.  It is a rule that 
 has formed the foundation of the constitution since the seventeenth century.  It is 
 that the government of the day  may continue in office for only as long as it continues to 
 enjoy the majority support of the House of Commons.  The moment such support is 
 withdrawn is the very moment that the government is required to resign.  By this one 
 rule is democracy in Britain secured ...  The rule is known as the convention of ministerial 
 responsibility or as the doctrine  of responsible government ...  [I]t stipulates that the 
 government is constitutionally responsible to Parliament.78 
The majority of western society's constitutions , Tomkins claims, 'are not founded on the ideal of 
making government responsible to a political institution such as Parliament,'79 but instead rely 
upon judges 'to provide the lead role in securing checks on government.'80  Unlike Pettit, 
therefore, Tomkins objects to the courts being used in order to hold the government to account 
on the grounds that it 'endangers both democracy and effectiveness.'81  It is undemocratic 
because participation and access to the courts is expensive and limited, and because judges, being 
both unelected and unrepresentative, are not as accountable for their actions as democratically-
elected parliamentarians.82  Legal accountability is also ineffective, he argues, because the judicial 
forum – the court – is limited by comparison to Parliament.  According to Tomkins, Parliament 
'may legislate on any issue, for any reason and at any time.'83  Judges, by contrast, have no say in 
what cases they decide.  The role of the judge is to hear the two sides of a dispute and then to 
'adjudicate between the arguments of the two parties and to give a judgment that will, ultimately, 
hold either that the claimant's case is made out or that it is not.'84  Judges accordingly 'have 
limited room for manoeuvre in terms of the arguments on which their judgments are based.  
Judges are generally required to decide cases on the basis only of the submissions made to them 
by counsel,'85 thereby allowing 'precious little room for compromise or negotiated settlement.'86  
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Tomkins points also to what he sees as the poor judicial record at holding the government to 
account as evidence of their further ineffectiveness.87  
In relaying his account of the political constitution, however, Tomkins distances himself from 
Griffith's descriptive account by making it normative.  The adoption of a legal constitution in 
Britain would not only be unwise, undemocratic, and politically undesirable, he argues, but also 
unconstitutional.88  This is the case, so he claims, because the political constitution is founded 
upon republican values,89 in particular Pettit's understanding of 'freedom as non-domination' 
outlined above.90  As Tomkins notes: 
 The point of our freedom is not that it should never be interfered with but that, when it  is 
 interfered with, the interference comes from a source whose authority over us is 
 legitimate rather than illegitimate.  Legitimate authority, for a republican, is authority 
 without domination.  This means authority that is neither arbitrary nor capricious, but 
 which is reasoned and is contestable at the instigation of those who are subject to it.91 
In order to protect the people from being arbitrarily interfered with by the government, therefore, 
Tomkins looks to democracy and political accountability as found under the British constitution.  
As he notes: 
 In the British system, we (Pettit's 'ordinary people') contest government policies and 
 decisions by insisting that the government of the day is fully and openly accountable to 
 our elected representatives in Parliament.  As contestability may be grounded in a 
 republican theory of freedom so too, in turn, may political accountability be grounded in 
 a normative account of constitutionalism.  In this way, responsible government ceases  to 
 be merely a descriptive practice and becomes instead an essential component in a 
 constitutional structure designed to secure our non-domination ...  It is through 
 republican political philosophy that we can obtain a normative foundation for our 
 practices of responsible government and political accountability.92 
For Tomkins, therefore, '[a] political constitution is one in which those who exercise political 
power (let us say the government) are held to constitutional account through political means, and 
through political institutions (for example, Parliament).’93  Consequently, Tomkins' political 
constitution can be seen to share Griffith's preference for politicians instead of judges on the 
grounds of accountability.  By couching the political constitution in the republican idea of 'freedom 
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as non-domination,' however, Tomkins is nevertheless able to distinguish his account from 
Griffith's by giving his preference for political accountability normative force. 
3.4 Richard Bellamy 
Echoing Tomkins' departure from Pettit's original thesis, Bellamy's conception of the political 
constitution is also structured in opposition to what he views as the hallmark of the legal 
constitution: the legal entrenchment of human rights within a justiciable 'higher law' 
constitution.94  Legal constitutionalists protect rights this way, he claims, because they are 
perceived to be 'central to a democratic society.'95  Such constitutionalists are therefore motivated 
by two related claims which Bellamy rejects: 
 The first is that we can come to a rational consensus on the substantive outcomes that a 
 society committed to the democratic ideals of equality of concern and respect should 
 achieve.  These outcomes are best expressed in terms of human rights and should form 
 the fundamental law of a democratic society.  The second is that the judicial process is 
 more reliable than the democratic process at identifying these outcomes.96 
Echoing Griffith, Bellamy dismisses the first claim on the grounds that 'we reasonably disagree 
about the substantive outcomes that a society committed to the democratic ideals of equality of 
concern and respect should achieve.'97  Bellamy is keen to stress that '[t]he fact of disagreement 
does not indicate that no theories of justice are true.  Nor does it mean that a democratic society 
does not involve a commitment to rights and equality.'98  However, such disagreement, he claims, 
nevertheless demonstrates that 'there are limitations to our ability to identify a true theory of 
rights and equality and to convince others of its truth.'99  Even where broad agreement exists, he 
argues, such a compact is nevertheless void of universal acceptance.100  In Bellamy's view, 
therefore, not everyone can agree on what set of substantive outcomes a democratic society 
committed to the democratic ideals of equality of concern and respect should achieve.  No 
substantive values whatsoever, therefore, should be granted supremacy over ordinary legislation. 
The second claim is rejected on the grounds that, if we all reasonably disagree on the substantive 
outcomes of a democratic society, 'it becomes implausible to regard judges as basing their 
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decisions on the 'correct' view of what a democratic society demands in particular 
circumstances.'101  As a result, the judicial enforcement of such substantive outcomes, Bellamy 
argues, does not guarantee Pettit's republican understanding of 'freedom as non-domination,' but 
instead undermines it.  As Bellamy notes: 
 Domination arises not only from a person or group possessing superior power of various 
 kinds, and hence the potential to interfere, but also from social, legal and political 
 hierarchies of formal and informal kinds – which may not be linked to greater resources 
 and power, though they usually are – through which certain individuals acquire the 
 assumed or actual right to lord over it over others.  In either case, it operates less 
 through actual interference than deference and the acceptance by the dominated of the 
 dominator's entitlement to impose duties upon them.  Thus, non-domination issues 
 from a condition of political and legal equality in which such deference no longer 
 obtains. 
 To the extent government action emanates from arrangements that are consistent with 
 this condition of equality, it will not dominate.102 
Legal constitutionalism, therefore, is unable to satisfy the 'intrinsic political egalitarianism of 
freedom as non-domination,'103 Bellamy claims, because judges are given leave to impose their 
particular view of rights on everyone else.  As he notes: 
 Given their freedom to interpret the law in diverse and inconsistent ways, according to 
 the moral and legal positions they hold, with no more authority than any other legal 
 interpreter apart from the mere fact that they are in a position to impose their opinion, 
 their rule cannot be other than arbitrary and hence dominating.104 
The public can only ever 'be regarded as equals and their multifarious rights and interests 
accorded equal concern and respect,'105 Bellamy argues, 'when the public themselves reason 
within the democratic process.'106  Through such democratic participation and deliberation, 
people's disagreements are not only acknowledged, but also resolved without resulting in 
domination.   As Bellamy notes, 'the test of a political process is not so much that it generates 
outcomes we agree with as that it produces outcomes that all can agree to, on the grounds they 
are legitimate.'107  Bellamy accordingly proposes three ways by which this is achieved.108  The first 
is the system of 'one person, one vote,' that, unlike the enforcement of 'higher law' by judges, 
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'provides citizens with roughly equal political resources,'109 because '[i]t allows everyone to be 
counted equally and to accept the legitimacy of the view that prevails – even if they disagree with 
it.'110  The second is decisions by majority rule that Bellamy asserts is the fairest method by which 
to resolve disputes between equally valid opinions.111  Although a democratically-elected 
legislature acknowledges the disagreement surrounding many different issues held by the people 
in the form of elected representatives, such disagreements are unlikely to produce unanimous 
agreement on any and all issues brought before the legislature.  Therefore, ‘the need for majority 
decision-making arises because everybody believes they hold trumps, so that nobody does … 
[M]ajority rule is the closure device for reaching a decision when all trumps have been played.’112  
The third is the 'balance of power' principle, that consists of ‘either rival aspirants for power, as in 
competing [political] parties, or rival centres of power, as in competing governments in certain 
aspects of federal arrangements.’113  Bellamy contends that the rivalry of such competing parties 
promotes mutual recognition through the construction of compromises.114  As a result of such 
compromises, legislation can be said to reflect the wishes and concerns of more than just the 
supporters of the governing party.  As Bellamy asserts, the division of power between rival centres 
of power forces such centres to ‘recruit the support of the majority of people to govern,’115 
ensuring that all sides are heard,116 and thus preventing tyrannical majority rule.  
Whereas Griffith's and Tomkins' account of the political constitution can therefore be seen to 
emphasise its ability to prevent the abuse of power through political means of accountability, 
Richard Bellamy's account, though not precluding the possibility of this negative check on power, 
instead focuses on the political constitution's ability, through democracy, to harness power in 
order to achieve goals desired by the masses.117  In this sense, as Bellamy himself asserts, ‘the 
democratic process is the constitution.’118 
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3.5 Disagreement, Participation, and Accountability  
From the above, the political constitution – as conceived by Griffith, Tomkins, and Bellamy – can 
be seen to make three closely-related claims. 
The first claim is that people disagree over what the substantive outcomes of a democratic society 
should be.  As a consequence of this, political constitutionalists dispute the existence of rights that 
are necessarily antecedent to democracy and thus deserving of legal entrenchment as part of a 
'higher law.'  Unlike with the legal constitution, therefore, the political constitution does not 
permit the constitutional review of legislation.  The second claim is that democratic participation 
in politics forms the basis of legitimate government because it best satisfies the egalitarian 
requirements of 'freedom as non-domination.'  The implication of these two claims combined, it is 
submitted, is the doctrine or legislative supremacy or, as it is known under the British constitution, 
parliamentary sovereignty.  If democratic participation in politics forms the basis of legitimate 
government, and in the absence of a 'higher law' from which the courts may review the 
constitutionality of legislative decisions, it stands to reason, therefore, that the legislature under 
the political constitution retains the final say on any and all matters.  The third is that political 
accountability is more effective than the courts at preventing authoritarianism because politicians, 
unlike judges, can be removed by the electorate at the ballot box, and because the survival of the 
government is dependent upon the support of Parliament.  As a result, the political constitution 
can be said to have a clear preference for political mechanisms of control over legal ones.119 
The next part of the chapter will discuss in detail the extent to which both the legal and the 
political constitutions can actually be seen to differ from one another.  As part of this analysis, it 
will be shown that although the two constitutions can be seen to sharply disagree on some issues, 
they nevertheless share many characteristics, often differing only on the question of degree or 
emphasis.  It will therefore be argued that no constitution is only legal or political in character but 
is instead a mixture of the two that is either primarily legal or primarily political.  In so doing, a 
new reconciliatory theory of constitutionalism will be advanced called 'complementary 
constitutionalism.'120  It will be shown that much of the overlap between the elements of each 
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constitutional model within a real world constitution can be seen to complement rather than 
contradict the underlying values of the constitutional model which has primacy. 
4. Complementary Constitutionalism 
4.1 The Mixed Constitution 
Because of the conceptual differences between them, both the legal and the political constitutions 
are frequently presented as polar opposites which are difficult to reconcile.  No one is more guilty 
of this than the architects and advocates of both the legal or the political constitutions who, in 
defence of their viewpoint, have tended to present 'a stark choice between either a legal 
constitution or a political constitution – but not both,’ 121 thereby presenting the debate on 
constitutionalism in an ‘all-encompassing’ manner.122  Despite this, however, there is increasing 
recognition by academic commentators that a constitution can be, and more often than not is, a 
mixture of both constitutions.  Graham Gee and Grégoire Webber, for example, have noted that 
'Britain's constitution today embraces, perhaps in uncertain ways and to an uncertain extent, both 
a political model and a legal model.'123  Trevor Allan and Tom Hickman have expressed a clear 
desire to reconcile the differences between the two schools,124 whilst Adam Tomkins and Richard 
Bellamy have conceded that elements of both the legal and the political schools do exist under the 
same constitution.125 
Recognition aside, however, very few commentators have sought to offer a full account of the 
'mixed constitution.'  Admittedly, given the fact that many accounts of either the legal or the 
political constitution are normative and therefore seek, not to offer an account of the constitution 
as it is, but instead of what the constitution should be, their reluctance to articulate a full account 
of the 'mixed constitution' comes as no surprise.  Such accounts are by their very nature more 
'idealized and stylized' than they are realistic.126  Tomkins' and Bellamy's arguments in favour of 
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political forms of accountability in particular ignore almost completely the fact that it is often a 
single-party government with a majority in the House of Commons that controls Parliament and 
not the reverse.127  Even where a partial account is offered, it is submitted that they are likely to 
provide an unreliable picture of Britain's mixed constitution.  This is because, as Gee and Webber 
note, 'when trying to make sense of a real world constitution's dual embrace of  both the political 
and the legal models, political and legal constitutionalists alike will tend to supply an account of 
the constitution that is itself shaped, more or less explicitly, in the image of their favoured 
model.'128  As a result, 'one of these two models will tend to supply a dominant frame within which 
to accommodate elements drawn from the other,'129 thus making it 'difficult to offer an account 
which is thoroughly faithful to the basic claims of – or possibly even the animating spirit of - both 
constitutional models.'130 
To illustrate this point, Gee and Webber rely upon Tom Hickman's account of 'the legal 
constitution plus political constitution, rather than the legal constitution versus political 
constitution.'131  If we are to view the legal and political constitutions 'not as competitors but as 
partners,' Hickman claims, '[w]e need to understand modern public law in terms of a harmonious 
and mutually reinforcing matrix of interacting, and frequently overlapping, remedial channels that 
together facilitate and control governance of the state.'132  Consequently, Hickman concedes that 
not all decisions are best left to judges, 133 and that the courts should not be the 'first remedial 
port of call.'134  Despite this concession, however, Hickman maintains that the legal school 
necessarily strengthens political accountability,135 and that, despite the role played by political 
accountability within the constitution, '[m]ore often than might be expected, it is judicial 
precedents, and particularly recent ones, that hold the solutions to matters of contemporary 
dispute.'136  As a result, he makes the argument that 'the constitution must guarantee that 
everyone and every office is ultimately subject to the rule of law ... We must have a legal 
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constitution, but it must be a balanced one.'137  In response to criticisms of legal constitutionalism 
by political constitutionalists, Hickman thus argues that 'there is widespread agreement that 
subjection to law is one of the most basic principles of modern constitutionalism ... The objection 
to liberal legalism,' he claims, 'is therefore not its major premises and foundational principles , as 
such, but to the fact that law's empire, and liberalism, must be constrained and that, in certain 
forms, liberalism presents a partial picture of the constitutional order.'138  In his account of 
Britain's mixed constitution, therefore, Hickman can be seen to depict the constitution as a 
fundamentally legal one which, in recognising a role for politics within it, denounces the political 
constitution as a freestanding model of constitutionalism.  As he notes: 
 In my view, the English constitution should not be conceived as founded upon political 
 discretion or upon the remnants of a bygone monarchical age.  It should be understood as 
 founded upon law that is enforceable in the courts.  In this sense, therefore, I argue 
 against a political constitution.  However, this is not to say that we should wipe out those 
 political checks and balances that operate to restrain political discretion.  Far from it: 
 understood as a complex and vitally important set of structures of political accountability 
 (such as the various ombudsmen, inspectorates, complaints procedures, auditors, and 
 channels of ministerial responsibility, as well as many more), the political constitution is 
 simply brought within a frame of law.139 
In adopting such a narrow view of the political constitution, Hickman ultimately fails to reconcile 
the legal and the political constitutions in a balanced and realistic manner, thereby producing a 
one-sided account of Britain's mixed constitution.  As Gee and Webber conclude, Hickman: 
 [E]xplicitly rejects the possibility that the model of a political constitution might serve as 
 an important explanatory model in clarifying either the theoretical foundations of Britain's 
 constitution or the character of its prevailing institutions – and, in this, Hickman's account 
 comes close to making the sort of all-encompassing claims that he purports to eschew.140  
It is submitted that this difficulty in formulating an account of Britain's mixed constitution which is 
free from normative influence can be seen also with Tomkins' brief account of Britain's mixed 
constitution published in the German Law Journal.  Here, Tomkins adopts an argument supported 
by this thesis; namely that Britain remains predominantly political in nature.  As he notes: 
 Ours is no longer an entirely political constitution – the model of the political constitution 
 taken alone no longer makes full sense of our contemporary constitutional experience – 
                                                     
137
 Ibid, 1017. 
138
 Ibid, 1016. 
139
 Ibid, 987. 
140
 Gee and Webber, n 117, 24. 
 49 
 but the political constitution remains vibrant and vital as a core component of our 
 increasingly rich constitutional order.141 
In conceding that the constitution is indeed a mixture of both legal and political elements, 
however, Tomkins also notes that: 
 To say that the British – or, for that matter, any other – constitution is a mixed 
 constitution, that brings together and relies on elements of both politics and law, does not 
 take us very far ... It matters less that the constitution is mixed than what the balance of 
 the mix is, and should be.142  
As result, Tomkins argues that 'the political and the legal constitution can and should be mixed ... 
so long as it continues to value and to invest in the constitutional goods that the political model of 
constitutionalism as rightly taught us to cherish.'143  Building on his previous work,144 Tomkins 
therefore  articulates a constitutional role for the courts which, in his view, protects civil liberties 
whilst preserving the political constitution.  In so doing, he makes the following claims: 
(i) The courts should ensure that the government acts within the scope of, and not 
beyond, its legal power; 
(ii) The courts should ensure that the government's decision-making is procedurally 
fair; 
(iii) The protection of civil liberties should be privileged, so that the courts should 
ensure that government interference with civil liberties may occur only when 
justified as being necessary on the basis of evidence; 
(iv) Some protections of civil liberties are so important that they may be articulated in 
the form of absolute rights – such as the rule that no-one ma be subjected to 
torture; such rights should be rigorously enforced by the courts; and 
(v) The courts should have a role in nourishing and supporting the political 
constitution; when the government acts in a manner that undercuts or 
circumvents effective parliamentary scrutiny, the courts should refer the matter 
back to Parliament for reconsideration of the matter ... 
 (vi) that where the protection of civil liberties ... [is] ... qualified rather than absolute, the 
 task of  balancing the needs of the public interest against the civil liberty in question ... [is] 
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 ... appropriately seen as a political question for Parliament rather than as a legal question 
 for the courts. 145 
In articulating this vision, Tomkins clearly seeks to curtail the potential for judicial creativity in the 
legal protection of rights.  Ensuring that government acts in accordance with the law as stipulated 
by statute is, as argued below, an important function of the courts under both legal and political  
schools which controls government power in conformity with a formal reading of the Rule of Law.    
Although ensuring that the government's decisions are both procedurally fair and supported by 
evidence are similarly important in controlling the executive, and are not necessarily catered for 
by the enabling legislation at issue, they nevertheless envisage only a narrow process-oriented146  
and fact-finding147 role for the courts.  They are, as Tomkins argues, functions which the courts 
'ought to be good at, given their training, their professional experience, and the modes and forms 
of argument with which they are most familiar.'148  In order to provide greater protection to rights 
without inviting the courts to engage with what Tomkins views as political, not legal, questions, 
therefore, he argues that only narrowly-defined absolute rights should be enforced by the courts, 
with decisions regarding government interference with qualified rights best left to Parliament.  As 
a result, Tomkins believes that proportionality is a matter best left to Parliament.  In determining 
whether an infringement with a qualified rights is proportionate or not, the courts, Tomkins 
argues, should take into account a range of 'constitutional goods' in addition to rational 
government – that the government should be allowed to govern; accountability; and that the 
government is democratically chosen.149  As Tomkins argues: 
 When it comes to review on grounds of reasonableness or proportionality, we need a 
 judicial review that is appropriately responsive to, and respectful of, these other 
 constitutional goods and accords them due weight.  A reasonable and proportionate 
 government is itself a constitutional good, but judicial review which that over-invests in 
 this one constitutional good at the expense of the others would make for an unbalanced 
 constitutional order.  Likewise, over-investment in any of the other constitutional goods at 
 the expense of securing reasonable and proportionate government would be 
 unbalanced.150 
Despite Tomkins claim to the contrary, however, the fact that rational government is 
outnumbered three to one by constitutional goods which appear to invite judicial deference 
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makes it unlikely, it is submitted, that a court would ever rule against the government under 
Tomkins' model.  Tomkins, in clarifying that the role of the courts should not be 'ruling on whether 
the government has sufficient democratic mandate for its actions, or whether scrutiny is 
sufficiently effective, but that the courts should be taking these matters into account,'151 it is 
submitted, reinforces this perception as it appears to suggest that the courts can only presume 
that the government has a democratic mandate and that parliamentary scrutiny has been 
effective.  Tomkins' unwillingness to permit the courts to show any initiative in the protection of 
rights is most visible, however, by his submission that the courts, when they are unsure of the 
scope or meaning of government power152 or think the government has circumvented 
parliamentary scrutiny,153 should refer the matter back to Parliament.          
Hickman and Tomkins, therefore, can be see to offer two very different visions of the mixed 
constitution, both of which present one school of constitutionalism as dominant over the other 
and, as a result, heavily skew  the elements of the other school in favour of the dominant.  As a 
legal and a political constitutionalist respectively, both Hickman and Tomkins produce accounts of 
the mixed constitution that privilege their preferred schools, thereby failing to fully recognise the 
claims of their rivals.  They instead treat their rival school with a degree of disdain as something 
secondary and perhaps even unnecessary to the fulfilment of constitutionalism.  Elements from of 
it may be accommodated within their account of the constitution, but not at the expense of their 
preferred school.  Consequently, they accord such elements only a limited role within the 
constitution which ultimately subjugates them to their model of choice at the expense of both 
their utility and normative underpinnings.  This is especially the case with Tomkins, who, in 
conceding that Britain possesses a 'mixed' constitution, nevertheless believes that Britain was, 
until relatively recently, only a political constitution.154  Both Hickman and Tomkins make 
normative presumptions about the foundational values of the British constitution and thus 
present their respective accounts of the mixed constitution as the only viable reconciliation of the 
legal and the political schools possible.  The result is not merely an incomplete view of Britain's 
mixed constitution, but a wholly inaccurate one which is more normative than analytical. 
In response to the inability of both legal and political constitutionalists to articulate a vision of 
Britain's mixed constitution which is faithful to the normative claims of both models, Gee and 
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Webber reject the idea that the complex reality of a constitution's relationship between its legal 
and political elements can be successfully encompassed within a single all-embracing 
constitutional model.  Instead, they argue that ‘it can be true both that a real world constitution 
will embrace both models and that a political model and a legal model are, at least in some 
significant respects, at odds.’155  Under a real world constitution, therefore, they conclude that 'the 
interface of a legal constitution and a political constitution is in fact messy, uncertain and 
contested.'156   
This thesis, however, advances a new and alternative reconciliatory theory of constitutionalism – 
complementary constitutionalism.  It argues that a real world constitution may be characterised as 
either primarily legal or primarily political in nature, but that the predominance of one school's 
normative preferences does not negate the importance of its rival's preferences under the 
constitution, nor do they necessary operate in contradiction to one another, thereby achieving a 
more balanced constitutional order.  In so doing, this thesis refrains from making normative 
assumptions about the basis of a mixed constitution beyond the aim of securing 'limited' or 
'controlled' government – the cornerstone of constitutionalism as noted above.157 
It is argued that elements of both the legal and the political schools, most notably their respective 
mechanism of accountability, are indeed utilised under real world constitutions.  It is also 
conceded that a constitution's mixture of legal and political elements can, in some circumstances, 
be untidy and haphazard, thereby resulting in some degree of contention.  Because the British 
constitution, for example, 'has not been made but has grown,'158 and remains in a state of flux, 
areas of contention between its legal and political elements may prove inevitable.  Despite Gee 
and Webber's suggestion to the contrary, however, it is submitted that the fusion of a 
constitution's legal and political elements is not necessarily nor inevitably haphazard or 
contradictory, but instead complementary.  Both legal and political methods of accountability can 
in fact be seen to support and sustain each other in order to achieve better government 
accountability than either methods could achieve on their own, thus resulting in a more balanced 
constitution.  This is made possible by the fact that, although the two schools remain distinct from 
one another, the experiences of real world constitutions reveals that much overlap exists between 
the two in practice, thereby suggesting that the differences have been largely exaggerated.  
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Despite being preferred by the legal and political schools of constitutionalism respectively, both 
legal and political mechanisms of accountability, along with their normative underpinnings, do in 
fact form a necessary and integral part of each school.  The two schools differ from one another 
primarily, although not exclusively, on the emphasis attached to them.  Politics, for example, may 
be relied upon to regulate executive behaviour under the political school in areas normally 
governed by law under the legal school, and vice versa.   
Admittedly, disagreement exits between the legal and the political schools of thought on specific 
matters which are often irreconcilable and thus, as a result, must be considered hallmarks of their 
respective schools.  A key example of this would be the political school’s attachment to the 
doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty which, in its orthodox understanding, rejects outright the 
legal school’s belief in a higher order of law which is antecedent to and thus capable of overruling 
a democratically-elected legislature.  It is conceded, therefore, that the presence of such a 
hallmark ultimately affects the balance between a constitution’s legal and political elements in 
term of the frequency and limits of their use when holding the government to account, and is thus 
a strong indicator of a real world constitution's predominant character.  When parliamentary 
sovereignty forms the basis of a constitutional order, for example, legal methods of accountability 
may have to operate subject to parliamentary supremacy, thus precluding specific actions such as 
judicial strike down of primary legislation.  It is submitted, however, that the presence of such 
hallmarks do not necessitate the complete subjugation of rival elements as it does under the 
accounts offered by Hickman and Tomkins.  Parliamentary sovereignty, therefore, does not negate 
the value of and necessity for legal forms of accountability under the political school, nor does it 
mean that the courts may only legitimately operate within the narrow confines of Tomkins' model 
as outlined above.   
It is submitted that the presence of a hallmark can be seen to demonstrate an attachment to 
specific normative ideals or principles.  The doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty under the 
political school, for example, reveals an overriding belief in democratic legitimacy and freedom as 
non-domination.  By contrast, judicially-enforceable higher law under the legal school suggests an 
overriding belief in human rights and freedom as non-interference.  It is submitted, however, that 
whilst each school of constitutionalism gives priority to different normative principles, this does 
not exclude other normative principles from their remit, including those preferred by their rival.  
Human rights and freedom as non-interference, therefore, although often given priority over 
freedom as non-domination under the legal school in the form of judicially enforceable higher law, 
can nevertheless receive protection under the political school.  So long as courts respect and 
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support Parliament’s right to the final say, the courts may be utilised in order to hold the executive 
to account and protect both procedural and substantive values without explicit parliamentary 
authorisation but nevertheless in a manner which is complementary, not contradictory, to the 
underlying values of the political school.  These legal methods of accountability may also have the 
effect of strengthening political controls as suggested by Hickman above.  It is argued, however, 
that the potential for legal  methods to do so, as discussed below, is very much context-dependent 
and is therefore neither an indicator of a predominantly legal constitution as suggested by 
Hickman, nor necessary in order for any legal action to be considered complementary as 
suggested by Tomkins.  Because human rights form an integral part of the political school, their 
protection by the courts short of either judicial strike down or extensive statutory construction can 
already be seen to complement the underlying values of the political school. 
Consequently, the requirements of one constitutional school should not necessarily be at the 
exclusion of all the requirements of another.  The 'all-encompassing' claims of both legal and 
political constitutionalists, therefore, should not be treated as absolutes when considering their 
application under a real world constitution such as that of Britain.  It is submitted that both 
schools of constitutionalism are a composite of shared legal and political elements – including 
methods of accountability and normative principles – which are given different levels of emphasis 
by each school.  This difference in the level of emphasis manifests itself in the form of 'hallmarks' 
which ultimately shape and inform the constitutions and thus the balance between its legal and 
political elements.  Real world constitutions, therefore, are similarly a mixture of legal and political 
elements and, depending upon the emphasis attached to them, can be either primarily legal or 
primarily political in character.  In either case, both legal and political elements are used in a 
complementary manner in order to achieve better government accountability, and thus, in turn, a 
more balanced constitutional order. 
The following analysis will therefore demonstrate some of the overlap which occurs between real 
world constitutions of both supposedly legal and political persuasions and in particular how such 
overlap can be complementary rather than contradictory. 
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4.2 Democratic Participation and Political Accountability under the Legal 
Constitution 
Under the legal constitution, Tomkins argues that 'the principal institution, through which the 
government is held to account is the law and the court-room.’159  By contrast, he identifies politics 
and Parliament as being chiefly responsible for holding government to account under the political 
constitution.
160
  Although political rather than legal methods of control is a distinguishing 
characteristic of the political constitution, Tomkins is wrong to assume that legal accountability 
acts as a substitute for political accountability under the legal constitution.     
'Higher law' constitutions primarily establish only the general framework from which government 
may operate, including the limits on government power such as human rights guarantees.  It does 
not, therefore, give any direction on what government should or should not do on a daily basis on 
the overwhelming majority of issues that confront the modern state, for example, on health care, 
social security, housing, education, transport, policing, defence, taxation, and government debt.161  
Although constitutional challenges can still occur in these areas, they are less likely to succeed.  
Real world legal constitutions, therefore, make provisions also for democratic government, which 
seeks to ensure that the day-to-day decisions of government correspond as much as possible to 
the wishes of the general public.  Because only a very limited number of legislative decisions will 
ever be subject to judicial reversal, therefore, Tomkins is mistaken in identifying the court-room as 
the principal institution through which government is held to account under the legal constitution.  
Under legal constitutions, therefore, democratic mechanisms of accountability exercised by 
political institutions are chiefly responsible for holding government to account.  This is true of both 
parliamentary and presidential systems, although more so under the former.  Whereas 
parliamentary systems have a fusion of powers between the executive and the legislature, 162 
thereby making the executive theoretically dependent upon and thus accountable to the 
legislature,163 presidential systems separate the executive and legislative branches.  As a result of 
this separation, each branch is often empowered to check one another's power with the aim of 
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preventing an over concentration of power within any single branch.164  Under the Constitution of 
the United States of America, for example, the President may veto congressional bills,165 whilst 
Congress can refuse to give its consent to congressional bills endorsed by the President.  Despite 
the prominence of checks and balances, however, many presidential systems will also seek to 
make the executive accountable to the legislature for its decisions.  This occurs under the United 
States Constitution in the form of congressional oversight and investigative hearings, whereby 
congressional committees are given the power to invite and, if necessary, subpoena members of 
the executive to give evidence.166  Congress may also impeach both the Vice-President and the 
President,167 although this power has seldom been used.168       
Bellamy's above claim that legal constitutions, by empowering judges to enforce 'higher law' 
against democratically-elected politicians, constitutes a form of domination, is therefore similarly 
exaggerated.  Politicians can only realistically be seen to be subject to domination in relation to 
constitutional matters.  The vast majority of political decisions are therefore not subject to 
domination by the courts.  In addition to this, the benefits of democratic participation Bellamy 
outlines above as being essential to the political constitution's legitimacy over the legal 
constitution – one man, one vote, decisions by majority rule, and the balance of power principle – 
apply also to the legal constitution.  As a result, legal constitutions can be seen to embrace, not 
only 'freedom as non-interference,' but also 'freedom as non-domination.'   
4.3 Legal Accountability under the Political Constitution 
Correspondingly, it is submitted that the political constitution's preference for political 
accountability does not necessarily exclude legal accountability under a political constitution.  
Although Tomkins, as noted above, objects to the government being held to account by the courts 
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on the grounds that it is both ineffective and undemocratic,169 he nevertheless accords the courts 
a limited but important role within the political constitution.  As he notes: 
 A core function of the courts in constitutional law is to declare what legal powers the 
 government has.  It is a fundamental rule of constitutional law that the government has 
 only such powers as are clearly conferred upon it by the law.  Where the government 
 has acted without legal authority, the courts should be robust in declaring such action 
 unlawful ...  Parliament must consider with great care the powers its legislation confers 
 on the government; and the courts must be fearless in ruling where the government has 
 overstepped the line or, indeed, in ruling where the line is too blurred to be 
 meaningful.170 
Resort to legal forms of accountability, therefore, is not merely unavoidable under a political 
constitution, but necessary.  This can be seen, it is submitted, under the British constitution, where 
the courts have a long history of holding the government to account via judicial review in a way 
which  complements rather than undermines its key tenets.   
As Helen Fenwick and Gavin Phillipson note: 
Judicial review is the procedure whereby the High Court is able to review the legality of 
decisions made by a wide variety of bodies which affect the public, ranging from 
Government Ministers exercising prerogative or statutory powers, to the actions of certain 
powerful self-regulatory bodies.171    
Political constitutionalists may understandably view judicial review with a degree of suspicion and 
hostility, therefore, because it invites judges to cross over from the legal sphere into the political 
sphere.  As Fenwick and Phillipson remark, ‘[t]he system of judicial review allows judges to 
interfere in the decisions made by central and local government and a vast range of other public 
bodies.’
172
  In Britain, however, judicial review has been traditionally conducted on the grounds 
that the administrative decision of a public body is ultra vires i.e. ‘beyond the powers granted by 
Parliament.’173  As Sir William Wade and Christopher Forsyth explain: 
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Having no written constitution on which he can fall back, the [English] judge must in every 
case be able to demonstrate that he is carrying out the will of Parliament as expressed in 
the statute conferring the power.  He is on safe ground only where he can show that the 
offending act is outside the power.  The only way in which he can do this, in the absence 
of an express provision, is by finding an implied term or condition in the Act, violation of 
which then entails the condemnation of ultra vires.
174
    
Judicial interference with the decisions of public bodies, therefore, has been justified on the 
grounds that the courts are merely enforcing the will of Parliament.  Consequently, the ultra vires 
model of judicial review appears to have what Mark Elliott describes as ‘structural coherence.’
175
  
As he notes, ‘it furnishes a theoretical model of judicial review which is consistent with the 
structure of the constitutional order generally and with the principle of parliamentary sovereignty 
in particular.’
176
  It is as a consequence of this structural coherence that the ultra vires model of 
judicial review can be seen to be an example of complementary constitutionalism.  Legal methods 
of accountability are used in order to ensure that power is exercised in accordance with 
Parliament's will, thereby bolstering, not undermining, the democratic process.177 
The compatibility of the ultra vires model of review with the political school, however, is 
dependent upon  the courts interpreting statutory provisions consistently with Parliament's 
intention.  As seen with the decision of the House of Lords in the Fire Brigades Union case, the 
courts can construct statutory provisions in a manner which arguably blurs the distinction 
between interpreting and legislating, thereby pushing the boundaries of complementary 
constitutionalism to its limits.178 
It is submitted that judicial review can also be seen to be necessary under the political school on 
the grounds that it enables the people to contest government action as required under Pettit's 
republican view of 'freedom as non-domination.'179  The courts can be seen to provide a forum 
from which individuals, whose interests may not be sufficiently represented in Parliament, may 
challenge the legality of government decisions.  Therefore, although Tomkins may prefer political 
accountability over legal accountability because it is more effective at contesting government 
actions, judicial review of executive action is nevertheless in conformity with the republican notion 
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of 'freedom as non-domination.'  It can therefore be seen to complement rather than contradict 
the underlying themes of the political constitution. 
4.4 Constitutional Democracy  
Distinguishing between a primarily legal constitution and a primarily political constitution in light 
of this complementary overlap of legal and political methods of accountability, as noted above, is 
ultimately one of degree.  A primarily political constitution, for example, may prioritise political 
control over legal control – the British constitution's dependency upon constitutional conventions 
in particular may prove a testament to this fact.  Although the legal and the political constitutions 
can be seen to disagree most vehemently on the issue of constitutional review, it is submitted that 
the difference between a primarily legal and a primarily political constitution on this issue is 
similarly one of degree.  The political constitution's seemingly blanket prohibition of constitutional 
review, therefore, should not be seen to completely debar the courts from protecting and 
enforcing the fundamental values of the political constitution. 
Constitutional review of 'higher law' is frequently justified under the legal constitution on the 
grounds that it protects rights that are essential to democratic society.  Because democracy is 
constituted by rights, they claim, these rights should be protected and insulated from democracy 
itself: a ‘constitutional democracy.'  One of the forerunners to such a theory was John Hart Ely, 
who argued that the American constitution was primarily concerned, not with specific substantive 
values, but with process and structure;180 to frame a system of representative democracy 
designed to preserve, not undermine, liberty.
181
  He argued that the courts should thus be 
concerned, not with promoting substantive values, but in facilitating greater democratic 
representation.182    
Although political constitutionalists contend that the substantive outcomes of a democratic 
society are subject to reasonable disagreement, it is clear that the political constitution, like its 
legal rival, possesses a number of fundamental prerequisites without which a political constitution 
would neither function nor exist.  As Gee and Webber have observed: 
 The idea of a political constitution is prescriptive, but it des not purport to prescribe the 
 nature and content of the constitution in great detail.  By design, a political constitution 
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 leaves it to political actors, operating through the ordinary political process, to prescribe 
 the nature and content of the constitution.  At it simplest, it directs political actors to 
 design an electoral process based on some notion of equal votes and to ensure that the 
 political process is based on some notion of holding those in power to account.  In this, 
 the idea of a political constitution prescribes no more than the bare minimal conditions 
 for political equality and accountability and non-domination.183 
Democracy is one such minimal condition that can be best expressed in the language of rights.  
This includes not only the right to vote, but also freedom of expression and the right to assembly 
and non-discrimination to name but a few.  Although Trevor Allan therefore argues that judges in 
Britain should express their commitment to democracy by rightly adhering to the sovereignty of 
Parliament in the laws that it passes, he argues also that such respect cannot be a limitless one:  
A parliamentary enactment whose effect would be the destruction of any recognizable 
form of democracy ... could not consistently be applied by the courts of law.  Judicial 
obedience to the statute in such (unlikely) circumstances could not coherently be justified 
in terms of the doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty, since the statute would violate the 
political principle which the doctrine itself enshrines.184 
Given the fact that constitutional review, as discussed above, does not threaten the overwhelming 
majority of political decisions, the objections by political constitutionalists to its use appear greatly 
exaggerated.  Despite this, however, it is conceded that the retention of Parliament's right to the 
final say is one of the hallmarks of a political constitution.  It is for this reason that the theory of bi-
polar sovereignty fails to achieve a complementary balance which is respectful of Britain's 
constitutional traditions.   
The most widely quoted proponent of bi-polar sovereignty is easily Sir Stephen Sedley, who 
argued in 1995 that: 
 [W]e have today ... a new and still emerging constitutional paradigm, no longer of Dicey’s 
 supreme parliament to whose will the rule of law must finally bend, but of a bi-polar 
 sovereignty of the Crown in Parliament and the Crown in its courts, to each of which the 
 Crown’s ministers are answerable – politically to Parliament, legally to the courts.185   
The implications of Sedley’s new constitutional paradigm are difficult to ascertain with any 
certainty.  This is in large part due to the fact that, as a result of Sedley’s subsequent writings, bi-
polar sovereignty can be seen to advocate for only one of two things – the sovereignty of 
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Parliament or the de facto sovereignty of the courts, but not both – therefore demonstrating, it is 
submitted, the inherent inability of the model to live up to its name.  
In one of his more recent articles, for example, Sedley elaborated upon the role of the courts in 
relation to the executive further in such a way as to suggest that his above separation of powers is 
still, despite its use of terminology, structured around the sovereignty of Parliament: 
The courts go to considerable lengths to respect the constitutional supremacy of 
Parliament ...  It is the executive – the departments of state over which ministers preside, 
along with quangos and local government – which is subject to public law controls.  That is 
because executive government exercises public powers which are created or recognised 
by law and have legal limits that it is the courts’ constitutional task to patrol.  When I 
argued the leading case of M v Home Office in the Court of Appeal (the case went on to 
the House of Lords, which confirmed the liability of ministers for contempt of court in the 
discharge of their offices), I proposed a formulation which Lord Justice Nolan adopted in 
his judgment and which has been accepted as correct by our unreflective and atheoretical 
profession: ‘The proper constitutional relationship of the executive with the courts is that 
the courts will respect all acts of the executive within its lawful province, and that the 
executive will respect all decisions of the courts as to what its lawful province is.186  
If what Sedley states is a true account of his view of the judicial role, his earlier claim that 
ministers are legally accountable to the courts must be seen as nothing more than a statement in 
support of the complementary role the courts have traditionally played under the British 
constitution as advanced above.   
Despite this, however, earlier comments by Sedley appear to suggest that bi-polar sovereignty, far 
from preserving Parliament’s sovereignty, instead gives the final say on matters of law to the 
courts, offering in place of a working theory of bi-polar sovereignty a theory of constitutionalism 
which is not too dissimilar from the common law model.  As he once noted, ‘[i]t is conventional 
wisdom, at least among lawyers, that the constitution of the United Kingdom is in its essentials the 
creation of the common law – an accretion of legal principles derived from judicial decisions which 
determine for the most part how the country is to be run from day to day.’187  The supremacy of 
the courts under this reading of Sedley’s hypothesis is evidenced further by his belief in the 
importance of judges in upholding human rights which are, he argues, historically derived from the 
liberal values of the Enlightenment,188 but which he believes are far from universal or fixed,189 
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advocating also for the courts to play a more active role in making human rights ‘real’ and 
meaningful.190     
Acknowledging the similarities between Sedley’s position and common law constitutionalism, 
Christopher Knight has recently attempted a vindication of the bi-polar thesis.  It is submitted, 
however, that despite such recognition on Knight’s behalf, his hypothesis can also be seen to 
collapse into common law constitutionalism. 
Knight argues that the English constitution, and thus by necessary implication the British 
constitution, is characterized primarily by its long history of institutional pragmatism, which he 
defines as a 'readiness to use one institution to compensate for perceived or actual weaknesses in 
another, or to take on new functions as the institution develops.’
191
  Building on this, he argues 
that the courts are the most apt at evolving to meet the nation’s constitutional needs, namely to 
protect human rights against encroachments by the executive in light of Parliament’s failure to do 
so.192  However, unlike common law constitutionalism, Knight asserts that bi-polar sovereignty 
does not advocate higher-order law.  Instead, he argues that the courts, like Parliament, have law-
making powers.  Likewise, he emphasises the fact that Parliament can act, and in fact has acted, as 
a higher court.193  Consequently, he contends that there is an overlapping of legislative and judicial 
functions between the two branches.  It is here that Knight incorporates into his thesis the work of 
W.J. Rees, who argued in the 1950s that there exists two sovereigns: the legal sovereign and the 
coercive (or enforcement) sovereign.194  Building on this distinction, Knight argues that, despite 
the overlapping of functions between Parliament and the courts, Parliament’s primary role is legal 
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and that the court’s primary role is enforcement.195  As Knight himself concludes, the former is the 
power to make the law and the latter is the power to enforce the law.196     
Although this separation of sovereign functions suggests that bi-polar sovereignty is nothing more 
than a re-packaging of Britain’s tradition of parliamentary sovereignty, Knight rejects this, arguing 
instead that under his model of dual sovereignty ‘the courts retain a certain amount of “legal 
supremacy”…in very specialized circumstances the courts would have the power to bind the 
legislature using their legal sovereignty.’
197
  Such ‘legal supremacy’ manifests itself in the form of a 
judicial power to strike down primary legislation.  As Knight categorically states, ‘[t]he purpose of 
bi-polar sovereignty is to provide the courts with the kind of “nuclear” option of striking down an 
Act of Parliament which existing jurisprudence does not generally afford them, but which is 
derived from their role as the primary enforcement sovereign.’
198
   The circumstances Knight 
identifies as being capable of justifying this nuclear option are where common law constitutional 
rights have been infringed, circumstances which Knight also finds well suited to the institutional 
pragmatism of the British constitution because of the freedom it gives the courts to use the 
common law to develop both existing and future constitutional rights.199   
Despite his claim to the contrary, therefore, Knight’s theory of bi-polar sovereignty instead 
appears to give judges the final say on issues of fundamental rights.  As a result, his theory, far 
from offering a cohesive theory of reconciliation between the legal and political schools, instead 
collapses into common law constitutionalism where Parliament is made subordinate to a judicially-
enforceable higher law, albeit only in a handful of instances.  This is illustrated best by one of his 
concluding remarks in his most recent paper:  
 The common law can resist the will of Parliament, where that will is manifested in an 
 unjustified interference with rights recognised by the common law as constitutional.  
 The unique bi-polar sovereignty of the constitution places the courts and the legislature 
 on an equal footing because there is an overlap between their legislative and 
 enforcement functions.200   
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Adherence to the doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty, however, has not prevented British 
courts from protecting the underlying values of the political constitution short of declaring void 
and incompatible Acts of Parliament.  This has been achieved by way of statutory presumptions. 
Despite the structural coherence of the ultra vires model of judicial review outlined above, the 
model has nevertheless been criticised for lacking what Elliott describes as ‘internal coherence: 
that is, it is not capable of providing a convincing explanation of the source of the principle which 
the courts apply on review.’201  According to Elliott, the ultra vires model lacks internal cohesion 
because of both ‘passive artificiality’ and ‘active artificiality.’
202
   
Passive artificiality refers to the development by the courts of principles or standards of good 
administration – usually in the form of presumptions as to Parliament’s intention – by which the 
executive, in utilising discretionary powers granted to them by Parliament, must be judged, 
although such standards do not appear in the enabling statute itself.  The application of such 
standards, therefore, cannot readily be justified as emanating from Parliament.203  They would 
appear instead to emanate from the judges themselves under the common law, thereby 
suggesting that judicial review operates independently of parliamentary intention.  As Colin Turpin 
and Adam Tomkins notes:  
Presumptions ... derive from the common law, which is to say that the courts have 
developed them, and so we see that judicially created principles may be applied by the 
courts in deciding what a statute permits to be done.  It has been questioned whether ... 
the courts are really giving effect to the unexpressed but presumed intention of 
Parliament or are rather simply requiring statutory powers to be exercised in conformity 
with principles which the court see it as their responsibility to uphold, and which have 
their source in a judicial conception of the rule of law.  If this is so, it would seem that the 
judges are not acting – or at all events are not acting exclusively – on a principle of ultra 
vires.  Rather, they are enforcing the rule of law, taken to mean not only that precisely 
limited statutory powers must not be exceeded, but that powers must not be used – we 
should say abused – in ways or for purposes that run counter to the principles of justice 
and fair dealing evolved by the courts in the long experience of judging and developing the 
common law.204    
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This problem with the ultra vires model of judicial review is further exacerbated by the fact that 
the exercise of non-statutory powers – prerogative and de facto powers – are also subject to 
judicial review.205  As a result, the courts in such cases clearly cannot be seen to be enforcing 
parliament’s will. 
Active artificiality refers to those instances where the courts effectively ignore the express words 
of an Act of Parliament and apply their own independent standards.  This is seen most typically in 
instances where the courts are faced with an ouster clause prohibiting judicial review as in 
Anisminic Ltd v Foreign Compensation Commission.
206
  Consequently, as Elliott observes, the 
artificiality of the ultra vires model is fully exposed: ‘it purports to explain judicial review in terms 
of the enforcement of legislative intention, yet the courts at least appear to effect review in spite 
of parliament’s will.’207   
Such artificiality may appear to put in jeopardy the use of the ultra vires model of judicial review 
as evidence of complementary constitutionalism.  For common law constitutionalists, the 
artificiality of the ultra vires model of judicial review demonstrates beyond all doubt that the 
grounds for judicial review exist independently of Parliament’s intention, emanating instead from 
the common law as developed by judges.  Once this common law constitution is accepted, both 
the development of standards of good administration and the refusal by courts to apply ouster 
clauses can be readily explained.208  The passive and active artificiality of the ultra vires model of 
judicial review, however, should not be seen to be necessarily incompatible with the political 
constitution.  Although the standards of good administration applied by the courts have not 
emanated from Parliament, they may nevertheless be seen to give expression to some of the 
underlying values of both the legal constitution and the political constitution. 
Elliott contends, for example, that the artificiality of the ultra vires model can be overcome, not by 
completely denying the relevance of parliamentary intention, but by accepting that the chief 
purpose of judicial review is ultimately to uphold the Rule of Law.  The purpose of judicial review, 
therefore, is to ensure that Parliament acts in accordance with the Rule of Law.  This is to be 
achieved ‘by means of deploying the well-established presumption that Parliament is taken to 
legislate with the intention that its enactment should be consistent with constitutional 
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principle.’209  Elliott justifies the use of such a presumption by identifying as the Rule of Law the 
key values of the constitutional order within which the legislature is based, thereby distinguishing 
his model from the common law model.  As he notes: 
It [the common law model] postulates that constitutional principle is something which is 
created by judges and with which the judges are exclusively concerned; thus the courts 
are viewed as imposing the rule of law on the other parts of government.  Meanwhile, the 
modified ultra vires principle treats the rule of law as a pervasive constitutional principle 
which influences the contexts within which legislation is both enacted by Parliament and 
interpreted by the courts.  This captures much more accurately the way in which we think 
about the values on which the constitutional order is founded given that, by definition, 
constitutional values (such as those to which judicial review give expression) are shared 
values which possess an overarching resonance.  To regard them as uniquely judicial 
constructs is ultimately to deny their constitutional status.
210
  
Consequently, because the legislature is located within a constitutional order founded on the Rule 
of Law, passive artificiality can be avoided because the courts can legitimately presume that 
Parliament intends to act in accordance with the Rule of Law.211  Active artificiality is also 
overcome, Elliott claims, by identifying, for example, the rule against depriving an individual of his 
right to access to the courts, as nothing more than a presumption which can be rebutted by 
express parliamentary words to the contrary.  As he notes: 
[S]o long as the British constitution continues to accord legislative supremacy to 
Parliament, any irreconcilable conflict between the intention of Parliament and the rule of 
law must ultimately be resolved in favour of the former, and judicial decisions which fail to 
respect this axiom must be rejected as lacking constitutional legitimacy.
212
                  
Under this reasoning, all rules of construction are treated as nothing more than presumptions, 
albeit apparently strong ones which should only be capable of rebuttal where expressed clearly 
and unequivocally.   
Elliott’s understanding of the Rule of Law is essentially one which is largely formal in nature.213  If 
taken to mean only the basic requirements of law,214 the use of statutory presumptions to bring 
Acts of Parliament into conformity with the Rule of Law is therefore more than compatible with 
the political constitution.  After all, if the duty of the courts is to enforce the law (whether 
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statutory or common law), what they enforce must, one would presume, conform with the formal 
requirements of the law.  It is submitted, however, that even a more substantive reading of the 
Rule of Law which requires conformity with fundamental human rights may also find expression 
via statutory presumptions without contradicting Parliament's ultimate sovereignty.   
This can be seen with the recognition of fundamental common law constitutional rights, beginning 
with the decision of the Court of Appeal in R v Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex 
parte Leech.215  The case concerned an action for judicial review against the power of prison 
governors under the Prison Rules 1964 to intercept and block prisoner correspondence on the 
grounds that it included letters to and from a solicitor where legal proceedings were not 
imminent.
216
  The Court of Appeal held that, in interfering with correspondence between a 
prisoner and a solicitor, the wider common law right of access to the courts was infringed which, 
‘even in our unwritten constitution,’ Steyn L.J. claimed, ‘must rank as a constitutional right.’
217
  
The constitutional right of access to the courts was later recognised by Laws L.J. in R v Lord 
Chancellor, ex parte Witham,218 with the added caveat, however, that such a right ‘cannot be 
abrogated by the State save by specific provision in an Act of Parliament,’219 as well as by the 
House of Lords in R v Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex parte Simms, where the 
court also recognised the existence of further fundamental constitutional rights, such as the right 
to freedom of expression.220 
Such rights were similarly accorded recognition, albeit obiter, in Thoburn v Sunderland City 
Council.221  Laws L.J. went further than in Leech, Witham, and Simms, however, by arguing that 
‘[w]e should recognise a hierarchy of Acts of Parliament: as it were ‘ordinary’ statutes and 
‘constitutional’ statutes,' whereby ‘[t]he special status of constitutional statutes follows the 
special status of constitutional rights.’222  In other words, ‘[o]rdinary statutes may be impliedly 
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repealed.  Constitutional statutes may not.’223  The only way a constitutional statute could be 
repealed, so he claimed, was by express words in a later statute.224 
Thoburn, along with Leech, Witham, and Simms, could be seen as evidence of a relatively modest 
step away from a political constitution towards a common law constitution.  Because fundamental 
rights can only be abrogated by way of express words in an Act of Parliament, an unprecedented 
restriction as to form on Acts of Parliament has arisen, emanating not from Parliament itself, but 
instead from the common law.225  Undeniably, this appears to have been the intention in at least 
some of these cases.  In outlining his new constitutional framework, for instance, Laws L.J. praised 
it on the grounds that ‘[i]t gives us most of the benefits of a written constitution, in which 
fundamental rights are accorded special respect.’226  Although this sentiment was also shared by 
Lord Hoffmann in Simms, it is submitted that his Lordship's reasoning demonstrates that a 
requirement for express words has the potential to strengthen political accountability for the 
protection of fundamental rights.  As Lord Hoffmann noted: 
 Parliamentary sovereignty means that Parliament can, if it chooses, legislate contrary to 
 fundamental principles of human rights ...  But the principle of legality means that 
 Parliament must squarely confront what it is doing and accept the political cost.  
 Fundamental rights cannot be overridden by general or ambiguous words.  This is 
 because there is too great a risk that the full  implications of their unqualified meaning 
 may have passed unnoticed in the democratic  process.  In the absence of express 
 language or necessary implication to the contrary, the courts therefore presume that 
 even the most general words were intended to be subject to the basic rights of the 
 individual.  In this way the courts of the United Kingdom, though acknowledging the 
 sovereignty of Parliament, apply principles of constitutionality little different from those 
 which exist in countries where the power of the legislature is expressly limited by a 
 constitutional document.227 
A requirement of express words, as noted above, is in effect a requirement of clear intention.  
Both Parliament and the government, therefore, are being forced to be more open about the true 
extent of their legislative intentions in relation to human rights, thereby exposing them to greater 
political scrutiny from members of Parliament, the media, and the general public.  As a result, 
Parliament is compelled to think twice about pursuing legislative aims which require the 
abrogation of human rights, although its success depends greatly upon whether human rights are 
held in the same high regard by members of Parliament, the media, and the general public as they 
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are by judges like Lord Hoffmann.  In either event, the constraints upon Parliament, as Lord 
Hoffmann himself notes, remain 'ultimately political, not legal.’228 
5. Conclusion 
Both the legal and the political constitutions share many common characteristics and disagree 
with one another primarily on emphasis.  A real world constitution, therefore, can be seen to be a 
complementary mixture of elements from both the legal and political schools which can be either 
primarily legal or primarily political in character.  Whether Britain's mixed constitution can be seen 
to remain primarily political is ultimately a question of degree and context.  It depends, not only 
upon whether it relies more upon political as opposed to legal methods of accountability, but also 
upon effectiveness of such methods and the extent to which the legal methods of accountability 
used complement, rather than contradict, the underlying principles of the political school.
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Chapter Three 
THE ROYAL PREROGATIVE 
1. Constitutionalism and the Crown 
One of the earliest definitions of the royal prerogative was supplied by William Blackstone.  He 
noted that the term signifies ‘something that is required or demanded before, or in preference to, 
all others.  And hence it must be in its nature singular and eccentrical; that it can only be applied 
to those rights and capacities which the King enjoys alone, in contradistinction to others, and not 
to those he enjoys in common with any of his subjects.’1  However, the most widely accepted 
definition of the prerogative is that of A.V. Dicey,2  who famously described the prerogative as ‘the 
remaining portion of the Crown’s original authority, and it is therefore … the name for the residue 
of discretionary or arbitrary authority, which at any given time is legally left in the hands of the 
Crown.’3 
Despite its residual nature, as well as the difficulty in defining it,4 the prerogative is nevertheless 
fundamental to the operation of the constitution, acting as the source of authority for many of the 
constitution’s most important rules.  As Maurice Sunkin and Sebastian Payne explain: 
[T]he Crown is widely defined as possessing wide ranging powers, some of which may be 
crucially important to the running of the constitutional and political system.  These include 
powers relating to the appointment of the government ... and enactment of primary 
legislation; the conducting of international relations, including the making of Treaties, the 
declaration of war and the disposition of armed forces abroad; as well as a range of 
executive powers which are used by ministers in the day-to-day government of the United 
Kingdom.5  
This reliance by the executive on the prerogative has been the subject of widespread 
dissatisfaction as a consequence of the fact that its exercise has historically been largely immune 
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from both legal and political scrutiny.6  As a result, the prerogative occupies the ‘dead ground’ of 
the constitution; ‘a vacuum in which the citizen would be left without protection against a misuse 
of executive powers.’7  The potential for its abuse is obviously apparent.  As Helen Fenwick and 
Gavin Phillipson note, the existence of the prerogative ‘allows powers of ... great breadth, 
magnitude and importance to be wielded by the executive alone.’8   
Because the prerogative’s prominence within the British constitution is therefore an affront to 
constitutionalism and the principle of limited government, calls for the prerogative to be brought 
under control have become increasingly common amongst legal and political constitutionalists 
alike.  Political constitutionalists wish to bolster Parliament's controls over the prerogative, whilst 
legal and common law constitutionalists, although in support of strengthening political controls, 
wish also to expand judicial controls.  Recent efforts both by Parliament and the courts to bring 
the prerogative under control suggests also that the gap in accountability caused by the 
prerogative, if not yet completely plugged, is certainly smaller than it has ever been. 
The aim of this chapter, therefore, will be to assess the effect of these judicial and parliamentary 
developments on the balance within the constitution between its legal and political elements.  As 
noted in the previous chapters, real world constitutions are in fact a mixture of both legal and 
political schools to varying degrees.  Both legal and political controls may be relied upon in order 
to bring the prerogative under control, therefore, without necessarily altering the fact that the 
constitution remains primarily political in nature.  With this in mind, two arguments will be 
advanced in relation to the most recent attempts to bring the exercise of the prerogative under 
control: firstly, that the Fixed-term Parliaments Act 2011, although a legal means of change, 
nevertheless strengthens parliamentary, rather than judicial, controls; secondly, that the recent 
extension of judicial review in Bancoult (No. 2)9 to include Orders in Council issued under the royal 
prerogative, although not a solution necessarily preferred by political constitutionalists, 
nevertheless complements, rather than contradicts, the underlying values of the political 
constitution.  Before engaging with the main analysis, however, it is important to first fully 
understand the reasons behind the prerogative’s historic immunity from scrutiny. 
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2. Failure to Control the Prerogative 
2.1 The Glorious Revolution 1688: Parliament's Victory over the Crown 
Historically, the English constitution recognised the Crown as being sovereign; the monarch made 
the law, and the monarch executed the law.  However, in order to remain sovereign, the early 
monarchs required the support of the nobility and of the clergy, a fact made most apparent with 
the signing of the Magna Carta in 1215.  From this necessity of consent emerged the concept of 
Parliament.10   Because it was utilised primarily as a vessel through which the King could raise 
revenue via taxation, and because it could only be summoned and dissolved by the King whenever 
he so chose,11 Parliament was not always in session.  When King Charles I came to the throne in 
1625, for example, he dissolved Parliament in 1629 and reigned for eleven years relying solely on 
the royal prerogative.  Known as the ‘Eleven Years’ Tyranny’ or the ‘Personal Rule,’ Charles was 
eventually forced to call a new Parliament in 1640 in order to raise funds for his war against 
Scotland, which had begun the year before.  However, instead of raising money, Parliament 
insisted on addressing grievances which had arisen during Charles’ eleven years of rule.  Frustrated 
with Parliament’s refusal to supply the King with the funds he required, Charles dissolved 
Parliament after it had sat for less than a month.12  However, due to the defeat of the English 
Army by the Scottish in the North of England, Charles once again had to summon Parliament.13  
However, as with the Parliament summoned earlier that year, the new Parliament was keen to 
address grievances ahead of supply.  Becoming increasingly frustrated with Parliament’s attempts 
to dismantle the personnel and machinery responsible for Charles’ eleven years of personal rule, 
as well as calls for Parliament to sit on a regular basis,14 Charles, in addition to being involved in an 
army plot to overthrow Parliament,15 attempted to impeach five MPs for treason.  When 
Parliament refused, Charles entered the House of Commons accompanied with armed guards with 
the intention of arresting the men, leaving empty handed because the men had already fled.   In 
March 1642, outright civil war between the King and Parliament ensued,16 ultimately concluding 
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with the execution of Charles I in January 1649, and the establishment of an English republic 
following the abolition of the monarchy and the House of Lords.17   
The Commonwealth, and later the Protectorate,18 were not to last however.  As John Western 
notes, ‘[t]he victorious parliamentarians were unable to establish a workable and durable system 
of government.’19  This was made abundantly clear after the death of its Lord Protector Oliver 
Cromwell in September 1658 and the resignation of his son and successor Richard in May 1659.20  
Because of the civil unrest which followed – in no small part due to the unpopularity of the 
republic amongst the populace – the Stuarts were returned to the throne of England in May 
1660.21  Under King Charles II, monarchy reigned once again in England, albeit with the consent of 
Parliament and with diluted powers.  However, relations between the Crown and Parliament 
eventually began to sour; Parliament became increasingly concerned by Charles II’s close 
friendship with catholic France, 22 and, as Tim Harris notes, Charles II did much to strengthen the 
position of the Crown during his final years on the throne, including:  
[U]sing the law to defeat the political and religious enemies of the crown, enhancing royal 
control over the judiciary and local government through a series of purges, and making the 
crown more independent of parliament thanks to a combination of improved royal 
finances and subsidies from the French king, Louis XIV.23 
This tension would come to a head under the reign of Charles II’s successor King James II, who 
caused anxiety amongst parliamentarians – who were united in their opposition to Catholicism24 – 
because he was ‘England’s first Catholic ruler since Queen Mary (r. 1553-8),’ and because he 
‘pursued an ambitious policy of trying to increase the religious and civil liberties of his co-
religionists across his three kingdoms.’25  Because of the Test Acts of 1673 and 1678, Catholics in 
England were denied the same religious, political, and social freedoms enjoyed by Anglicans.  
James II therefore sought to nullify the effects of these Parliamentary laws via the royal 
prerogative.  In April 1687, James issued the Declaration of Indulgence, which granted everyone 
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dispensation from the Test Acts;26 threatening to ‘destroy both the laws and the independence of 
Parliament, the very foundations of the traditional constitution.’27  As Harris notes, ‘[w]hat 
safeguards were there for subjects’ legal liberties if a reigning monarch could decide at will to 
dispense with or suspend laws that had been passed by parliament?’28  With the birth of James II’s 
son in June 1688, and a new royal Catholic dynasty all but certain, Parliament was once again 
forced to assert its supremacy over the monarchy in the 1688 Glorious Revolution.  Fearing an 
alliance between the Catholic kings of England and France, William of Orange invaded England, 
causing James II to flee to Ireland.   
However, this time the monarchy was not abolished following Parliament’s ‘victory,’ which was 
only made possible thanks to foreign intervention on the behalf of Holland.  Instead, the Crown 
was retained, albeit at the behest and mercy of Parliament.  Declaring James II to have forfeited 
his right to the throne (and rejecting completely his new-born son’s right to succession), 
Parliament offered the Crown instead to James’ sister Mary and her husband William of Orange, 
creating the ‘unique phenomenon’ of a dual monarchy: Queen Mary II and King William III of 
England.29          
As Payne notes, ‘[t]he events of 1688 re-established the duality of the King governing in 
conjunction with Parliament, but the King still governed.’30  The King, albeit the King-in-Parliament, 
was still the Head of State, and still took the ‘administrative initiative.’31  For efficiency, therefore, 
much of the royal prerogative was retained.32  The Bill of Rights 1688, for example, while 
abolishing King James II’s claimed power of suspension,33 nevertheless left much of the royal 
prerogative intact.34  Despite this, however, the Bill of Rights nevertheless limited the Crown's 
authority by subjecting it to modification or abolition by statute.  As a result, 'it would no longer be 
sufficient for the Crown (or its Ministers) to invoke the prerogative to justify its actions.  It would 
have to show that at common law there was such a power and that it had not been affected by 
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legislation.'35  As Diplock L.J. famously declared in BBC v Johns: ‘[i]t is 350 years and a civil war too 
late for the Queen’s courts to broaden the prerogative.  The limits within which the executive 
government may impose obligations or restraints on the citizens of the United Kingdom without 
any statutory authority are now well settled and incapable of extension.’36  The effect of the 1688 
Revolution and subsequent constitutional settlement, therefore, was to secure the de facto 
supremacy of Parliament, whereby the monarchy was made subordinate to the legislature.37  
Despite its subordination to Parliament, however, the royal prerogative has historically operated 
largely free from scrutiny, thereby placing Parliament in a less privileged position than the 
executive.  The historic inability of both Parliament and the courts to effectively control the 
exercise of the prerogative can be attributed , firstly to the fact that prerogative powers do not 
require parliamentary approval in order to be used; secondly to the absence of positive authority 
in determining the existence and scope of prerogative powers; and thirdly to the prerogative's 
immunity, until recently, from judicial review. 
2.2 No Parliamentary Approval 
Although the royal prerogative was retained following the 1688 Revolution and subsequent 
constitutional settlement by the grace of Parliament, and therefore subordinate to Acts of 
Parliament, political control over the exercise of the prerogative nevertheless remained weak.  
Despite the subsequent emergence of constitutional conventions stipulating that many of the 
Crown’s prerogative powers were in practice to be exercised by ministers drawn from both Houses 
of Parliament38 – one of the hallmarks of political control – virtually no conventions emerged 
regulating ministerial exercise of the prerogative themselves.39  As a result, governments need not 
secure the approval of Parliament before making decisions in relation some of the most important 
areas of government activity, most notably in relation to foreign affairs, where prerogative powers 
continue to operate in relation to signing of treaties, declaring war, deploying armed forces 
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abroad, recognising foreign states, and governing overseas territories.40  In addition to the absence 
of prior parliamentary approval, Parliament has also proven ineffective at holding the government 
to account ex post facto due to the predominance of single-party majority governments.41 
2.3 No Positive Authority 
In the seventeenth-century decision in Case of Proclamations, Sir Edward Coke (in)famously 
declared that ‘[t]he King hath no prerogative, but that which the law of the land allows him.’42  In 
the landmark case, the court considered the legality of two proclamations made by King James I: 
the first prohibited new buildings in London; the second made it a criminal offence for starch to be 
made from wheat.  As the above quote suggests, the court ultimately found the proclamations to 
be illegal; it was not within the remit of the King’s power for him to change the common law or 
create a new criminal offence.  It is submitted that the effect of this decision should have been the 
strengthening Parliament’s position against the Crown.  Paul Craig, agrees, arguing that the 
significance of the Case of Proclamations is as follows: firstly that ‘it clearly established that the 
prerogative was bounded and not unlimited;’ secondly that it firmly established that it was for the 
courts and not the Crown to determine the boundaries of the royal prerogative; and thirdly that 
‘the principal beneficiary of the court’s judgment was, of course, Parliament.’43   
In the centuries that followed the decision in Case of Proclamations, however, the courts have in 
fact shown reluctance in relying upon their power to determine both the existence and scope of 
prerogative powers.44  Far from curtailing the powers of the Crown, the courts have instead shown 
consistent deference towards the executive.  In some cases the courts have even extended 
existing prerogative powers, sometimes to the point where a new de facto power has been 
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created, and in others upholding the executive’s claim as to the existence of prerogative powers 
despite the absence of evidence as to its existence.  As a result, the courts have failed to uphold 'a 
very basic aspect of the rule of law.'45  In R v Secretary of State for the Home Department ex parte 
Northumbria Police Authority,46 for example, the Court of Appeal agreed with the then Home 
Secretary that the power to supply equipment to the police fell within the broad prerogative 
power of the Crown to preserve the peace.  As Nourse L.J. noted, ‘[t]he scarcity of references in 
the books to the prerogative of keeping the peace within the realm does not disprove that it 
exists.  Rather it may point to an unspoken assumption that it does.’47  In Malone v Commissioner 
for the Metropolitan Police (No. 2), the Government argued successfully that phone tapping was 
legal because there was no law prohibiting it.48  The courts have also given recognition to the Ram 
Doctrine, which identifies a 'third source' of non-prerogative, non-statutory powers that may be 
exercised by the government 'except so far as he [a minister] is precluded from doing so by 
statute.’49  The scope of the Ram Doctrine, however, is uncertain and hotly disputed.  At its 
narrowest, the Ram Doctrine stipulates merely that the Crown 'has all the powers of a natural or 
legal person'50 – the power to enter into contracts, employ staff, convey property etc.  The courts, 
however, have recognised a much wider reading of the Ram Doctrine whereby the Crown  
possesses, not only 'ancillary powers, necessary for the carrying out of any substantive 
governmental (or indeed non-governmental) function,'51 but substantive governmental powers 
also.  As argued by the High Court in Shrewsbury & Atcham Borough Council, Congleton Borough 
Council v The Secretary of State for Communities and Local Government, 'the fact that the Crown 
enjoys legal personality means that it is prima facie entitled – so far as vires in the strict sense are 
concerned – to do any lawful act, even if the act in question is plainly governmental.'52  In the 
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recent decision of the Supreme Court in the New London College case, however, Lord Sumption, 
although acknowledging the existence of and necessity for 'third source' powers, nevertheless 
expressed grave doubts over the wide scope accorded to them in previous judgments:    
 [I]t is open to question whether the analogy with a natural person is really apt in the case 
 of public or governmental action, as opposed to purely managerial acts of a kind that any 
 natural person could do, such as making contracts, acquiring or disposing of property, 
 hiring and firing staff and the like.53  
Despite this concerns, Lord Sumption decided that the uncertainty surrounding the scope of 'third 
source' powers  did not need to be resolved in the present case.  This was because there was little 
doubt, he argued, that the statutory power of Home Secretary at issue in the case 'must 
necessarily extend to a range of ancillary and incidental administrative powers not expressly spelt 
out in the Act,'54 thereby leaving the question open.  
Given the residual nature of the royal prerogative, this approach by the courts is not entirely 
without merit.  As Fenwick and Phillipson note, ‘[b]ecause it is accepted that prerogative powers 
are residual – that is, recognised rather than created by the common law – it can therefore be 
plausibly argued by the Crown that the absence of prior positive recognition by the courts of a 
particular prerogative is not necessarily fatal to a claim that it exists.’55  In order for the courts to 
hold that a prerogative power exists, therefore, the government has to prove, not that the power 
has been previously exercised or positively recognised by either the courts or Parliament, but only 
that neither statute nor court decision expressly prohibited the power that they claim.  As Sir 
Robert Megarry V.-C. in Malone v Metropolitan Police Commissioner once observed, England ‘is 
not a country where everything is expressly permitted; it is a country where everything is 
permitted except what is expressly forbidden.’56   
Admittedly, because the prerogative survived the 1688 Revolution and constitutional settlement 
subject to Parliament, the prerogative is theoretically exercised with the tacit consent of 
Parliament.  Because Parliament did not expressly or impliedly abolish many of the powers the 
executive claims to possess, Parliament must therefore be taken to have not objected to their 
existence and thus their use.  It is submitted, however, that this is an untenable position which 
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invites arbitrariness.  Central to the concept of consent, whether express or implied, is knowledge 
of what one is consenting to.  Without such knowledge, consent cannot be said to be informed 
and valid.  As noted by the Public Administration Select Committee, Parliament has no right to 
know what the powers of the prerogative are.57  There exists no comprehensive, authoritative list 
or record of all the powers, privileges, and immunities that constitute the royal prerogative.  
Parliament, therefore, although undeniably aware of what the main prerogative powers are, 
cannot be said to be making an informed decision in not abolishing any of the prerogative powers 
claimed by the government.  Any presumed consent is often fictitious, therefore, resulting in 
potential arbitrariness.  
2.4 Immunity from Judicial Review 
The courts historically treated the exercise of the royal prerogative as being immune from judicial 
review.  This classic stance can be traced as far back as the decision in Darnel’s Case.58  Known also 
as the Case of the Five Knights, the court declared that they could determine only the existence 
and scope of a prerogative power; they could not review the manner in which it had been 
exercised.  The justification for such immunity can be attributed to the prerogative's status as 
original kingly authority.  The prerogative, because it is derived from the King and not an Act of 
Parliament, constitutes original, not subordinate, authority.59  It is accordingly a source of law 
which is separate and distinct from Parliament.  Judicial review of the prerogative could not be 
justified by recourse to the ultra vires model of review as the courts would not be enforcing 
Parliament's will as expressed in statute.  In contrast to either legislation or delegated legislation 
(which has its origins in an enabling statute), therefore, the prerogative has been treated with a 
degree of legal reverence despite its subordination to Parliament.  As Colin Munro argues, 
following the 1688 Revolution, ‘something survived of the notion that the king’s discretionary 
powers were ‘absolute' ... that courts lacked jurisdiction to review the manner of exercise of 
prerogative powers, or the adequacy of grounds upon which they had been exercised.’60  
Governments, therefore, have historically been able to draw upon a wide array of discretionary 
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powers free from judicial interference because of the fact that such power is derived, not from a 
democratically-elected legislature, but instead from the Crown.    
3. Bringing the Prerogative under Control 
3.1 Plugging the Gap in Accountability  
In an attempt to plug this gap in accountability, both Parliament and the courts have recently 
sought to rectify some of the shortcomings in political and legal controls noted above – the former 
by placing some prerogative powers or conventional controls on a statutory footing and the latter 
by extending the scope of judicial review.  The remainder of this chapter will therefore discuss in 
detail the most recent parliamentary and judicial efforts at doing so and consider, firstly the extent 
to which they can be seen to effectively plug the gap in accountability, and secondly their effect on 
the balance within the constitution between its legal and political elements.  This chapter will 
focus in particular on the recently enacted Fixed-term Parliaments Act 2011, which placed the 
once prerogative power of the Crown to dissolve Parliament on a statutory footing, along with the 
controversial decision of the House of Lords in Bancoult (No. 2), which extended judicial review to 
include Orders in Council issues under the prerogative. 
3.2 Placing the Prerogative, or Controls on it, on a Statutory Footing 
As noted above, the historic failure of Parliament and the courts to control the prerogative stems 
from the absence of a requirement for prior parliamentary approval for the use of prerogative 
powers, from the fact that positive authority is not needed for the court to rule in favour of the 
existence of a claimed prerogative power, and from the prerogative's historic immunity from 
judicial review.       
The first two problems can to an extent be overcome by constitutional conventions.  Prerogative 
powers could be subject to conventions which place constraints upon its exercise, including a 
requirement of prior-parliamentary approval in some instances.  When such conventions are 
codified as part of an ‘authoritative statement,’61 the prerogative powers they regulate may also 
be accorded a degree of positive authority, thereby enabling the courts, where appropriate, to 
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determine the existence and scope of prerogative powers more firmly in line with Parliament's 
wishes.  As will be discussed in greater detail in the next chapter, conventions of this kind, because 
it is a political as opposed to a legal method of controlling the exercise of the prerogative, would 
be of particular normative value to political constitutionalism.  Despite Britain's heavy dependency 
upon conventions, however, few conventions exist which actually regulate the executive's exercise 
of the Crown's prerogative powers.62   
A solution to all three problems would be to place the prerogative powers themselves on a 
statutory footing.  As Adam Tomkins argues, ‘[t]he starting principle for executive power should be 
the same for central government as it is for local government: namely, that the government may 
exercise only those powers which are expressly (or by necessary implication) conferred upon it by 
statute.’63  By placing prerogative powers on a statutory footing, the prerogative powers are 
replaced with a statutory equivalent and accorded positive authority.  Crucially, when passing the 
legislation, Parliament is also able to determine the limits of the powers that the courts may then 
enforce in conformity with the ultra vires model of review.  Parliament may also stipulate that 
specific powers may only be used upon securing Parliament's prior approval, thereby further 
strengthening political, rather than judicial, controls.  Legislative reform, therefore, can 
demonstrate that Parliament, not the prerogative, is the source of executive power, thereby 
reaffirming the executive's subservience to Parliament and bolstering the doctrine of 
Parliamentary sovereignty.   
Strengthening Parliamentary controls over the prerogative in this manner, however, should not be 
assumed to be the exclusive preference of political constitutionalists.  As noted above, there is a 
degree of overlap between the two schools of constitutionalism and both want to see effective 
controls over government.  Although political constitutionalists prefer political rather than judicial 
controls, legal constitutionalists would nevertheless find any extension of political controls 
unproblematic.  Legal constitutionalists call for enhanced judicial controls, but only where they are 
appropriate and effective.  Subjecting the exercise of specific prerogative powers to prior 
parliamentary approval, therefore,  is a development which would almost certainly receive 
widespread support. 
Although enthusiastic about placing all prerogative powers of the Crown on a statutory footing, 
Tomkins has nevertheless expressed doubts over the likelihood of any prerogative powers being 
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voluntary relinquished by the government.  As he notes, ‘[n]o government can realistically be 
expected to volunteer to surrender such powers: this is not the way politics works ...  If the 
prerogative is going to be wrested away from the government it is going to be as a result of 
parliamentary insistence, not government self-sacrifice.’64  Despite his scepticism, however, the 
legislative reform of the prerogative can be seen to have a long history, with some of Parliament's 
most recent attempts proving to among the most dramatic.   
Although the Bill of Rights 1688 was an Act of Parliament which abolished some prerogative 
powers whilst restricting others, legislative reform of the prerogative has been sporadic, 
pragmatic, and piecemeal, having been initiated for a variety of ‘different reasons and 
motivations.’65  Some prerogative powers have been abolished, as seen with the Wild Creatures 
and Forest Laws Act 1971 (the right of the Crown to all wild animals except royal fish and swans), 
placed on a statutory footing, as seen with the Interception of Communications Act 1985 (the 
power exercised by the Home Secretary to issue warrants authorising the interception of 
communications) and the Treasure Act 1996 (the Crown’s right to treasure trove), or retained but 
regulated by statute, as seen with the Royal Assent Act 1967 (the power to convert a Bill into an 
Act of Parliament).  Executive agencies that were established under the prerogative for the 
Defence of the Realm have also been subsequently placed on a statutory footing, as seen with the 
Security Service Act 1989 (the Security Service) and the Intelligence Services Act 1994 (the GCHQ 
and the SIS).  More importantly, many of the Crown’s most significant and controversial powers 
have been left untouched, such as the power of the Crown to declare war and deploy armed 
forces. 
Despite the ambitious reform agenda of the 1997, New Labour under Tony Blair likewise made no 
attempt to reform the prerogative powers of the Crown.66  Although some have sought to argue 
that the enactment of the Human Rights Act 1998 removed the prerogative’s remaining immunity 
from judicial review,67 at least in situations where Convention rights were engaged, its effect has 
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been incidental at best, and non-existent at worst.68  However, in an attempt to distinguish his 
premiership from that of his predecessor, Gordon Brown, on becoming Prime Minister in 2007, 
expressed the ambition for large-scale reform of government.  Contained within the green paper 
The Governance of Britain69 were reform proposals, later developed in white paper The 
Governance of Britain – Constitutional Renewal, 70 which the then Government claimed were 
designed to re-invigorate British democracy by limiting the power of the executive and making it 
more accountable to Parliament71 – to ‘begin the journey towards a new constitutional settlement 
– a settlement that entrusts Parliament and the People with more power.’72  This therefore 
required reform of arguably the most significant and most controversial prerogative powers of the 
Crown: the power to declare war and deploy the armed forces, ratify treaties, manage the Civil 
Service, and dissolve Parliament.  Compared with New Labour’s 1997 reform package, the Brown 
reforms had a distinctive republican or political flavour about them.  Instead of adopting largely 
legal mechanisms for holding the executive to account, in order to compensate for but in no way 
repair the perceived weaknesses and failure of Parliament to do so, the Brown reforms sought 
instead to strengthen political control over the executive.  Although the Brown reforms marked an 
improvement on the previous situation, they ultimately failed to readdress the balance between 
Parliament and the executive in favour of the former in relation to the prerogative for two 
reasons: firstly, because only two of the four prerogative powers were successfully reformed; 
secondly, because the reforms sought suffered from critical weaknesses that undermined their 
effectiveness. 
The two reforms that were successfully implemented were in relation to the management of the 
Civil Service and the ratification of treaties.  Proposals for the reform of the management of the 
Civil Service were by far the most bold and ambitious of those sought.  Up until the Constitutional 
Reform and Governance Act 2010, the Civil Service was managed by the Prime Minister (in his 
capacity as Minister for the Civil Service) via Orders in Council issued under the royal prerogative.73  
Labour successfully proposed to remove these prerogative powers and place the management of 
the Civil Service on a statutory footing instead, which eventually became Part 1 of the 
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Constitutional Reform and Governance Act 2010.74  Statute, not the prerogative, should now be 
the source of executive power, thereby strengthening the ability of both Parliament and the courts 
to hold the executive to account.  Despite its boldness, however, the statutory powers conferred 
by the 2010 Act do not apply to national security vetting;75 this instead continues to be managed 
by prerogative power,76 thereby maintaining a gap in accountability. 
In addition to this, the reform successfully sought in relation to the ratification of treaties was 
much weaker.  The Government did not place the prerogative power of the Crown to ratify 
treaties on a statutory footing, but instead decided to codify as part of a statue the Ponsonby Rule 
– the constitutional convention whereby a treaty must be laid before both the House of Commons 
and the House of Lords for a minimum of twenty-one sitting days before it is officially ratified by 
the government.77  The reform, however, suffers from a number of weaknesses which ultimately 
undermine its aim of strengthening Parliament's control over the exercise of the prerogative.  
Under s 20(1) of the Constitutional Reform and Governance Act 2010, the House of Commons 
may, if it chooses, reject the ratification of a treaty within twenty-one sitting days of the treaty 
being laid before Parliament.  However, even if the House of Commons passes a motion opposing 
ratification, a Minister may nevertheless lay the same treaty before Parliament again, thereby 
giving the Commons a further twenty-one sitting days to decide whether it still wishes to reject it.  
This process may be repeated as many times as the government wishes.78  Moreover, the 
government is permitted to forgo s 20(1) altogether and ratify a treaty without giving the House of 
Commons the opportunity to reject it.79  As the Public Administration Select Committee therefore 
noted: 
 It certainly does not seem right to us that it should be for the Government alone to 
 decide whether to circumvent its obligations to Parliament.  A safeguard that can be 
 ignored at will is no safeguard at all.  Other leading democracies do not allow their 
 Governments to avoid their obligations to Parliament at their sole discretion.80  
On the reform of the Crown’s war powers and power of dissolution, the proposals put forward  
were never implemented.  Despite placing the Civil Service on a statutory footing, Labour rejected 
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the idea of doing the same for the Crown’s war powers, and instead proposed to pass a House of 
Commons resolution declaring a convention that the House of Commons must give their approval 
for the use of armed forces.  The proposed resolution, however, was drafted in such a way that 
the Prime Minister retained considerable discretionary power on the issue of going to war.  As the 
Public Administration Select Committee observed:  
A Prime Minister should not be able to choose whether or not to seek the support of 
Parliament based on political expediency; nor should he be able to present information to 
Parliament in a way which is partial or subjective, leading members of the Commons 
perhaps to support a conflict which they might not support if more information was 
available to them.81 
The green paper proposal to reform the Crown’s power of dissolution – a power Hilaire Barnett 
describes as ‘perhaps the most important residual prerogative exercised personally by the 
sovereign’82 – was not even included in the white paper at all, but sought only to alter current 
convention so that the Prime Minister would in future be required to seek the approval of the 
House of Commons before asking the Monarch to dissolve Parliament, thereby triggering a general 
election.83  However, following the defeat of Labour in the May 2010 elections to Westminster, the 
newly-formed Conservative-Liberal Coalition Government carried on their predecessor’s goal of 
strengthening Parliament’s control over the exercise of the prerogative in the form of the Fixed-
term Parliaments Act 2011, which makes statutory provisions for elections to Parliament to be 
held every five years on the first Thursday of May.84  Consequently, the Act puts into statute the 
automatic dissolution of Parliament seventeen working days in advance of a general election, thus 
abolishing the prerogative power of the Crown, exercised by the Prime Minister, to dissolve 
Parliament whenever he or she so chooses.85   
Before the passage of the Fixed-term Parliaments Act, s 7 of the Parliament Act 1911 set the 
maximum life of a Parliament to five years from the day it was summoned following a general 
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election, the expiry of which would automatically trigger Parliament's dissolution.86  As Rodney 
Brazier has noted, however, 'Parliament never ends in that way: it is ... dissolved by the Sovereign 
on the Prime Minister's advice.'87   
The constitutional significance of the power of the Crown to dissolve Parliament cannot be 
understated.  As B.S. Markesinis noted, '[a] dissolution of Parliament, on the Prime Minister's 
advice, is a very serious and important decision ... [D]issolution shortens the life of the existing 
Parliament and plunges the country into the tumult and turmoil of elections which are bound to 
disrupt its normal activities.'88  Not only this, but an election also brings with it the prospect of a 
new Prime Minister.  Although the power to appointment the Prime Minister rests again with the 
Crown under the prerogative, such power is heavily regulated by convention.  As Rodney Brazier 
explains: 
 In theory the Queen could commission anyone she pleased to form a government.  But in 
 practice such a notion is entirely removed from reality, because of course today the royal 
 discretion is subject to several limiting factors, the most important of which is that in 
 making an appointment she should commission that person who seems able to command 
 a majority in the House of Commons.  The other restraints are that the person chosen 
 must be a Member of Parliament (or be about to occupy his seat as an MP after a general 
 election), must not be a peer (unless he can disclaim his peerage under the Peerage Act 
 1963 and seek a seat in the House of Commons), and must usually be the elected Leader 
 of his party.89   
Because all the major political parties in Westminster now have their own rules and procedures 
for selecting their Leader,90 the Crown no longer has to become actively involved in deciding who 
can best command a majority of the House of Commons when there is no clear successor to the 
leadership of the party forming government as was the case in 1957 and 1963.91  Because to these 
party mechanisms for selecting a leader, Markesinis, with one minor reservation,92 has suggested 
that '[n]owadays it is doubtful ... whether the Queen still possesses this prerogative.'93  Brazier, 
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however, has argued that the Crown's power to appoint a Prime Minister is not yet redundant, 
and identifies several situations when the Crown would be unable to leave the choice to political 
parties.  Although the majority of situations he identifies involve the complexity of the Labour 
Party's electoral college system for choosing its leader, he crucially includes the situation when 'a 
coalition is needed, either as a matter of extreme urgency (so that there is no time for any party 
election), or when Parliament is dissolved.'94  As Brazier therefore concludes: 
 [A]lthough there has undoubtedly been a shift of constitutional responsibility from the 
 Sovereign to the political parties, enhancing the dignity of the head of state while, where 
 possible, making the choice of a head of government more democratic, there remains 
 sufficient possible circumstances in which the Queen would have to exercise her 
 prerogative of choice unaided by the parties.  It is much too soon to consign that part of 
 the royal prerogative to the lumber room wherein lie discarded bits of constitutional law 
 and practice.95 
Given the potentially widespread and costly consequences of a dissolution of Parliament, 
therefore, the power of the unelected Crown to interfere directly with the everyday functions of 
the democratically-elected legislature has proven controversial.  The limits of the Crown's power 
to dissolve Parliament, therefore, have been hotly debated in the twentieth century, most notably 
by Markesinis and then later by Brazier. 
As with all prerogative powers, the decision when or whether to dissolve Parliament rested solely 
with the Crown's discretion.  As Markesinis observed, however, this was never strictly the case: 
 Technically speaking, in the United Kingdom a dissolution necessitates an Order in Council, 
 the Lord President accepting responsibility for summoning the Council.  It also necessitates 
 a Proclamation and writs of summons under the Great Seal, for which the Lord Chancellor 
 is held responsible.  It is therefore obvious that dissolution cannot originate only from the 
 King. 
 From the constitutional and political angle it also appears to be universally accepted that 
 the Monarch may never use the prerogative power relating to a dissolution of Parliament 
 in an arbitrary way, entirely on his own responsibility.  There must always be a Minister 
 willing and prepared to assume responsibility for the Monarch's act and thus shield him 
 from attack, should there be any.96   
Up until the early twentieth century, it was clear that the Monarch could force a dissolution 
regardless of whether the Prime Minister agreed or not.97  In order to further bring the Crown's 
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power of dissolution under Parliament's control, a convention eventually emerged whereby the 
Monarch could only exercise her prerogative powers upon the advice of Ministers.  In the case of 
the Crown's power to dissolve Parliament, this was the advice of the Prime Minister.  As 
Markesinis observed in 1972, therefore, the Crown's power of dissolution shifted in the twentieth 
century from the Crown to the Prime Minister.  The key constitutional question thus became, not 
whether the Monarch could enforce a dissolution, but whether the Monarch could refuse a 
request for dissolution from the Prime Minister.98 
Markesinis was of the opinion that the Crown could still refuse a dissolution under specific 
circumstances.99  Although Markesinis observed that the conventions regulating the Crown's 
exercise of the power to dissolve Parliament were in serious doubt,100 he nevertheless identified 
the following rules regulating the Crown's exercise of its power to dissolve Parliament which had 
emerged in practice: 
 (i) The Crown cannot force a dissolution upon a Government; this would also imply its 
 dismissal. 
 (ii) The Crown, in the vast majority of cases, must act on the advice of the Prime Minister 
 of the time. 
 (iii) The Crown cannot refuse a dissolution to a majority Prime Minister.  The size of his 
 party's majority is irrelevant. 
 (iv) The timing of and reason for dissolution is left to the Prime Minister's discretion. 
 (v) The Crown may, under certain circumstances, refuse a dissolution to a majority 
 Government (whether defeated or undefeated) provided an alternative Government is 
 possible and able to carry on with the existing House.  If the Government is censured it is 
 advisable that the Crown recall its predecessor and grant its request to dissolve. 
 (vi) Though an appeal to the electorate is always proper a series of dissolutions, 
 particularly if they are based on the same reason, might represent a triumph over and not 
 a triumph of the electorate. 
 (vii) A Government which has been granted a dissolution may not proceed to a second 
 dissolution until the new Parliament proves unworkable and no other Government is likely 
 and willing to carry on with the existing House. 
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 (viii) The question as to which party was granted the previous dissolution and the timing of 
 dissolution (first or last of the Parliament) are matters which may be taken into account 
 but are not in themselves decisive.101       
Although the Crown's right to dissolve Parliament was thus limited by convention to such an 
extent that it prevented granting a Prime Minister a completely free hand at deciding when to 
dissolve Parliament, it remained the case that no conventions existed regulating the Prime 
Minister's right to do so.102  It is submitted, however, that the Prime Minister may nevertheless 
have been obliged to request a dissolution in the event of either a successful vote of no 
confidence in his government or, as the case may be, an unsuccessful vote of confidence in his 
government, thereby suggesting that his discretion, although unquestionably wide, was not 
completely unlimited.  As Brazier observed, '[d]efeat on an unambiguous motion of confidence or 
of no confidence has been treated as fatal by all governments since 1832.'103 
As discussed in greater detail in Chapter Four, there are two types of constitutional conventions 
under the British constitution: regulatory and foundational.  Regulatory conventions influence the 
behaviour of democratically-elected politicians, whilst foundational conventions serve to establish 
the political framework from which the political behaviour of such politicians may then be 
regulated.104  Conventions regulating the Crown's power to dissolve Parliament, it is submitted, fall 
into the latter category and thus, in the absence of any conventions regulating the Prime 
Minister's right to request a dissolution of Parliament, do not make the executive more 
accountable to Parliament.  As a result of this accountability deficit, the Prime Minister was 
accorded a political advantage over his opponents. 105  As Brazier has noted: 
 The Prime Minister will usually bring about a dissolution in good time before the 
 maximum duration of Parliament and at the best moment as he can judge it for his party 
 to win: this is an unfair advantage for him, but one which the Leaders of the opposition 
 parties in the main hope to enjoy themselves one fine day.106     
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This advantage extends also to members of the Prime Minister's own party, thereby making the 
power to dissolve power a powerful tool in enforcing party discipline as MPs seldom enjoy fighting 
elections and the risk of defeat that goes with them.107  Prime Minister John Major in particular, 
during his turbulent administration, resorted to tabling motions of confidence in his own 
government in order to compel his own MPs to support his initiatives.108 
Following this, it can be seen that the green paper proposals for reform of the power of the Crown 
to dissolve Parliament, had they been implemented, would have subjected the Prime Minister's 
use of the prerogative to prior parliamentary approval, thereby strengthening Parliament's control 
over the executive.  The Fixed-term Parliaments Act, therefore, can be seen to be of far greater 
constitutional significance to that of the Brown proposals in two important respects. 
Firstly, The Governance of Britain green paper, as noted above, sought only to alter the current 
convention.  Because of the non-legal nature of conventions, their success at strengthening the 
position of Parliament is necessarily a relative one.  It is in many ways the least one could do to 
strengthen the accountability of the executive to Parliament.  Conversely, introducing fixed-terms 
is the most one could do.  As Robert Blackburn argues: 
The principal argument behind fixed term Parliaments is to remove this unfair advantage 
to the party in government, and lay down politically neutral constitutional rules imposed 
by law and known to all parties in advance.  This would go further to distribute the balance 
of power away from the Executive towards Parliament, as aspired to in Labour’s 
constitutional renewal programme.109            
Secondly, and closely related to the first, the change is significant for the simple reason that it was 
deemed extremely unlikely to occur.  As Blackburn also notes on the prospect of introducing fixed-
term parliaments: 
The prerogative power of dissolution of Parliament is a potent political tool, and its 
relinquishment by the Executive in favour of fixed intervals between elections will require 
considerable strength of character and will-power on the part of whichever future Prime 
Minister decides to adopt and implement the reform.  It will be a rare example of political 
self-sacrifice, even greater than Herbert Asquith's decision to reduce the maximum 
parliamentary (and therefore governmental) term of office from seven to five years in the 
Parliament Act 1911.110 
                                                     
107
 Markesinis, n 88, 121. 
108
 Brazier, n 86, 219. 
109
 Blackburn, n 71, 785. 
110
 Ibid, 789. 
 91 
The Government therefore boasted that the reform was ‘a significant and unprecedented 
surrender of Executive power,’111 which, as the Deputy Prime Minister Nick Clegg MP stated, was 
‘fundamental to this House [of Commons] and our democracy.’112 
However, despite the fact that the prerogative power to dissolve Parliament has now been 
abolished, it was generally recognised that a power to dissolve Parliament in certain circumstances 
was still needed.  As the Deputy Prime Minister argued, ‘there are circumstances in which the 
desire for a general election to press the reset button, is so great that something needs to 
happen.’113  Such circumstances could include where a Prime Minister dies or resigns,114 or either 
where a split in a coalition occurs, or where a government with a small working majority loses bye-
elections or undergoes a backbench revolt, resulting in unworkable government.  As a result, the 
power to dissolve Parliament and trigger an early election has been transferred from the Prime 
Minister to Parliament, albeit in a largely diluted form.  As the Government categorically stated, 
‘[t]he ... [Fixed-term Parliaments Act] ... provides that the power to trigger an early general 
election will rest with Parliament.’115  Although a number of potential weaknesses with the Act 
have been identified, it will be shown below that these weaknesses are theoretical and unlikely to 
ever materialise. 
The Act provides two ‘safety valves’116 by which an early general election can be initiated.  The first 
method for triggering an early general election is through the passing of a motion in the House of 
Commons which states that there should be one.117  However, the Act qualifies this new 
parliamentary power in the form of a procedural limitation.  Originally, it was intended that 
Parliament could be dissolved prematurely if 55 per cent of all MPs voted in favour of doing so.118  
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Under the Act, this was changed to two-thirds of all MPs.119  This provision means that early 
elections cannot be called for the benefit of the ruling party, as no post-war government has ever 
secured two-thirds of all seats in the Commons.  It means also that Parliament is less likely to be 
dissolved prematurely120 – this is, after all, the purpose behind of the Act.  As the Minister for 
Political and Constitutional Reform Mark Harper MP explained: 
 [T]he logic was to set a number that was sufficiently high that it was unlikely that a 
 government could reach it ... it would have to be a cross-party decision with broad 
 support across the House, which means that it would not be being done for partisan 
 reasons but because of the general sense that an early election was in the interests of 
 the country.121   
As the Political and Constitutional Reform Committee observed, the requirement for a super-
majority in the House of Commons is a novelty.122  It does not, however, shift the balance within 
the constitution away from the political and towards the legal.  Super-majorities are indeed more 
commonly associated with primarily legal constitutions, but the adoption of them under the Act in 
no way constitutes a limitation on the power of Parliament 'to make and unmake any law 
whatever.’123  Any procedural limitation remains subject to repeal or amendment by legislation 
passed with a simple majority.   
Despite this, however, some have nevertheless argued that the requirement for a super-majority 
will dilute the ability of parliamentarians to hold the government to account.   As George Howarth 
MP has argued: 
We are sent here [the House of Commons] to exercise a judgment about many things, one 
of which is the performance of any Government at any given time.  One of the devices 
that we have at our disposal in such circumstances is a vote of no confidence.  Normally, a 
vote of no confidence can trigger an election process, subject to the monarch and all the 
procedures that have to take place in those circumstances.  I do not believe that our 
constituents want us to be in a position where we retain the right to pass a vote of no 
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confidence if the effect of that vote is dependent on the proportion of members who 
voted for it … 
I was sent here to make sure that whatever the political composition of the Government 
of the day, I had the ability on behalf of my constituents to say, “Enough is enough.  Go!”  
That ability, which I have had for 20-odd years that I have been a Member of the House, is 
circumscribed by the terms of the … [Fixed-term Parliaments Act] ...124 
It is submitted, however, that this argument fails to draw a distinction between dissolving 
Parliament and dismissing government.  As seen with the second method for triggering an early 
election discussed below, Parliament can still pass a motion of no confidence by simple majority 
against the government.  The necessity for being able to call a general election in the above 
manner arises, not out of a need to hold the government to account, but out of a need to have an 
effective and legitimate government.  In other words, it is a procedure designed to allow an 
election to be called where an incumbent government needs to win the support of a newly 
appointed Prime Minister, or where government has proved to be unworkable.125  This is 
evidenced by that fact that a two-thirds majority most likely requires cross-party support.  As the 
Government asserted, ‘the proposals set out in the…[Fixed-term Parliaments Act]…already require 
cross-party agreement for the passing of a dissolution motion, since the threshold has been set at 
a level which no post-war Government has been able to achieve on its own.'126  The provision, 
therefore, was drafted to prevent not only the government from calling a general election for its 
own benefit, but the opposition also.   
The second method for triggering an early election is through the sitting government losing a vote 
of no confidence by simple majority with no motion of confidence in the government being issued 
within the following fourteen days.127  Although the wording of the enacted provision strongly 
implies that a motion of confidence can only be passed in order to reconstitute the sitting 
government,128 it is clear that the intention behind the fourteen day period was to allow ample 
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time for alternative governments to be formed as well.129  The threat of an election can be used, 
not only as a tool from which an incumbent government may theoretically be held to account, but 
also as a means by which an incumbent government may reassert its authority.   
However, because a general election will automatically take place if no alternative government 
can be formed within fourteen days, and because a vote of no confidence requires only a simple 
majority to succeed, the second safety-valve does not prevent an incumbent government from 
forcing a general election, a potential weakness of the provision that risks undermining the 
legislative intention behind the Act.  As Chris Bryant MP noted on an early draft: 
[A] Prime Minister who wanted to ensure an early general election at a time of his or her 
own choosing would simply engineer a motion of no confidence or, for that matter – as 
there is no determinant for what counts as a motion of no confidence – table a motion of 
confidence in which the Government then chose not to vote.  The Opposition would 
almost certainly vote against the motion of confidence, and an early general election 
would follow.130   
Although an early election can now only be triggered under the second safety-valve where there is 
a successful motion of no confidence in the form stipulated under s 2(4), the government, because 
it has a majority, could still engineer an early election by voting in favour of, or abstaining from, a 
motion of no confidence in itself.  It would then need only to sit-out the fourteen days allocated 
for forming a working government, as the opposition parties, even if they all decided to band 
together against the incumbent government, would assumedly not have enough MPs to secure 
the competence of the House.  The opposition, however,  would most likely see this coming and, if 
they wished to prevent an election from being called, would most likely vote against the motion of 
no confidence. 
Therefore, despite the Prime Minister retaining a de facto power to call a general election almost 
whenever he or she likes, it is submitted that its exercise is theoretical and highly unlikely.  
Although recent experiences of Canada suggests that the public are not always willing to condemn 
blatant abuses of power,131 passing a motion of no confidence in oneself is akin to political suicide.  
After all, if a government cannot trust itself, how can they expect the people to trust it and vote 
for it in the election?  As the Deputy Prime Minister Nick Clegg MP noted: 
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 [I]f a government sought to do that it would be so transparent and so self-evidently 
 grubby and self-serving that it would not do that government any good at all.  The final 
 court of opinion, of course, is what the electorate would do, and I think they would be 
 very unforgiving…can you exclude that theoretical possibility?  I think it is pretty difficult 
 to do that.  Can you exclude it in practical political terms?  I think you pretty well nigh 
 can.132 
Another potential weakness of the Fixed-term Parliaments Act is that it fails to abolish every 
prerogative power associated with the dissolution of Parliament.  Despite abolishing the Crown’s 
power to dissolve Parliament, the Act fails to abolish the power of the Crown to appoint the Prime 
Minister, and even expressly retains the Crown’s power, exercised on the advice of the Prime 
Minister, to prorogue Parliament, that is, bring to an end a parliamentary session and therefore all 
of the business before the House of Commons.133  The retention of this prerogative power caused 
concern within the Political and Constitutional Reform Committee that an incumbent Prime 
Minister, after losing a vote of no confidence, could compel an early general election in order to 
prevent the government’s rivals in Parliament forming a working government.134  If the House of 
Commons is unable to sit, the opportunities for an alternative government to gain the confidence 
needed to govern could be removed.  Although not denying the legal possibility for the power to 
suspend Parliament being used in such a way, the Government nevertheless asserts that it is 
politically impossible.  As the Government noted: 
[T]he provisions of the ... [Fixed-term Parliaments Act] ... mean that proroguing Parliament 
in these circumstances would not stop the clock on the 14-day government formation 
period, and an election would therefore result.  Political gamesmanship of the kind 
envisaged by the Committee would be a very public matter, and we believe it would result 
only in a damning verdict from the electorate at the subsequent general election.  We 
therefore see no need legally to limit the prerogative further to deal with such an 
eventuality.  The Government considers that such political safeguards in our constitution 
should not be underestimated.135       
The Select Committee on the Constitution seemed to side with the Government on this issue, 
concluding that the power to prorogue Parliament should be retained due to the very small risk of 
it being abused.136  Although this is not disputed by this thesis, it is nevertheless submitted that 
the retention of this power, along with the power to appoint the Prime Minister, sits 
uncomfortably with the abolition of the power to dissolve Parliament.  All of the prerogative 
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powers associated with the dissolution of Parliament should have been abolished and placed on a 
statutory footing in order to fill the gap in accountability. 
Because the Fixed-term Parliaments Act places the power to dissolve Parliament on a statutory 
footing, concerns were also raised during the Act's passage through Parliament by the Clerk of the 
House that the courts would be invited to scrutinise the internal proceedings of Parliament.  As 
the Clerk noted: 
[E]mbodying these internal proceedings in statute radically changes their status since, by 
reason of being embodied in statute law, they become questions which are ultimately to 
be determined by the judiciary rather than by members of the legislature accountable to 
the electorate whom they serve. 
The history of the courts’ involvement in interpreting the meaning of words in the Bill of 
Rights and the implications of human rights aspects of European law, provide no basis for 
concluding that the courts will keep out of this new statutory territory.  Indeed, it is the 
purpose of the courts to interpret and apply the law to individual cases.
137
 
Political constitutionalists would almost certainly object to judicial interference in the internal 
workings of Parliament, especially where the outcome could effectively decide who gets to form 
government.  Tomkins, for example, raises objections to the court reviewing what he considers to 
be political questions, ‘such as whether a government minister has acted as is required in a 
democratic society in the interests of national security or public health.’138  According to Tomkins, 
‘in a democracy, those who are empowered for the time being to resolve political disputes are 
required to be politically accountable.  Judges are not, which makes the transferring to the courts 
of responsibility for answering political questions objectionable.’139  Legal constitutionalists would 
also most likely view judicial interference with the internal proceedings of Parliament as 
unnecessary.140   
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It is submitted, however, that the concerns raised by the Clerk of the House were, for reasons 
shared by the Government, completely unfounded.141  Firstly, there is a legal precedent forbidding 
the courts to intervene on issues of parliamentary procedure.  As Article 9 of the Bill of Rights 1688 
states: ‘the freedom of speech and debates or proceedings in Parliament ought not to be 
impeached or questioned in any court or place out of Parliament.’142  Secondly, it is highly unlikely 
that the courts themselves would even want to discuss and decide upon political issues relating to 
the internal proceedings of Parliament.143  As Robert Hazell noted on the matter, ‘the probability 
is that they [the courts] would consider the issue to be non-justiciable; an obligation to be 
enforced in the political but not the legal sphere.’
144
  As a result, it appears all but certain that the 
Fixed-term Parliaments Act is non-justiciable.     
Although a legal means of change, the Fixed-term Parliaments Act has successfully strengthened 
parliamentary rather than  judicial controls over the executive's use of the royal prerogative in a 
way which commands broad support.  A highly controversial power which the executive was using 
to its own advantage has been removed and given instead to Parliament.  Parliament, not the 
government, may now decide if there should be an early election, thereby loosening the 
executive's grip over Parliament whilst also giving Parliament control over its own dissolution.  
Although the impact of fixed terms upon party discipline, and thus the government's hold over 
Parliament, is not yet known,145 knowledge of when the next general election is to be held may yet 
result in a loosening of party discipline, thereby further strengthening Parliament's ability to hold 
the government to account.   
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3.3 Extending Judicial Review 
It was noted in the previous chapter that judicial review under the British constitution is an 
example of complementary constitutionalism where the legal elements of the constitution support 
the political elements.  This is because of the ultra vires model of review, whereby the courts hold 
the executive to account by ensuring that it abides by the law as expressed chiefly by Acts of 
Parliament.  The royal prerogative, however, has historically been granted immunity from judicial 
review because it falls outside of the scope of the ultra vires model of review.  If the purpose of 
judicial review is to enforce the limits of statutory intention, judicial review would not logically 
apply to the prerogative because it is not derived from an Act of Parliament, but is instead a 
separate and distinct source of authority.  As Mark Elliott notes: 
In the absence of a Judicial Review Act providing for supervision of non-statutory powers, 
an immovable obstacle would block the application of the principles of good 
administration to powers which do not owe their existence to the will of Parliament, 
however significant those powers and however desirable judicial oversight of them may 
be.146             
As noted in the previous section, placing the prerogative powers of the Crown, or controls on 
them, on a statutory footing would resolve this issue, and would most likely be a solution 
supported by both political and legal constitutionalists.  It is submitted, however, that despite 
falling outside of the ultra vires model of review, the recent extension of judicial review to include 
prerogative powers, far from contradicting the underlying values of the political constitution, can 
instead be seen to complement them, thereby providing further evidence of complementary 
constitutionalism.   
The move towards expanding judicial review, however, was not a sudden occurrence after 
centuries of judicial inactivity.  It was instead a gradual process whereby the courts, little by little, 
chipped away at the prerogative's immunity to judicial scrutiny in an effort to bring its exercise 
under control, sometimes in creative ways which arguably push the boundaries of complementary 
constitutionalism.   
Although, as noted above, the courts have shown reluctance in determining the existence and 
scope of claimed prerogative powers, the courts have nevertheless actively sought to subjugate 
the executive's use of the prerogative to the will of Parliament, thereby bringing it under greater 
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control.  This is precisely what happened in Attorney-General v De Keyser's Royal Hotel Ltd.147  
Here, a hotel owner claimed compensation under the Defence Act 1842 for the occupation by the 
armed forces of his establishment during the Great War.  The Crown, however, refused 
compensation on the grounds that the hotel was requisitioned, not under the Defence Act, but 
instead under the royal prerogative.  The House of Lords unanimously held that the requisition of 
the hotel had occurred under the Defence Act and not the royal prerogative.  The hotel owner, 
therefore, was entitled to compensation as stipulated under the Defence Act.  In reaching this 
conclusion, they argued that, where a subject matter is governed both by the prerogative and by 
statute, the latter takes precedence over the former.  As Lord Atkinson noted: 
 It is quite obvious that it would be useless and meaningless for the Legislature to impose 
 restrictions and limitations upon, and to attach conditions to, the exercise by the Crown  of 
 the powers conferred by a statute, if the Crown were free at its pleasure to disregard 
 these provisions, and by virtue of its prerogative to do the very thing the statutes 
 empowered it to do.  One cannot in the construction of a statute attribute to the 
 Legislature (in the absence of compelling words) an intention so absurd.  It was suggested 
 that when a statute is passed empowering the Crown to do a certain thing which might 
 therefore have done by virtue of its prerogative, the prerogative is merged in the statute.  
 I confess I do not think the word "merged" is happily chosen.  I should prefer to say that 
 when such a statute, expressing the will and intention of the King and of the three estates 
 of the realm, is passed, it abridges the Royal Prerogative while it is in force to this extent: 
 that the Crown can only do the particular thing under and in accordance with the 
 statutory provisions, and that its prerogative power to do that thing is in abeyance.  
 Whichever mode of expression be used, the result intended to be indicated is, I think, the 
 same – namely, that after the statute has been passed, and while it is in force, the thing it 
 empowers the Crown to do can thenceforth only be done by and under the statute, and 
 subject to all the limitations, restrictions and conditions by it imposed, however 
 unrestricted the Royal Prerogative may therefore have been.148 
Their Lordships, therefore, managed to avoid reviewing the executive's exercise of the royal 
prerogative, along with the controversy it would inevitably have brought, by focusing instead upon 
the proper construction of the Defence Act 1842 and the implications they believed it had upon 
the existence and scope of the executive's claimed prerogative power.  By reasserting the 
supremacy of statute over the prerogative, however, it is submitted that Parliament, not the 
courts, were the ultimate beneficiary.  Legal methods of accountability were used, not to 
undermine the underlying values of the political school, but instead to enforce them against an 
executive all to eager to use the prerogative to subvert Parliament's clear intention. 
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Another major development in the judicial review of prerogative powers occurred in the 1967 case 
of R v Criminal Injuries Compensation Board, ex parte Lain.149  Here, the widow of a police office 
killed in the line of duty sought to challenge the refusal of the Criminal Injuries Compensation 
Board to award her compensation for her husband's death.  The Board was not a creature of 
statute, however, but instead of the royal prerogative, and it was intended that their decisions 
would not be subject to either judicial or ministerial scrutiny.150  The question before the High 
Court, therefore, was whether they had the power to review the decisions of a non-statutory 
body.  The High Court unanimously held that they did have jurisdiction to review acts of the Board, 
regardless of the fact that it did not have its origins in an Act of Parliament.  As Diplock L.J noted: 
 I see no reason in principle why the fact that no authority from Parliament is required by 
 the executive government to entitle it to decide what shall be the form of the 
 administrative process under which compensation for crimes of violence is paid, should 
 exempt the board from the supervisory control by the High Court over that part of its 
 functions which are judicial in character.  No authority has been cited which in my view 
 compels us to decline jurisdiction.  Certainly, applicants have an interest in the proper 
 performance by the board of its judicial functions.  And ... so has the public, whose money 
 the board distributes to the tune of nearly a million pounds a year.151    
The Board, despite lacking a statutory basis, was nevertheless empowered to 'take decisions 
affecting individual rights and interests.'152  By extending judicial review to include public bodies 
created under the prerogative, therefore, a significant gap in accountability was closed.  Despite 
this, however, the High Court failed to seriously consider whether the Crown possessed the power 
under the prerogative to create such a powerful body without express parliamentary approval in 
the first place.153  Greater legal control over the prerogative was achieved, therefore, but in a 
manner which subjugated the executive to the courts rather than to Parliament.    
The major breakthrough in the judicial review of prerogative powers, however, occurred in 1985 
with the GCHQ case.154  The case was centred on the legality of an instrument made under an 
Order in Council, which had in turn been made under the royal prerogative, which prevented 
members of a British intelligence agency – the Government Communications Headquarters 
(GCHQ) – from joining a trade union.  Although their Lordships found that the GCHQ members 
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were entitled to legitimately expect to be consulted prior to any changes in the terms of their 
employment, they nevertheless concluded that the actions of the Government were legal on the 
grounds of national security.   
The constitutional significance of the decision rests in the fact that three of their Lordships – Lord 
Diplock, Lord Scarman, and Lord Roskill – found that the instrument in question, despite being 
made under an Order in Council, was nevertheless in principle subject to judicial review.  The 
constitutional significance of this to the history of the royal prerogative was, and perhaps still is, 
unrivalled; the blanket immunity enjoyed by the royal prerogative by virtue of that fact that it is 
derived from an original and not a secondary source was finally rejected.   As Lord Scarman 
famously remarked: 
I believe that the law relating to judicial review has now reached the stage where it can be 
said with confidence that, if the subject matter in respect of which prerogative power is 
exercised is justiciable, that is to say if it is a matter upon which the court can adjudicate, 
the exercise of the power is subject to review in accordance with the principles developed 
in respect of the review of the exercise of statutory power ...  Today, therefore, the 
controlling factor in determining whether the exercise of prerogative power is subject to 
judicial review is not its source but its subject matter.155     
Subject matter and not source now determines reviewability, although there remains some areas 
of executive competence which the courts cannot or will not review.  In the GCHQ case itself, their 
Lordship’s clearly felt that national security was one such area of executive competence which fell 
outside the scope of review.  As Lord Diplock noted; ‘[n]ational security is the responsibility of the 
executive government ...  It is par excellence a non-justiciable question.  The judicial process is 
totally inept to deal with the sort of problems it involves.’156  Although their Lordships' exclusion of 
national security from the remit of judicial review has not been condemned by everyone,157 Lord 
Roskill’s subsequent dicta on what government activities he felt were and were not excluded from 
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judicial review prevented the decision from completely plugging the gap in accountability caused 
by the prerogative.  As Lord Roskill noted: 
I do not think that the right of challenge can be unqualified.  It must, I think, depend upon 
the subject matter of the prerogative power which is exercised.  Many examples were 
given during the argument of prerogative powers which as at present advised I do not 
think could properly be made the subject of judicial review.  Prerogative powers such as 
those relating to the making of treaties, the defence of the realm, the prerogative of 
mercy, the grant of honours, the dissolution of Parliament and the appointment of 
ministers as well as others are not, I think, susceptible to judicial review because their 
nature and subject matter are such as not to be amenable to the judicial process.  The 
courts are not the place wherein to determine whether a treaty should be concluded or 
the armed forces disposed in a particular manner or Parliament dissolved on one date 
rather than another.158   
The result of Lord Roskill’s open list of excluded competences was inevitably the continuing 
immunity of much of the royal prerogative from judicial review.  Moreover, as Thomas Poole 
remarks, even in relation to areas that are not excluded from judicial review, 'the courts tend still 
to approach the prerogative with a caution bordering on outright deference.’159  Also, because the 
case involved the reviewability of de facto secondary legislation issued under the royal 
prerogative, and not the reviewability of primary prerogative legislation, doubts over whether the 
comments by both Lord Scarman and Lord Roskill applied to the reviewability of the royal 
prerogative as a whole arose and persisted until, that is, the decision of the House of Lords in 
Bancoult (No. 2)160 twenty-three years later. 
During the intermediate period between the GCHQ case and Bancoult (No. 2), however, another 
major extension in the judicial control of the prerogative occurred in Secretary of State for the 
Home Department, ex parte Fire Brigades Union and Others.161  The case concerned an action for 
judicial review of the Home Secretary's powers under s 171(1) of the Criminal Justice Act 1988 
(CJA) to appoint the day when the new criminal injuries compensation scheme, contained 
primarily within sections 108 to 117, would come into force and replace the existing compensation 
scheme which operated under the royal prerogative.  Section 171(1) stated that:  
 Subject to the following provisions of this section, this Act shall come into force on 
 such day as the Secretary of State may by order made by statutory instrument appoint and 
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 different days may be appointed in pursuance of this subsection for different provisions or 
 different purposes of the same provision. 
Instead of implementing the statutory scheme, the then Home Secretary decided to put into force 
an alternative tariff system under the royal prerogative, a compensation scheme which was 
fundamentally different to the one outlined in the CJA.  Both the Court of Appeal and the House of 
Lords therefore had to answer two questions: firstly, whether the Home Secretary had a legal duty 
to implement the statutory scheme under s 171; secondly, whether he had acted unlawfully in 
deciding to implement the non-statutory scheme instead of the statutory one. 
By a majority of two to one, the Court of Appeal held that the Home Secretary had abused his 
powers, although their reasoning was far from unanimous.  In response to the first question, Sir 
Thomas Bingham held that the Home Secretary was under a legal duty to implement the statutory 
scheme 'as soon as he might properly judge it to be appropriate to do so' and, as a result, 'would 
be entitled to have regard to all relevant factors ... [including] ... the time needed to make 
preparations and prepare subordinate legislation.'162  On the facts, however, he held that the 
Home Secretary had not breached this duty.  Both Hobhouse L.J. and Morritt L.J., by contrast, 
disagreed with Bingham's conclusion that the Secretary of State was under a legal duty to 
implement the statutory scheme.  As Hobhouse L.J. argued:  
 Parliament in the present case has chosen by section 171(1) to provide that the  relevant 
 provisions shall not come into force until the minister decides that they  should.  It has 
 done so in unqualified terms and in words which expressly allow him to appoint different 
 dates for different provisions and even to appoint different dates for different purposes 
 for the same provision.  Parliament has chosen, despite the alternatives open to it, not to 
 impose any restriction upon the Secretary of State.  In these circumstances, in my 
 judgment, it is not possible, or proper, to imply into section 171(1) any requirement 
 whatsoever as to the time scale within which the minister may or must appoint a day.  It 
 follows that the Secretary of State cannot be required at any stage to appoint a day and is 
 at liberty to put off the appointment indefinitely.163   
Although Morritt L.J. agreed that the Home Secretary was under no legal duty to implement the 
statutory scheme,164 he nevertheless argued that the Home Secretary was under a political duty to 
do so.  As a result, Parliament, not the courts, was the appropriate forum for holding the Home 
Secretary to account.  As he noted: 
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 If Parliament considers that the Secretary of State has failed to perform his duty to 
 Parliament then there are, no doubt, adequate parliamentary means by which to 
 compel him to do so or to secure his replacement.165 
On the second question, Hobhouse L.J., applying the principle in De Keyser's Royal Hotel strictly, 
found that there had been no abuse of power.  Because sections 108 to 117 were not yet in force, 
he argued, they were not yet law.166  Consequently, '[i]f the statutory provisions were not in force 
... [t]he executive's powers would not have been abridged or qualified by any law nor would the 
executive be acting contrary to any law.'167  Sir Thomas Bingham and Morritt L.J., however, found 
that the Home Secretary had abused his powers under the royal prerogative.168  In reaching this 
conclusion, both attached significance to the fact that the tariff scheme was inconsistent with the 
compensation scheme legislated for by Parliament, regardless of the fact that the relevant 
provisions were not yet in force, thereby extending the principle in De Keyser's Royal Hotel.  As Sir 
Thomas Bingham argued:       
 [Parliament] ... has approved detailed provisions governing the form which, underpinned 
 by statute, the scheme should take ... It was, of course, open to the Secretary of State to 
 invite Parliament to repeal those provisions ... He could have sought enactment of 
 provisions giving effect to the tariff scheme in substitution for the 1988 provisions; or if 
 the 1988 provisions were simply repealed he could have exercised his prerogative powers 
 to introduce the tariff scheme, the field then being once more unoccupied by statute. 
 What in my judgment he could not lawfully do, so long as the 1988 provisions stood 
 unrepealed as an enduring statement of Parliament's will, was to exercise prerogative 
 powers to introduce a scheme radically different from what Parliament had approved.169 
By extending the principle in De Keyser's Royal Hotel, Sir Thomas Bingham and Morritt L.J. 
arguably increased judicial control over the executive's control of the prerogative without 
resorting to creative methods of statutory construction to justify their conclusions.  It is true that 
both interpreted s 171(1) as imposing a duty upon the Home Secretary despite the absence of any 
express statutory limitations, but Morritt L.J. classified it a purely political one owed to Parliament, 
and thus beyond legal enforcement by the courts, whilst Sir Thomas Bingham was unconvinced 
that the duty had in fact been breached.  The majority's decision, therefore, turned completely on 
the relationship between statute and the prerogative, specifically the superiority of statute to the 
prerogative whether in force or not.  As a result, the Court of Appeal's decision can be seen to 
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respect and reinforce the democratic legitimacy of Parliament, and is thus an example of 
complementary constitutionalism. 
On appeal to the House of Lords, their Lordships, by a majority of three to two, Lord Keith and 
Lord Mustill dissenting, upheld the Court of Appeal's ruling that the Home Secretary had abused 
his powers.  Their Lordships reasoning, however, was just as disparate as it was in the Court of 
Appeal, and although it is submitted that the decision remains an example of complementary 
constitutionalism, it is arguably less respectful to the political school than the Court of Appeal's.   
Both Lord Browne-Wilkinson and Lord Nicholls, forming the bulk of the majority judgment, held 
that, despite the absence of any express limitations on his powers under s 171(1), the Home 
Secretary was nevertheless under a legal duty to consider from time to time the question of when 
to bring into force the statutory scheme,170 a duty which they also held had been breached by the 
Home Secretary in introducing the tariff scheme under the royal prerogative which was 
inconsistent with the statutory one. 171  As Lord Nicholls argued: 
 This statutory duty is not devoid of practical consequence.  By definition, the continuing 
 existence of this duty has an impact on the Secretary of State's freedom of action.  Since 
 the legislature has imposed the duty on him, it necessarily follows that the executive 
 cannot exercise the prerogative in a manner, or for a purpose, inconsistent with the 
 Secretary of State continuing to perform this duty.  The executive cannot exercise the 
 prerogative power in a way which would derogate from the due fulfilment of a statutory 
 duty.  To that extent, the exercise of the prerogative power is curtailed so long as the 
 statutory duty continues to exist.  Any exercise of the prerogative power in an inconsistent 
 manner, or for an inconsistent purpose, would be an abuse of power and subject to the 
 remedies afforded by judicial review.172    
Although he did not comment on whether or not the Home Secretary was under a continuing duty 
to review the implementation of the statutory scheme, Lord Lloyd nevertheless agreed with his 
colleagues in the majority that the Home Secretary could not decide whether to introduce the 
statutory scheme, only when to introduce it.  As he noted: 
 The mistake which, if I may say so, underlies the dissenting judgment of Hobhouse L.J. is to 
 treat these sections [sections 108 to 117 of CJA] as if they did not exist.  True, they do not 
 have statutory force.  But that does not mean that they are writ in water.  They contain a 
 statement of Parliamentary intention, even though they create no enforceable rights.  
 Approaching the matter in that way, I would read section 171 as providing that sections 
 108 to 117 shall come into force when the Home Secretary chooses, and not that they 
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 may come into force if he chooses.  In other words, section 171 confers a power to say 
 when but not whether.173 
In implementing the tariff scheme, therefore, Lord Lloyd reached the conclusion that the Home 
Secretary had acted inconsistently with his continuing power to bring the statutory power into 
force under s 171, and thus, as a result, unlawfully. 174  As he noted:  
 I can find nothing in section 171 which, on its true construction, justifies the Home 
 Secretary's refusal to implement the statutory scheme.  Whether that refusal should be 
 regarded as an abuse of the power which he was given under section 171, or as the 
 exercise of a power which he has not been given, does not matter.  The result is the same 
 either way.  By renouncing the statutory scheme, the Home Secretary has exceeded his 
 powers, and thereby acted unlawfully.175 
Although he was of the opinion that the Home Secretary was under a continuing duty under s 
171(1) to appoint a day for the statutory scheme to come into force,176 Lord Mustill, dissenting, 
concluded that the implementation of the tariff scheme did not, in his opinion, frustrate this 
duty.177  As he noted:      
 Nothing is certain in politics.  Who is to say that a successor in office, under the  present 
 or some future administration, with wholly different ideas on social policy and financial 
 means and priorities, might not decide that the present Secretary of State has taken a 
 completely wrong turning and that after all the Parliamentary scheme is best?  If he did so, 
 and made an order under section 171(1), accompanied by the necessary regulations and 
 by executive action to wind up the new scheme, there is nothing in what the present 
 Secretary of State has done that could stand in his way.  His words have no lasting effect; 
 he has not put an end to the statutory scheme; only Parliament can do that.  So long as he 
 and his successors in office perform in good faith the duty to keep the implementation of 
 Part VII under review there is in my opinion no ground for the court to interfere.178     
Lord Keith, by contrast, agreed with Morritt L.J. that the duty upon the Home Secretary to review 
the implementation of the statutory scheme was political rather than legal in nature.  As Lord 
Keith stated:   
 [T]he terms of section 171(1) are not apt to create any duty in the Secretary of State owed 
 to members of the public ... any decision by the Secretary of State as to whether or not 
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 sections 108 to 117 should be brought into effect at any particular time is a decision of a 
 political and administrative character quite unsuitable to be the subject of review by a 
 court of law.  The fact that the decision is of a political and administrative character means 
 that any interference by a court of law would be a most improper intrusion into a field 
 which lies peculiarly within the province of Parliament.  The Secretary of State is 
 unquestionably answerable to Parliament for any failure in his responsibilities, and that is 
 the proper place, and the only proper place, for any possible failure in the present respect 
 to be called in question.179 
In making their dissenting judgments, both sought to highlight the political nature of the Home 
Secretary's power under s 171, with Lord Keith emphasising the desirability of political forms of 
accountability as a result.  In so doing, however, both failed to bring the prerogative under control 
and readdress the imbalance between Parliament and the executive.  By contrast, the majority of 
the House of Lords, despite the differences between Lord Lloyd's reasoning and that of both Lord 
Browne-Wilkinson and Lord Nicholls, successfully brought the executive's exercise of the royal 
prerogative under control by reasserting the prerogative's subservience to statute, and thus of 
Parliament's supremacy over the executive.  As Lord Browne-Wilkinson argued:   
 My Lords, it would be most surprising if, at the present day, prerogative powers  could be 
 validly exercised by the executive so as to frustrate the will of Parliament expressed in a 
 statute and, to an extent, to pre-empt the decision of Parliament whether or not to 
 continue with the statutory scheme even though the old scheme has been abandoned ...  
 It is for Parliament, not the executive, to repeal legislation.  The constitutional history of 
 this country is the history of the prerogative powers of the Crown being made subject to 
 the overriding powers of the democratically elected legislature as the sovereign body.180 
This was achieved, however, by implying a limitation upon the Home Secretary's otherwise 
unlimited discretionary power to decide both when and whether to introduce the statutory 
scheme, thereby blurring the distinction between judicial interpretation and legislative lawmaking 
in a manner arguably more akin to legal constitutionalism.  Compared with the majority judgment 
in the Court of Appeal, therefore, the decision of the House of Lords, despite its effect, arguably 
frustrates, rather than upholds, Parliament's enacted intention.  Because it readdresses the 
balance between Parliament and the executive in favour of the former, however, it is submitted 
that their Lordships ruling remains an example of complementary constitutionalism, albeit one 
which is less complementary than the Court of Appeal's decision to extend the principle in De 
Keyser's Royal Hotel to include statutory provisions not yet in force.  The decision, therefore, 
illustrates the fine and often imperfect line complementary constitutionalism treads. 
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Although the history behind and the facts of Bancoult (No. 2) are perhaps too complex to recount 
in full for the purposes of this thesis, it can nevertheless be summarised as follows:   
In 1965 the many islands of the Chagos Archipelago, located in the Indian Ocean and owned by 
Britain, were transformed into an overseas colony separate and distinct from Mauritius called the 
British Indian Overseas Territory (BIOT).  This change was enacted via the British Indian Ocean 
Territory Order 1965, an Order in Council issued under the royal prerogative.  The Order granted 
the BIOT commissioner powers to ‘make laws for the peace, order and good government of the 
territory.’  In 1971, the BIOT commissioner accordingly issued the Immigration Ordinance 1971, 
which forcibly relocated the entire population of BIOT to Mauritius.  This was done in order to 
establish a US military base on the principal island of the Chagos Archipelago – Diego Garcia – 
which was formalised in the form of a treaty between Britain and America following the forced 
exile of the Chagossians or Ilois. 
Unsurprisingly, the exiled Chagossians launched a series of legal actions against their removal, 
beginning in 1975, and culminating in 1998 with a judicial review challenge against s 4 of the 
Immigration Ordinance 1971.181  In Bancoult (No. 1), the High Court found that the removal and 
relocation of the native population to Mauritius under the Immigration Ordinance 1971 was 
unlawful and that the power of the BIOT commissioner to ‘make laws for the peace, order, and 
good government of the territory’ was broad but not unlimited.  As Laws L.J. noted, the islanders 
‘are to be governed; not removed.’182  Initially, the Government promised to abide by the 
judgment of the High Court and allow the Chagossians to return to their native islands, apart from 
Diego Garcia.183  In 2002, however, a feasibility study on Chagossian resettlement was published 
which found that long-term resettlement, due to the effects of global warming on seas levels, 
would be both 'precarious and costly.'184  The findings of this report, along with 'concerns about 
the effect of re-settlement of the other islands on the security of US bases on Diego Garcia,' 
persuaded the Government to unexpectedly withdraw its support for resettlement in 2004.185  As 
a result, the Government, in order to reinstate control over immigration and prevent Chagossian 
resettlement, used its powers under the royal prerogative to replace the 1965 BIOT Order with the 
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BIOT (Constitution) Order 2004 and issue a new BIOT (Immigration) Order.  Section 9 of the 
Constitution Order 2004 stated clearly that ‘no person has a right to abode in the territory,’ and 
that ‘no person is entitled to enter or be present in the territory except as authorised by or under 
this Order.’   
In Bancoult (No. 2), the legality of the two new Orders in Council was challenged.  The suspicion 
was that the British Government had opted to ‘legislate around’186 Bancoult (No. 1) by 
implementing these new measures, not through reviewable secondary prerogative legislation, but 
through primary and (it was thought) un-reviewable prerogative legislation.187  As Sedley L.J. in the 
Court of Appeal noted:  
The unannounced withdrawal of the Chagossians’ right to return by the two Orders in 
Council in 2004 has been defended in court not on the ground of an ineluctable change of 
circumstances and policy but on the ground that, by using Orders in Council, ministers 
could do with impunity something which was known to be unlawful when done by 
Ordinance.188   
The Court of Appeal upheld the decision of the Divisional Court189 to quash the Orders in Council 
on the grounds that they constituted an 'abuse of power on the part of the executive 
government.'190  This was because the Orders in Council, not only 'frustrated the legitimate 
expectation ... that the Chagossians would be vouchsafed a right to return,'191 but negated also 
'one of the most fundamental liberties known to human beings, the freedom to return to one's 
homeland ... for reasons unconnected with the well-being of the people affected.'192   
On appeal, the House of Lords, by a majority of three to two, overruled the Court of Appeal's 
decision that the Constitution and Immigration Orders were unlawful abuses of power.193  In 
making their judgments, their Lordships had to answer four fundamental questions, the second of 
which is of particular importance to this thesis: (1) Did the Crown have the power under the royal 
prerogative to legislate in order to exile an entire population from its native homeland?  (2) Were 
Orders in Council issued under the royal prerogative subject to review by the courts?  (3) If so, 
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what standard of review should be applied to the Crown's exercise of its prerogative powers in this 
instance? And (4) Did the Chagossians have a legitimate expectation that they would be 
resettled?194 
On the first question, the majority of the House of Lords held that the Crown, despite '[t]he 
absence of any precedent for the exercise of the royal prerogative to exclude the inhabitants of a 
colony,'195 did have the power under the royal prerogative to deny the right of abode to an entire 
population.  As Lord Hoffmann declared: 
 In a ceded colony ... the Crown has plenary legislative authority.  It can make or unmake 
 the law of the land. 
 ... [T]he right to abode is a creature of the law.  The law gives it and the law may take it 
 away.  In this context I do not think that it assists the argument to call it a constitutional 
 right.  The constitution of BIOT denies the existence of such a right.196 
On the second question, their Lordships unanimously agreed with their colleagues in the Court of 
Appeal that all Orders in Council were open in principle to review by the courts.  As Lord Rodger 
noted, ‘[n]owadays, a broader form of review of prerogative acts is established ...  Therefore ... I 
see no reason in principle why, today, prerogative legislation, too, should not be subject to judicial 
review on ordinary principles of legality, rationality and procedural impropriety.’197  On the third 
question, however, the majority, despite ruling that Orders in Council were subject to review by 
the court, held that their decision to exile the Chagossians was not irrational.  In reaching this 
conclusion, the majority showed particular deference to the Government on matters of colonial 
governance and national security.  As Lord Hoffmann stated plainly and unambiguously: 
 Policy as to the expenditure of public resources and the security and diplomatic  interests 
 of the Crown are peculiarly within the competence of the executive and it seems to me 
 quite impossible to say, taking fully into account the practical interests of the Chagossians, 
 that the decision to reimpose immigration control on the islands was unreasonable or an 
 abuse of power.198 
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On the fourth and final question, the majority rejected the claim that the Chagossians had a 
legitimate expectation that they would be resettled following the press release by the Foreign 
Secretary following Bancoult (No. 1) that the Government then denied in 2004 by issuing the 
Constitution and Immigration Orders.199 
Despite unanimously deciding to extend judicial review to include Orders in Council issued under 
the royal prerogative, the House of Lords' decision in Bancoult (No. 2) has nevertheless been 
widely criticised for failing to bring the Crown's exercise of the prerogative under control.  By 
extending judicial review, their Lordships did close one gap in reviewability left by the GCHQ case, 
thereby contributing towards the demystification of the royal prerogative as an immutable source 
of primary and thus unreviewable legislation.  As Richard Moules concluded following the decision 
of the Court of Appeal, ‘[t]he decision represents an important vindication of the rule of law by 
denying the executive a sphere of action, defined merely by mode of enactment, that is free from 
both parliamentary and judicial scrutiny.’200  Likewise, Mark Elliott and Amanda Perreau-Saussine 
have argued that ‘the House of Lords’ decision in Bancoult is the first decision to establish clearly 
that the prerogative itself – as distinct from secondary powers derived from exercises of the 
prerogative – exist in the shadow of the rule of law.’201  The significance of this development on 
the control of the prerogative, however, was undermined in two important respects.  Firstly, in 
finding that the Crown could deny the right of abode to an entire population by virtue of a broad 
and seemingly unlimited prerogative power to legislate for overseas territories;202 the majority in 
the House of Lords failed to curtail both the existence and scope of the Crown's prerogative 
powers in line with a key requirement of the Rule of Law, thereby continuing the trend established 
by previous case law.203  In so doing, it was harder for the majority to say that the power of the 
Crown to legislate for colonies had been used irrationally, thereby resulting in deference being 
shown to the Government's exercise of it.  Secondly, in also showing deference to the Government 
on matters of colonial governance and national security, the majority accorded it de facto 
immunity from judicial scrutiny, thereby failing to close a major gap in accountability left by the 
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GCHQ case.  As a result, Elliott and Perreau-Saussine have concluded that the decision constitutes 
only a pyrrhic victory for the Rule of Law,204 with Margit Cohn arguing that ‘their Lordships’ 
deference fails to reflect a judicial commitment to substantive legality.’205   
Despite this, however, it is submitted that the decision in Bancoult (No. 2) to extend judicial review 
to all Orders in Council complements rather than contradicts the underlying values of the political 
constitution, thereby providing further evidence of complementary constitutionalism.  This is 
because judicial review was extended in order to protect Parliament's authority, with some of 
their Lordships’ reasoning reflecting in part an argument put forward by Waller L.J. in the Court of 
Appeal that Orders in Council should be subject to review by the courts because they lack the 
democratic legitimacy of Acts of Parliament.  As Waller L.J. noted: 
The question is where in the spectrum should an Order in Council fall in the modern era?  
Should it be categorised with primary legislation passed through Parliament or with 
secondary legislation subject to a negative resolution or in some other category?  So far as 
legislation passed in Parliament is concerned, there is an opportunity for debate and 
scrutiny.  So far as subsidiary legislation in the form of regulations is concerned there is 
little opportunity for debate but as least there is the negative resolution procedure.  So far 
as Orders in Council are concerned there is simply no opportunity for debate at all and no 
opportunity for scrutiny.  It involves a minister acting without any constraint.  Indeed the 
Crown may be doing something that, if she only knew the true position, she would prefer 
not to do, and yet it is then said that the Government can hide behind the “Crown’s 
prerogative." 
In the modern era I do not believe that position is tenable.  If regulations can be set aside 
for procedural impropriety then the more so should decisions to act by Order in Council.  
Since the power of the Crown to legislate by Order in Council flows from the common law, 
it should if anything be clearer that the court has the power to interfere for procedural 
impropriety in that context than in the context where regulations have been placed before 
Parliament and passed by virtue of the negative resolution procedure.206 
This argument by Waller L.J. found its way into the judgment of the House of Lords.  In giving the 
leading judgment of the majority, Lord Hoffmann stated clearly that primary legislation made 
under the royal prerogative, unlike Acts of Parliament, should be subject to review by virtue of 
them lacking the necessary democratic credentials.  As he noted: 
It is true that a prerogative Order in Council is primary legislation in the sense that the 
legislative power of the Crown is original and not subordinate ...   
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But the fact that ... Orders in Council in certain important respects resemble Acts of 
Parliament does not mean that they share all their characteristics.  The principle of the 
sovereignty of Parliament, as it has been developed by the courts over the past 350 years, 
is founded upon the unique authority Parliament derives from its representative 
character.  An exercise of the prerogative lacks this quality; although it may be legislative 
in character, it is still an exercise of power by the executive alone.  Until the decision of 
this House in Council of Civil Service Unions v Minister for the Civil Service [1985] AC 374, it 
may have been assumed that the exercise of prerogative powers was, as such, immune 
from judicial review.  This objection has been removed, I see no reason why prerogative 
legislation should not be subject to review on ordinary principles of legality, rationality and 
procedural impropriety in the same way as any other executive action.207     
Although the other two members of the majority – Lord Rodger and Lord Carswell – did not 
mention this argument, one of the dissenting judges – Lord Mance – nevertheless endorsed Lord 
Hoffmann’s democratic justification for reviewing legislation passed under the royal prerogative in 
the belief that the interests of the Chagossians affected, though denied consideration under the 
royal prerogative, would have been taken into account if subject to debate by Parliament.  As Lord 
Mance noted: 
No doubt it is true, and I accept, that Parliament could by statute achieve the result at 
which the BIOT Order 2004 was aimed.  But that is not ... a reason for holding that the 
Queen in Council can or must “logically” be able to do the same.  On the contrary ... there 
are fundamental differences between legislation enacted by the executive through Her 
Majesty in Council and legislation subject to democratic debate in Parliament.  In the 
present case, the process adopted affected basic common law rights without any form of 
consultation whatever with the Chagossians affected.208        
As with their decision in the Fire Brigades Union case, therefore, their Lordships' decision in 
Bancoult (No. 2) to extend judicial review can be seen to have been motivated largely by a desire 
to protect Parliament's democratic authority against the executive.  This was also arguably 
achieved in a manner less ambivalent to that employed by the House of Lords in the Fire Brigades 
Union case, as the decision did not turn upon the construction of a statutory provision, thereby 
providing no opportunity for creative and expansive judicial interpretation.  Despite this, however, 
it is conceded that some of their Lordships were also driven by a desire to protect fundamental 
common law rights as well as customary international law rights. 
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In the case, Lord Hoffmann, Lord Bingham, and Lord Mance gave recognition to the existence of 
fundamental common law constitutional rights to varying degrees.209  Both Lord Bingham and 
Lord Mance in dissent recognised the existence of a common law right to abode, albeit less 
explicitly in the former instance, which had, in their view, been breached by the British 
Government.
210
  Lord Bingham also recognised the existence of a right to abode in international 
law,211 whilst Lord Mance noted the obligations of the United Kingdom under international law 
concerning the well-being of inhabitants in territories under its control.212  Leading the majority 
judgment, Lord Hoffmann recognised also a fundamental common law right not to be tortured, 
noting that ‘[t]he idea that such conduct on British territory, touching the honour of the United 
Kingdom, could be legitimated by executive fiat, is not something which I would find 
acceptable.’213  On the specific issue of a fundamental common law right to abode, however, Lord 
Hoffmann is adamant of its non-existence.  As his Lordship stated categorically, ‘there seems to 
me no basis for saying that the right of abode is in its nature so fundamental that the legislative 
powers of the Crown simply cannot touch it.’214  Both Lord Rodger and Lord Carswell were also 
doubtful as to the existence of fundamental common law rights.
215
  Although Elliott and 
Perrineau-Saussine argue that Lord Carswell, in considering the question of whether the right of 
abode is near to becoming ‘an inalienable constitutional right,’216 by inference acknowledges the 
existence and validity of fundamental common law rights – as such a discussion ‘is senseless if 
there exist no such things’
217
 – it could just as easily be said that Lord Carswell was merely 
engaging with a question at issue in the case and nothing more. 
Common law rights, therefore, appear to have had little to no impact on the majority's decision.  
Their limited recognition in the case, therefore, cannot be seen as evidence of a move towards 
legal constitutionalism.  In fact, as argued in the previous chapter, the recognition of fundamental 
common law rights can be seen to provide further evidence of the complementary overlap 
between the legal and the political schools within the British constitution.  This is because of the 
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fact that common law rights are ones which are fundamental to a democratic society and which 
cannot be abrogated save by express words in an Act of Parliament, thereby facilitating greater 
political accountability.  By giving recognition to such rights in their judgments, Lord Hoffmann, 
Lord Bingham, and Lord Mance were essentially engaging in a form of constitutional democracy 
which is respectful to both the hallmarks of the political constitution as well as to the underlying 
rights which give it its legitimacy.  Despite this, however, the majority's decision not to enforce 
such rights against the executive negates the impact of such complementary constitutionalism.   
The expansion of judicial controls over the executive's exercise of the prerogative, as seen above, 
was a long and gradual process which, in some instances, has arguably pushed the boundaries of 
complementary constitutionalism to its limits.  In so doing, however, control over the prerogative 
has been unquestionably strengthened.  Although the decision in Bancoult (No. 2) to subject the 
prerogative to judicial review should have been the crowning achievement of this age-old struggle 
to bring the Crown's powers under control, the progress made is ultimately undermined by the 
unwillingness of the court to interpret prerogative powers narrowly and abandon deference to the 
executive on matters of colonial governance and national security.  In this regard, the decision in 
Bancoult (No. 2) fails to practice what it preaches.  The executive is accorded unwarranted 
reverence which results in the executive's de facto immunity from legal scrutiny, thereby 
preventing the executive from being made subservient to Parliament. 
4. Conclusion 
The royal prerogative is an archaic relic of government which, because of its historic immunity 
from both legal and political scrutiny, is incompatible with both the legal and the political schools 
constitutionalism.  Because of the prerogative’s continued unsatisfactory prominence within the 
British constitution, therefore, real efforts have been made by both Parliament and the courts to 
close the gap in accountability it causes.  Although an improvement on the previous situation, 
their respective efforts do not completely fill the gap in accountability caused by the prerogative. 
Parliament has sought to strengthen parliamentary control over the exercise of some of the 
Crown's most significant prerogative powers by placing such powers, or controls on them, on a 
statutory footing.  Although earlier attempts suffered from critical weaknesses that ultimately 
undermined their effectiveness, the Fixed-term Parliaments Act 2011, by abolishing the Crown's 
power of dissolution and transferring it to Parliament, represents a significant strengthening of 
parliamentary controls over the executive.  Though some significant prerogative powers remain 
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unregulated by either statute or convention, the Fixed-term Parliament's extension of 
parliamentary controls is still more successful in bringing the prerogative under control than the 
extension of judicial controls following Bancoult (No. 2).  Whilst the extension of judicial review to 
include Orders in Council issued under the prerogative in Bancoult (No. 2) is a welcome 
development which marks the culmination of judicial efforts over many decades to bring the 
prerogative under control, its significance is ultimately undermined by courts’ unwillingness to 
interpret prerogative powers narrowly and abandon deference to the executive on matters of 
colonial governance and national security.  The majority in Bancoult (No. 2), far from plugging a 
gap in accountability, instead preserved it. 
On a bare reading, these two developments may also appear to pull in opposite directions.  The 
Fixed-term Parliaments Act strengthens parliamentary controls, whilst the extension of judicial 
review in Bancoult (No. 2), by its very nature, strengthens judicial controls.  The above analysis has 
revealed, however, that although these developments strengthen opposing methods of control, 
the extension of judicial review can protect, rather than contradict, the democratic authority of 
Parliament and the underlying values of the political constitution.  Therefore, although the 
decision in the Fire Brigades Union case illustrates the fine line complementary constitutionalism 
straddles between legal and political constitutionalism, the extension of judicial review to include 
the royal prerogative can nevertheless be seen to provide further evidence of complementary 
constitutionalism. 
 
 117 
Chapter Four 
CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTIONS 
1. The British Constitutional Dependency on Conventions 
It is often said that the British constitution can be found in an array of diverse sources from statute 
law, the common law, European Union law, the European Convention on Human Rights, legal 
treatises, the law and customs of parliament and, as discussed in the previous chapter, the royal 
prerogative.1  However, as any undergraduate student in law will be well aware, any analysis of 
the sources of the British constitution is incomplete without considering constitutional 
conventions.2  A.V. Dicey famously argued that conventions formed the morality of the 
constitution,3  whilst Trevor Allan has come to characterise conventions as constituting mere 
political practice.4  However, despite Allan’s use of the term ‘practice,’ conventions, despite being 
incapable of judicial enforcement, should not be confused with mere constitutional habit whereby 
‘certain governmental situations are dealt with in a particular way.’5  Instead, conventions can be 
seen to be chiefly regulatory in character, ‘a rule of behaviour’6 designed to influence the conduct 
of political actors.   As Helen Fenwick and Gavin Phillipson state, conventions are ‘non-legal, 
generally agreed rules about how government should be conducted and, in particular, governing 
the relations between different organs of government.’7  The significance here is in their use of the 
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term ‘rule,’ a term also used by Dicey.8  As Joseph Jaconelli notes, ‘[t]he important word is “rule.”  
“Rule” does not mean merely an observed uniformity in the past; the notion includes the 
expectation that the uniformity will continue in the future.  It is not simply a description, it is a 
prescription.  It has a compulsive force.’9     
Conventions can be found under many real world constitutions, including ones which have their 
foundations in law, such as the Constitution of the United States of America.  James G. Wilson has 
identified congressional powers and responsibilities, the presidency, judicial powers, and 
federalism, for example, as aspects of the Constitution of the United States of America where 
constitutional conventions operate, the most important of which concern the distribution of 
powers and their scope.10  As Anthony King has argued, ‘constitutions ... are never – repeat, never 
– written down in their entirety.’11  Despite this, however, it is apparent from even the barest of 
examinations that the un-codified British constitution relies upon conventions more so than most 
other constitutions.12  Despite having an elected Parliament, Britain would have no democratic 
government but for conventions.  Conventions are used in order to govern the behaviour of the 
Queen regarding the exercise of her prerogative powers.  It is accordingly by convention that Her 
Majesty must exercise her prerogatives (excluding personal prerogatives) on the advice of 
Ministers, appoint as Prime Minister the party leader capable of commanding a majority in the 
House of Commons, and give Royal Assent to Bills passed by both the House of Commons and the 
House of Lords.  Conventions are used also to govern the behaviour of the government and to 
regulate the relationship between the elected House of Commons and the unelected House of 
Lords.  The government cannot legislate on devolved matters without the consent of the relevant 
devolved bodies (the Sewell Convention), and government ministers are responsible to Parliament 
for their decisions (the Convention of Ministerial Responsibility) and expected to publically toe the 
government line or else resign (Collective Cabinet Responsibility).  The House of Lords, when faced 
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with a government bill implementing a manifesto promise, will not be struck down at either 
Second or Third Reading, or introduce ‘wrecking amendments’ which have the effect of changing 
its meaning and purpose (the Salisbury Convention).13  The House of Lords are also expected under 
convention to consider government business in a ‘reasonable time,’14 and to give reasonable 
notice of the consideration of amendments from the House of Commons during ‘ping-pong.’15  
Despite substituting legal rules for political ones, conventions have not to date been examined 
critically through the lens of political constitutionalism by either its proponents or opponents.  The 
aim of this chapter, therefore, is to explore the constitutional significance of Britain's heavy 
reliance upon conventions.  It will be argued that the British constitution's continuing dependency 
upon convention is indicative of it remaining primarily political in nature.  This will be shown 
through a detailed examination of the key characteristics of conventions and, crucially, how they 
differ from laws.  It will be shown that, although laws and conventions perform the same role, 
conventions may be distinguished from laws on the grounds that they are judicially unenforceable, 
a trait which will also be shown to be of particular normative value to the political school of 
constitutionalism.  Although Britain’s dependency upon convention is therefore indicative of the 
constitution remaining primarily political, it will also be argued that not all instances of British 
dependency on convention is of normative value to the political constitution.  This will be 
demonstrated through the identification of two distinct types of convention under the British 
constitution: regulatory and foundational.  Regulatory conventions influence the behaviour of 
democratically-elected politicians, whilst foundational conventions serve to establish the political 
framework from which the political behaviour of such politicians may then be regulated.  
Dependency upon convention is meaningless, however, where it is ineffective at controlling 
governmental behaviour.  This chapter will therefore consider also the effectiveness of 
conventions as constraints on political power under the British constitution.  In particular, it will 
consider the question of why conventions are abided by government and the extent to which 
recent reforms – such as the recent surge in the codification of conventions and the 
implementation of the Wright Committee Reforms16 – strengthen the role of conventions within 
the constitution.  It will be argued that, although executive compliance with conventions is unlikely 
to be motivated by a fear of political sanctions due to the government's traditional dominance 
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over the House of Commons, recent reforms have the potential to readdress this imbalance and 
thus strengthen the role of conventions as effective constraints on executive power. 
2. The Law-Convention Distinction 
2.1 The Regulatory Purpose of Conventions 
Constitutional Conventions, because they shape the behaviour of political actors, are regulatory in 
nature.  Because of this, conventions are also normative.  In considering the ways in which a 
convention can be established, Jennings concluded that mere practice, and mere precedent, is not 
enough; the persons concerned in the precedents must believe that they were bound by the rule, 
and there must, crucially, be a reason for the rule.17  As Jennings stated: 
As in the creation of law, the creation of a convention must be due to the reason of the 
thing because it accords with the prevailing political philosophy.  It helps to make the 
democratic system operate; it enables the machinery of the state to run more smoothly; 
and if it were not there friction would result.  Thus, if a convention continues because it is 
desirable in the circumstances of the constitution, it must be created for the same 
reason.18 
Admittedly, the necessity for a reason may appear self-evident.  Conventions without purpose, as 
with all rules, simply do not and cannot exist.   However, despite this, the requirement of a 
purpose for the establishment of convention has subsequently been accorded greater 
constitutional significance.  This can be seen, it is submitted, in the ruling of the Supreme Court of 
Canada in the Patriation Reference.19  
The case concerned the patriation of the Canadian Constitution by the Canadian Federal 
Government.20  Such patriation, however, ironically required the British Parliament to amend the 
British North America Act 1867 (BNAA).  The British Parliament, however, could only amend the 
statute if requested to do so by Canada.21  This request was to be made via a joint resolution of 
both Houses of the Canadian Parliament – which would include the proposed amendment to the 
BNAA permitting patriation along with a Charter of Rights and Freedoms – which would, when 
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approved by both Houses, be sent to Britain for enactment, and which would be binding, not only 
on the Federal Government, but on the provinces as well.   
Although the British Government at the time had expressed every intention of enacting the 
requested change,22 the ability of the Canadian Parliament to unilaterally alter the Canadian 
Constitution without first seeking the approval of the Canadian provinces was nevertheless 
challenged in court by a number of the provinces,23 the appeals from which were heard by the 
Canadian Supreme Court just a few days after the Canadian Senate and the Canadian House of 
Commons approved the joint resolution.  The Canadian Supreme Court therefore had to decide 
whether a convention existed under the Canadian Constitution to the effect that the Federal 
Government of Canada needed to obtain the consent of the Canadian provinces before requesting 
the British Parliament to change legislation which would affect the legislative competence of those 
provinces. 
Six of the nine judges in the Supreme Court held that such a convention did in fact exist.  As they 
noted: 
[T]he agreement of the Provinces of Canada ... is constitutionally required for the passing 
of the “Proposed Resolution for a Joint Address to her Majesty the Queen respecting the 
Constitution of Canada” and that the passing of this Resolution without such agreement 
would be unconstitutional in the conventional sense.24   
Despite this, however, the court held that it could not, by virtue of it being a constitutional 
convention, enforce the requirement.  There were no legally-enforceable limitations upon the 
power of the Canadian Parliament to pass resolutions or petition the Crown.  There were only 
political limitations – conventions – which ‘do not engage the law,’25 and which, they noted, could 
not ‘translate into a legal limitation, without expression in imperative constitutional text or 
statute.’26  As a result, the Supreme Court could prevent neither the passing of the joint resolution 
nor the subsequent request for the British Parliament to amend the BNAA.      
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In finding in favour of the existence of a constitutional convention, however, the Supreme Court 
adopted Jennings’ tripartite test.27  In so doing, the court considered the purpose, not only of the 
constitutional convention claimed, but of constitutional conventions generally.  With regards to 
the claimed convention, the court noted that its purpose was ‘to protect the federal character of 
the Canadian Constitution and prevent the anomaly that the House of Commons and Senate could 
obtain by simple resolution what they could not validly accomplish by statute.’28  On the purpose 
of conventions more generally, the court had this to say: 
The main purpose of constitutional conventions is to ensure that the legal framework of 
the constitution will be operated in accordance with the prevailing constitutional values or 
principles of the period.  For example, the constitutional value which is the pivot of the 
conventions stated above and relating to responsible government is the democratic 
principle: the powers of the state must be exercised in accordance with the wishes of the 
electorate; and the constitutional values or principle which anchors the conventions 
regulating the relationship between the members of the Commonwealth is the 
independence of the former British colonies.29 
The purpose of constitutional conventions, therefore, is to shape and inform the constitution in 
line with the principles they embody via a constitution’s political actors; to ‘impose a framework of 
rules the observance of which transcends the sectional interest of political party.’30  Hence the 
reason why, it is submitted, Dicey used the term ‘constitutional morality’31 as a substitute for 
constitutional conventions.  In this regard, conventions can be seen to perform the same function 
as the law.  James G. Wilson in particular has advocated for the greater use of constitutional 
conventions in the United States of America on the grounds that they serve the same 
constitutional purposes as the law.  As he remarks: 
Most of us know that it is difficult, if not impossible, to infer an “ought” from an “is.”  
Arguably, the widespread existence of conventions only shows that conventions ought to 
be studied, not that they ought to exist.  But there are also strong normative arguments 
for developing a doctrine of American constitutional conventions.  Conventions can and do 
serve many of the same valuable purposes that constitutional legal doctrine should fulfil.  
Conventions prevent tyranny, constrain discretion, distribute power, enhance efficiency 
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and accountability, strengthen separation of powers, and generate an internal political 
morality.’32 
Despite their shared purpose, however, it is clear that conventions remain distinct from laws.  
Although it is often argued that conventions are more flexible than laws – and therefore perform 
an important role in keeping the law up-to-date with constitutional ideas – it will be shown below 
that this is not the case.  An absence of legal enforcement, not flexibility, distinguishes convention 
from law. 
2.2 Flexibility and the Creation of Conventions  
The ruling of the Supreme Court in the Patriation Reference helps to illustrate that the principles 
embodied by constitutional conventions should not be seen to be fixed.  As the Supreme Court 
noted, conventions embody the ‘prevailing constitutional values or principles of the period.’33  In 
order to keep up with any changes in constitutional principle, there is the strong implication that 
constitutional conventions are, or should be, flexible.  As O. Hood Phillips remarked, ‘[c]onventions 
change in accordance with the ideas of government.’34  Such reasoning may go some of the way 
towards explaining Jennings’ famous remark that the purpose of constitutional conventions ‘is 
that they provide the flesh which clothes the bones of the law; they make the legal constitution 
work; they keep it in touch with the growth of ideas.’35  As Jennings went on to say: 
A constitution does not work itself; it has to be worked by men.  It is an instrument of 
national co-operation, and the spirit of co-operation is as necessary as the instrument.  
The constitutional conventions are the rules elaborated for effecting that co-operation.  
Also, the effects of a constitution must change with the changing circumstances of 
national life.  New needs demand a new emphasis and a new orientation even when the 
law remains fixed.  Men have to work the old law in order to satisfy the new needs.  
Constitutional conventions are the rules which they elaborate.36  
Geoffrey Marshall clearly shared in Jenning's view on the role of conventions, noting that their 
primary purpose was to give effect to government accountability 'in accordance with political 
reality rather than legal form.'37  Under the British constitution, conventions have certainly been 
used to bridge the gap between legal theory and political reality.  The convention that the Queen 
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must exercise her prerogative powers on the advice of her ministers is a good example of this.  
Jennings argument has also been deployed in order to explain, at least in part, the existence of 
constitutional conventions under many primarily legal constitutions.38  Conventions can assist in 
giving expression to the constitutional principles and values which are said to permeate the 
written 'higher law' constitution.39  This is especially needed in areas where the constitution itself 
may be silent and the limits or division of power uncertain – constitutional loopholes where 
elected officials could potentially act unconstitutionally without also acting illegally.40   As Wilson 
notes: 
The written text [the constitution] initially allocates many broad constitutional powers to 
different groups of political leaders, but the exercise of such powers is often not amenable 
to effective judicial review.  Only conventions can control the politicians’ implementation 
of many constitutional powers.41   
Because written 'higher law' constitutions are often entrenched, some have even argued for a 
greater reliance upon conventions under such jurisdictions than under constitutions such as 
Britain's.  As Munro argues, ‘it is at least arguable that conventions should play a larger role in 
countries with written constitutions; the greater the degree of constitutional rigidity, the greater is 
the need for the benefits of informal adaptation which conventions bring.’42   
It is argued, however, that although conventions may work change ‘without formal changes to the 
law,'43 this does not necessarily make them more flexible, and therefore more apt at gap-filling, 
than laws.  Conventions, as with laws, are normative in nature.  Their primary purpose, therefore, 
is to influence political behaviour.  This necessitates a degree of rigidity.  Under the British 
constitution, there exist a number of conventions – those governing the exercise of the Crown’s 
prerogative powers for example – which have existed for centuries and which have changed very 
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little, if at all, in that time.  Her Majesty remains an unelected Head of State who, legally speaking, 
possesses considerable and wide-ranging powers.  Flexibility is therefore not a desirable 
characteristic in this instance – rules regulating the exercise of her powers are as needed today as 
they were when they were first created.  Undue flexibility ultimately risks arbitrariness, which runs 
counter to the aims of constitutionalism.  It is submitted also that, although conventions are used 
to bridge the gap between legal theory and political reality, the gap could be just as easily bridged 
by reforming the law to better reflect political reality.  This is because the process by which 
conventions are established is often anything but quick and easy.   
As Aileen McHarg has observed, conventions may either evolve over time as  matter of practice or 
be deliberately declared.44  The orthodox view of conventions was that conventions arose or 
'evolved' slowly over time; ‘a gradual hardening of practice into rule.’45  Because of this, it has 
been argued that principle often played no role in the emergence of 'evolved conventions,'46 
although it has played some role in guaranteeing their acceptance.  As C.J.G. Sampford explains: 
Where conventions arise over time it is rarely because of right reason, goodwill or political 
morality, but because those whose interests lie in other directions face pressure to act in 
conformity to a practice.  Once the practice persists (and if the pressures remain that is 
likely), participants come to feel that the practices into which some or all were pressured 
are justified ...  These justifications reinforce the practice with internally generated moral 
pressure.  But the other pressures come first and the potential for pressure usually 
remains and is needed to steady the waters.47   
The gradual transference of executive power from the Crown to its ministers in Parliament acts as 
a good example of this phenomenon.  The Crown, instead of relying only upon its own discretion 
in exercising the royal prerogative, eventually did so more and more upon the advice of its 
ministers in Parliament, a convention which is still adhered to today.  The reason for this gradual 
surrender of power was painfully pragmatic: survival.  Following the Glorious Revolution of 1688, 
the Crown existed only at the behest of Parliament.  Parliament had been a rival to the Crown 
since the reign of Charles I and, following a series of wars and revolutions, had eventually emerged 
as the victor.  If the Crown was to survive, it would have to yield to Parliament.  Therefore, 
although retaining much of its power as a matter of law, such power would, as a matter of politics, 
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be exercised by ministers.  With the emergence of Parliament as a democratically-elected 
assembly over time this surrender of power by one institution to another became endowed with 
the democratic principle.  The Crown’s power was now to be exercised by ministers, not only 
because the Crown’s survival depends upon its appeasement of Parliament (though this is still the 
case), but because ministers were democratically-elected representatives of the people, and it was 
accordingly the right thing to do.  
'Evolved conventions,' therefore, come into existence over many years as a matter of practice, can 
change over time, and can absorb principles which help to bridge the gap between legal theory 
(such as the royal prerogative being vested in the Crown) and political reality (the need for it to be 
exercised by democratically-elected representatives).48  It is now the case, however, that 
constitutional conventions may also be 'declared' without the need for precedent.  A good 
contemporary example of such a 'declared convention'49 can be seen with the Sewell 
Convention.50  During the enactment of the Scotland Act 1998 – which devolved power from 
Westminster to Scotland – concerns arose over the preservation of Parliament’s ability to legislate 
on devolved issues without requiring the consent of the Scottish Parliament.51  In order to alleviate 
these fears, the British Government published a memorandum on the issue, which stated that ‘the 
UK government will proceed in accordance with the convention that the UK Parliament would not 
normally legislate with regard to devolved matters except with the agreement of the devolved 
legislature.’52  There was no precedent for such a convention.  The Government, in issuing the 
memorandum, created a new constitutional convention which embodied the democratic principle. 
Just because a convention can be declared, however, does not mean that it will be binding.  In 
considering the question of whether conventions can be explicitly created, McHarg argues that 
'declared conventions' should be seen as a form of constitutional soft law ‘which attempt to 
influence constitutional behaviour rather than generating binding norms.’53  She distinguishes this 
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from ‘evolved conventions,' which she claims are concerned with establishing binding norms.54  
McHarg draws this distinction on the grounds that the former is without a history of compliance 
whilst the latter is not.  As she observes, ‘it is subsequent practice, rather than initial statement, 
which has determined both the status and the scope of these constitutional norms.’55  It is also 
through this subsequent practice, she argues, that ‘the obligatory nature of conventional rules is 
not merely evidenced ... but actually constituted ...  In the absence of an authoritative text – of a 
law-giver – the requirements of a particular constitutional role can be determined only through 
the performance of that role.’56  Admittedly, without conformity to a rule, there can be no rule.  In 
this sense, McHarg’s distinction between declared and evolved conventions is sound.  The latter is 
an established rule, whilst the former is a merely a proposed rule.  Without conformity, it cannot 
be considered binding.  Subsequent conformity, McHarg notes, is therefore needed in order to 
make a 'declared convention' binding.57 
Therefore, because conventions, both evolved or declared, require either retrospective or 
prospective evidence of use in order to be considered 'binding,' it is clear that they are not 
necessarily more flexible than laws.  In fact, because conformity over many years is not required in 
order to determine the existence of validity of laws, the process by which a law is drafted, 
proposed, debated, and enacted, is comparatively quicker, easier, and arguably more apt at 
embodying the necessary constitutional principles of the day than conventions. 
2.3 Recognition versus Enforcement 
Constitutional conventions, therefore, may only be distinguished from laws on the grounds that 
they are legally unenforceable.  As Dicey famously noted: 
The rules which make up constitutional law, as the term is used in England, include two 
sets of principles or maxims of a totally distinct character. 
The one set of rules are in the strictest sense ‘laws,’ since they are rules which (whether 
written or unwritten, whether enacted by statute or derived from the mass of custom, 
tradition, or judge-made maxims known as the common law) are enforced by the courts; 
these rules constitute ‘constitutional law’ in the proper sense of that term, and may for 
the sake of distinction be called collectively ‘the law of the constitution.’ 
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The other set of rules consist of conventions, understandings, habits or practices which, 
though they may regulate the conduct of ... officials, are not in reality laws at all since they 
are not enforced by the courts.  This portion of constitutional law may, for the sake of 
distinction, be termed the ‘conventions of the constitution,’ or constitutional morality.58  
Dicey’s court-enforcement test, however, has been subject to widespread and varied criticism.  In 
particular, it has been criticised for defining conventions, as Colin Munro contends, negatively by 
example, of drawing a distinction between convention and law premised on the simple fact he 
defines law as rules capable of legal enforcement by the courts.59 
Sir Ivor Jennings, for instance, disputed Dicey’s distinction, and declared that there was ‘no 
distinction of substance or nature’60 between the two, insisting that both were dependent upon 
general acquiescence.  As he argued: 
The conventions are like most fundamental rules of any constitution in that they rest 
essentially upon general acquiescence.  A written constitution is not law because 
somebody has made it, but because it has been accepted.  Anyone can draft a paper 
constitution, but only the people concerned in government can abide by it; and if they do 
not, it is not law.61 
J.D.B. Mitchell likewise criticised Dicey’s court-enforcement test: 
Conventions cannot be regarded as less important than rules of law.  Often the legal rule is 
the less important.  In relation to subject-matter the two types of rule overlap: in form 
they are often not clearly distinguishable ... very many conventions are capable of being 
expressed with the precision of a rule of law, or of being incorporated into law.  Precedent 
is as operative in the formation of convention as it is in that of law.  It cannot be said that 
a rule of law is necessarily more certain than is a convention.  It may therefore be asked 
whether it is right to distinguish law from convention.62 
Although both writers’ arguments hold true – conventions can and do deal with issues which the 
law is capable of governing – neither explain satisfactorily why therefore conventions should be 
treated any differently by the courts who, although feeling able to give recognition to conventions 
when handing down their judgments, have consistently viewed conventions as being legally 
unenforceable.63 
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Allan, however, has challenged the extent to which judicial recognition of conventions differs if at 
all from judicial enforcement of conventions.  As he argues: 
It follows that recognition of convention by a court in the course of adjudication generally 
entails its acceptance as a rule which is legitimate.  It is acknowledged as a rule of practice 
which is grounded in political principle.  Curial ‘recognition’ implies judicial approval.  In 
the result, the distinction between recognition and enforcement – that last refuge of 
orthodox theory – plainly dissolves.  To recognize a convention is necessarily to endorse 
the principle which justifies it; and, in a context where legal doctrine is developed to 
reflect that principle, recognition means enforcement.  Indeed, in the absence of a 
willingness to act on the basis of convention – to acknowledge its significance for legal 
rights and obligations – a court’s ‘recognition’ would be empty and futile.  The positivist 
distinction between recognition and enforcement is grounded in an implausibly 
theoretical view of the judicial function: it overlooks the moral and political responsibility 
inherent in the practical activity of adjudication.64 
Allan’s argument, however, is not based upon any substantial empirical evidence of how a judge 
goes about deciding whether or not to recognise a constitutional convention.65  His proposition, 
therefore, may be dismissed on the grounds that it is more normative than analytical.  It is 
therefore submitted that there remains a real and important distinction between enforcement 
and recognition that makes conventions particularly attractive for political constitutionalists who 
wish to curtail the intrusion by the courts into the political sphere.  The decision of the Supreme 
Court of Canada in the Patriation Reference stands as a testament to this fact. 
Although it may be argued that the Supreme Court’s recognition of the claimed convention 
necessarily entails the Court's endorsement of it, it nevertheless held that it could not be legally 
enforced.  The court’s endorsement of the convention, if that was indeed what it was, did not 
result in its legal enforcement.  By recognising the convention, the court was effectively 
acknowledging that it did not have jurisdiction over the behaviour the convention regulated.  
Wilson’s work on conventions under the American constitution advocates a similar understanding.  
As he notes: 
On a purely legal level, the concept of conventions is important because it assists the 
[United States] Supreme Court in determining which constitutional issues should be 
ultimately resolved by the political branches.  Congress, the President, and/or the public 
will determine the existence of conventions, their precise contours, any violations, and 
any sanctions.  By simultaneously revealing and refining the existence of nonlegal 
constitutional conventions on political behavior which violate constitutional norms, 
constitutional conventions prevent the Supreme Court from deciding constitutional 
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controversies which are so disturbing that they cry for a remedy, but for a remedy that 
should be political, not legal.  Just as the Court is more willing to intervene when it can 
perceive a judicial remedy, it is less likely to produce final judicial resolutions if it is aware 
of alternative, political solutions.  The elected branches can sanction those who breach 
conventions, with the voters retaining the last word.  In other words, certain constitutional 
wrongs can only be effectively prevented or corrected by the politicians and/or the voters.  
Many constitutional debates should focus on the precise form of conventions, not solely 
on legal doctrine.  Many law review articles appear unaware of how the distinction 
between law and convention can improve their inquiries, even though they are primarily 
concerned with formulating appropriate constitutional conventions, not with developing 
constitutional law.66    
The result of the Supreme Court of Canada's recognition of convention in the Patriation Reference, 
it is submitted, was, if anything, political in nature.  By recognising the convention that the Federal 
Government had to obtain the consent of the Canadian provinces in order to make the changes to 
the constitution it desired, the court made it clear that the Federal Government was acting, not 
illegally, but unconstitutionally by subverting the democratic principle of the constitution.  
Although unable to enforce the convention legally, the court nevertheless firmly shifted 
responsibility for the unconstitutionality of the joint resolution to the Federal Government.  The 
Federal Government’s accountability for its actions to both the Canadian Parliament and the wider 
public was, therefore, arguably strengthened as a result of the court’s very public 
acknowledgment of its failure; this in effect gave the Parliament and the public the ammunition 
required to defeat the government should they chose to do so.  Judicial recognition of convention, 
therefore, may constitute further evidence of complementary constitutionalism.   
Despite this, however, the primary duty of the court remains to enforce the law.  If an issue was 
governed by both law and convention, therefore, the primary duty of the court, as endorsed in the 
Patriation Reference, is to enforce the law irrespective of the convention.67  Conventions, 
however, often exist in areas where legal regulation is non-existent such as, for example, in the 
exercise of the royal prerogative.  As a result, the primary duty of the court is often not engaged 
where questions concerning conventions are involved.  Judicial recognition of conventions, 
therefore, serves to reinforce, not blur, the distinction between laws and conventions. 
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3. The Constitutional Significance of British Dependency 
3.1 Regulatory and Foundational Conventions 
Because constitutional conventions represent the means by which government may be regulated 
politically without judicial interference in the political decision-making process, they can be seen 
to be of particular normative appeal to political constitutionalists who prefer political 
accountability over legal accountability.  Although it cannot be said that Britain relies more upon 
convention than it does law, it can be said to be more dependent upon convention than most 
other nations, relying upon convention for the regulation of behaviour which a primarily legal 
constitution would perhaps reserve for law.68  As noted above, without conventions, there would 
be neither democratic nor accountable government in Britain.  This would not be the case in more 
legal jurisdictions, such as the United States of America, where the basic structures of government 
are more often than not established by law. 
As a result, it is argued that such dependency upon convention is indicative of a general 
preference for political as opposed to legal accountability.  Entire swathes of the constitution 
remain non-justiciable.  The British constitution, therefore, can be said to remain primarily political 
in nature.  As Eric Barendt argues: 
The central part played by conventions in the constitutional arrangements of the United 
Kingdom indicates a preference for self-regulation by governments and politicians over a 
system of legal checks and balances enforceable by the courts, which is much more 
characteristic of modern codified liberal constitutions.  That conventions are so important 
to the working of the constitution in the United Kingdom should occasion no surprise.  
They are an integral aspect of the ‘political’ constitution.69 
Despite this, however, it is submitted that Britain's heavy reliance upon convention goes beyond 
what even a political constitutionalism would consider desirable.  This is because conventions 
under the British constitution can be separated into two types: regulatory and foundational. 
Regulatory conventions influence the behaviour of democratically-elected politicians.  The 
Convention of Ministerial Responsibility and the Sewell Convention are key examples of regulatory 
conventions.  Under the former, government ministers are placed under an obligation to make 
themselves accountable to Parliament, whilst under the latter Parliament is under an obligation to 
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not legislate in relation to devolved matters without their prior consent.  Dependency upon such 
regulatory conventions would be preferred by political constitutionalists because they constitute a 
form of self-regulation on the behalf of elected politicians.  Foundational conventions, by contrast, 
serve to establish the political framework from which the democratically-elected politicians may 
operate.  The conventions which regulate the Crown are prime examples.  Although the 
conventions governing the exercise of the royal prerogative are by design regulatory in that they 
govern the behaviour of the Crown, such conventions are ultimately foundational in effect 
because they ensure that the government is democratic and thus accountable to both Parliament 
and the electorate.  Foundational conventions, therefore, serve only to help bridge the gap 
between legal theory and political reality which, as noted above, can just as easily be remedied by 
changing the law.   
Britain's heavy reliance upon foundational conventions, especially in relation to the Crown, 
however, ultimately exaggerates and distorts the prominence of political accountability within the 
constitution.  This is because conventions which regulate the prerogative powers of the Crown de 
facto confer those powers upon government ministers.  Although the Queen may no longer be 
able to exercise the majority of her prerogative powers as a result of convention, therefore, her 
ministers certainly can.  Conventions, and their ability to move accountability of political actors out 
of the legal sphere and into the political one, is therefore of no normative value in this instance 
because rules – either legal or political – are still needed in order to regulate the government's 
exercise of the prerogative.  As noted in the previous chapter, however, conventions and laws 
governing the exercise of the prerogative are few and far between, with the existence of some 
conventions remaining in serious doubt, such as the supposed requirement for parliamentary 
approval for the use of armed forces following the government’s decision in 2003 to seek the 
House of Common’s support for military intervention in Iraq.70  Despite the presence of 
convention, therefore, a gap in accountability remains.  Given the lack of clear rules governing the 
exercise of the prerogative, as well as the government's traditional dominance over the House of 
Commons, any appearance of political accountability or control as a consequence of foundational 
conventions is illusionary.  Government may be more democratic as a result of such conventions, 
but this does not make it more accountable. 
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Therefore, although it is true to say that the British constitution remains primarily political as a 
result of its heavy dependency upon convention, the normative value of such dependency is 
severely undermined by the constitution's greater reliance upon foundational as opposed to 
regulatory conventions.   
3.2 Why do Conventions Bind? 
It is submitted also that even dependency upon regulatory conventions is meaningless where they 
are ineffective in providing real and meaningful regulation of political behaviour.  Although 
difficult to prove empirically, it appears safe to say that conventions under the British constitution 
are generally observed.  Given the fact that the existence of conventions is wholly dependent 
upon their regular observance, it is doubtful whether any of the constitution's current conventions 
could be identified as such without evidence of their compliance.  It is submitted, however, that 
mere conformity with convention alone is not indicative of real and meaningful regulation of 
political behaviour.  It is not a question of compliance but instead of enforcement: why do 
conventions bind? 
It is clear that conventions cannot arise solely from precedent.  Even 'evolved conventions' were 
once pioneering deviations of normal practice without past authority.  In order to become binding 
constitutional norms, therefore, conventions must be seen to be binding by those they purport to 
bind and by those they could bind.  As McHarg notes: 
[T]he moral commitment involved in abiding by conventions flows not from a personal 
morality, but rather from a role morality.  In other words, for a norm to have the status of 
a constitutional convention, it must be accepted as a correct and binding account of 
constitutionally appropriate behaviour by anyone who occupies the relevant role.71 
Understanding what exactly facilitates this role morality, however, is no easy task.  If it is not illegal 
for a government to disobey or deviate from convention, therefore, what then compels them to 
follow it?  Although numerous answers to this question have been proposed, it will be shown that 
each provides only a partial explanation for the obligatory nature of conventions. 
According to Jennings, conventions may be followed merely out of habit.  As he notes: 
 [M]en being what they are, they tend to follow rules of their own devising; they develop 
 habits in government as elsewhere.  And when these men give place to others, the same 
 practices tend to be followed.  Capacity for invention is limited, and when an institution 
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 works well in one way it is deemed unnecessary to change it to see if it would work 
 equally well in another.  Indeed, people begin to think that the practices ought to be 
 followed.  It was always so done in the past, they say; why should it not be done so 
 now?72 
On the other hand, Bradley and Ewing suggest that conventions are perhaps followed because it 
would be unconstitutional to do otherwise.  As they note, 'conventions are observed for the 
positive reason that they express prevailing constitutional values and for the negative reason of 
avoiding the difficulties that may follow from 'unconstitutional' conduct.'73  On this account, 
conventions can be said to posses strong moral authority, and are therefore observed simply 
because it is the 'right' thing to do.  Traces of this argument can certainly be inferred from 
Tomkins' account of the political constitution.  As discussed in Chapter Two, Tomkins argues that, 
a political constitution – whereby 'those who exercise political power (let us say the government) 
are held to constitutional account through political means, and through political institutions (for 
example, Parliament)’74 – has normative value because it is founded upon republican values such 
as 'freedom as non-domination.'75  As a result, he argues against the adoption of a legal 
constitution in Britain on the grounds that it would be unconstitutional.76  Because the hallmark of 
Tomkins' political constitution is the Convention on Ministerial Responsibility – the obligation 
upon government to make themselves accountable to Parliament – it stands to reason that any 
failure to observe it would likewise be deemed unconstitutional.   
By leaving compliance with conventions wholly dependent upon the moral persuasions of those 
they purport to bind, however, habit and moral imperativeness serve only to undermine the 
reliability of conventions as effective constraints upon primarily executive power.  Cynical of the 
extent to which government can be trusted to do the 'right' thing, some have accordingly sought 
more pragmatic reasons behind executive compliance with conventions.  As Dicey himself asked, 
'[w]hat is the sanction by which obedience to the conventions of the constitution is at bottom 
enforced?'77   
In an attempt at answering the difficult question he himself posed, Dicey was ultimately unable to 
escape the coercive force of the law, and explained the binding nature of conventions by arguing 
that a breach of convention would inevitably result in a breach of law.  As he noted:   
                                                     
72
 Jennings, n 17, 80. 
73
 Bradley and Ewing, n 12, 24. 
74
 Tomkins, A. Public Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), 18. 
75
 See Tomkins, A. Our Republican Constitution (Oxford and Portland, Oregon: Hart Publishing, 2005), 46-52. 
76
 Ibid, 40. 
77
 Dicey, n 3, 292. 
 135 
 [T]he sanction which constrains the boldest political adventurer to obey the 
 fundamental principles of the constitution and the conventions in which these principles 
 are expressed, is the fact that the breach of these principles and of these conventions 
 will almost immediately bring the offender into conflict with the Courts and the law of 
 the land.78 
Given the interdependency within the British constitution between law and convention, as 
witnessed in the previous chapter in relation to the Fixed-term Parliaments Act 2011, Dicey's 
argument has some basis.  A breach of convention may indeed result in a breach of law, but the 
circumstances whereby this would occur is difficult to state with any certainty.  Dicey based his 
argument upon the then convention that Parliament meet at least once a year.  If Parliament were 
prorogued for longer than a year, he argued, key laws controlling the Army would expire and the 
collecting of taxes would eventually become illegal.  Government, therefore, could not impose 
army discipline or collect taxes without acting illegally, all because the convention requiring 
Parliament to meet at least once a year was disobeyed.79  Although Dicey proclaimed his example 
to be 'a particularly plain case,'80 it has since been partially discredited by Jennings.81 
Given the uncertainty surrounding what breach of conventions would inescapably result in a 
breach of law, therefore, it is highly unlikely that  the threat of a breach of law compels 
compliance with all conventions.  Jennings, therefore, argues that conventions are obeyed 
'because of the political difficulties which follow if they are not.'82  Sampford similarly notes that 
'[w]here a 'breach' of convention is likely to be politically costly, the convention is far more secure.  
Where recent breaches have been politically costly for key participants, the convention may be 
stronger than imagined.'83  Yet again, however, this appears an inadequate explanation.  Not every 
breach of convention will invariably result in political difficulties and not all political difficulties will 
have arisen as a result of a convention having been breached.  Compliance with a convention will 
also depend very much upon the nature of the political difficulties that will result from it being 
disobeyed.  As Bradley and Ewing note, '[a]s these rules [conventions] regulate the conduct of 
those holding public office, possibly the most acute political difficulty which can arise for such a 
person is to be forced out of office.'84  Because conventions are legally-unenforceable, it certainly 
stands to reason that the responsibility for their enforcement should lie instead in the political 
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arena.  The threat of political sanctions is therefore the most convincing explanation on paper for 
why conventions should be followed, as well as the explanation most likely favoured by political 
constitutionalists who, after all, prefer political as opposed to legal methods of accountability.  As 
Turpin and Tomkins note, 'the breach [of a constitutional convention] may provoke accusations of 
unconstitutional behaviour and lead to serious consequences.’85  Despite this, however, the threat 
of political sanctions also appears incapable of explaining why conventions are followed in 
practice.  This is because of the tendency for single party majority governments within the House 
of Commons.   
The House of Commons, being a democratically-elected chamber, is one populated by many 
individuals of numerous political persuasions.  It is also one, however, dominated, not only by 
political parties, but often by a single political party with a working majority that accordingly forms 
government.  Party whips are adept at ensuring that the government retains the support of its 
elected members and thus the 'confidence' of the House.  Parliament is therefore largely 
ineffective at holding the government to account through threats of political sanctions, such as 
removing it from office via a vote of no confidence.  This has led Allan to conclude that the 
distinction between laws and conventions along the lines of judicial enforcement should prove 
unimportant to a court faced with the task of protecting the Rule of Law.  As he notes: 
In some cases ... such means [political accountability] may prove inadequate.  If a failure to 
enforce convention would undermine a basic constitutional principle, without effective 
means of redress, the court’s duty to safeguard the constitution will limit its freedom to 
manoeuvre.  In those circumstances, the distinction between what is unconstitutional as a 
matter of law and what is unconstitutional only as a matter of convention is likely to be 
elusive. 
When the integrity of the rule of law itself is threatened, artificial barriers to justiciability 
must certainly be rejected: conventions may properly ‘crystallize’ into law whenever the 
principle of due process and equality demand it.86 
Despite the dominance of political parties in Britain, however, their hold over Parliament is 
notably weaker than in other jurisdictions.  Parliament, therefore, should not be completely 
abandoned as an effective means of compelling executive compliance with convention.  In 
Australia, for example, party discipline is so strong that government accountability occurs, not on 
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the floor of the House, but behind closed doors in the 'party room.'87  As a result, public dissent is 
non-existent.  Party members are always expected to publically toe the party line, reserving any 
disagreements they may have with party policy or party leadership to the party room.88  As David 
Hamer accordingly notes, 'Australia has gone to the extreme lengths of viewing all legislation as a 
vote of confidence and any legislation amended by the House of Representatives against the 
Government's wishes as a vote of no confidence in that Government.'89  Public dissent in Britain, 
however, remains rare but comparatively more common.  Backbench MPs in particular have no 
aversion to rebelling against their own party when there is strong disagreement or where they feel 
they may secure more votes by dissenting rather than acquiescing to government policy.  As Fergal 
Davis has noted,  
 [P]arliamentary rebellion is rare but part of the reason for this is that the costs of 
 rebellion in a system of political parties and patronage are high.  Parliamentarians are 
 more likely to rebel after the mood in the country has already changed, because 
 supporting an already popular movement is likely to be popular with the electorate 
 thereby increasing the chances of electoral success.90 
Mark Shephard cites extraordinary rendition, ID cards, and the extension of the period of 
detention for suspected terrorists without charge as issues which were subject to a 'parliamentary 
backlash' following the 2005 general election due to public distrust in Blair's Government.91  More 
recently, having already been forced by Labour and the threat of backbench rebellion to delay a 
vote on actual military intervention in Syria until the UN Weapon Inspectors had reported their 
findings on the use of chemical weapons,92 the Prime Minister David Cameron failed to secure 
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parliamentary support in principle for military intervention in Syria by thirteen votes due to a 
backbench rebellion of 39 MPs.93  As a result, the Prime Minister confirmed that he would not use 
his powers under the royal prerogative to engage in military operations in Syria without another 
vote in the House of Commons, noting that '[i]t is very clear tonight that, while the House has not 
passed a motion, the British Parliament, reflecting the views of the British people, does not want 
to see British military action.  I get that, and the Government will act accordingly.'94  Consequently, 
there remains the real potential for MPs in Britain to be further freed from the iron-grip of their 
party whips, thereby enhancing the coercive effect of political sanctions, even for breaches of 
convention.  Until this potential is fully tapped, however, fear of political sanctions is unlikely to 
motivate executive compliance with convention in every instance. 
Although a threat of political sanctions could also emanate, not from Parliament itself, but instead 
from the general public at the ballot box, it is submitted that any threat of removal from public 
office at a general election still cannot be relied upon as a valid explanation for why conventions 
are indeed followed.  Although governments are understandably keen to retain the public's 
support during their time in office, there is simply no guarantee that the members of the general 
public that vote for the government will disagree with the government's decision to disregard it.  
The coercive force of public opinion, therefore, is often unknown if and until there is a breach of 
convention.  It is therefore unreliable as a general explanation for the binding nature of all 
constitutional conventions. 
Joseph Jaconelli has proposed a more pragmatic explanation for why conventions bind, that of 
reciprocal obligation.  He suggested that governments, in abiding by convention, are in fact 
reciprocating the previous government's adherence to the rule in the hope that their adherence 
will be likewise reciprocated by the next government.95  Although, as noted above, there is no 
guarantee that the general public will eject the government from office following a breach of 
convention, they may nevertheless still lose an election for any number of reasons and be 
replaced, more often than not, by the official opposition.  The major political parties, therefore, 
can be seen to take turns in office over many years and decades.  Although the party in power may 
view a breach of convention as particularly advantageous in the short term, Jaconelli suggests that 
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they are likely to be discouraged from doing so as they will almost inevitably pay the price for it in 
the long term when they are no longer in office.  As he notes, 'each party political actor must 
conduct himself in the realisation that he is helping to shape a social rule.  As he acts, so too may 
those of the opposite political persuasion when they, in their turn, attain office.'96  Unfortunately, 
however, Jaconelli's proposition is not based upon any empirical evidence.  It is therefore not yet 
known whether government's abide by conventions for the reasons he suggests.  A government 
may just as easily disobey convention in the knowledge that, although they may pay for it whilst in 
opposition, it will most likely be given the chance to form government again sometime in the 
future and thus regain the benefit of disobeying it once again.  At best, therefore, Jaconelli's 
proposition appears more than plausible, but is nevertheless unlikely to explain general 
acquiescence to convention by successive governments in every instance.  
Despite the merits of the above explanations for why conventions are followed, therefore, it is 
clear that each provides only a partial explanation, their application varying in degree and 
emphasis.  Although constitutionalists would prefer it to be the case that conventions are abided 
by because of the effectiveness of political sanctions – particularly political constitutionalists who 
believe political forms of accountability to be more effective than legal ones – this may only be the 
case in a handful of instances, thereby weakening the reliability of conventions as effective checks 
on executive power.  Some conventions may instead bind because non-compliance would result in 
a breach of law, or because to breach convention would give a political advantage to the 
government's political rivals should they one day form government.  In the end, because 
conventions are incapable of legal enforcement, the impetus is ultimately upon government to 
abide by them.  Governments, therefore, will only follow conventions if it is in their interests to do 
so.  As Colin Munro notes, '[m]ore than any other factor, a principle no higher than political self-
interest accounts for the observance of conventions.'97  Although much reform is likely needed, 
therefore, before the threat of political sanctions makes any breach of convention unthinkable to 
government, it is submitted that the recent codifications of conventions and the reforms to the 
composition and abilities of Select Committees have the potential to significantly improve the 
effectiveness of many of the British constitution's key conventions. 
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4. Strengthening Conventions 
4.1 Codification and Justiciability 
Many commentators have come to observe a widespread, albeit ad hoc, codification of 
constitutional conventions in recent years.98  That is the process whereby conventions are reduced 
to writing in an ‘authoritative statement,’ which, as the Joint Committee on Conventions have 
observed, can take any of the following forms: 
a) a statement made anywhere, e.g. in a book 
b) some form of concordat or memorandum of understanding 
c) a statement made in Parliament, e.g. in Hansard or in evidence to a Committee 
d) a Committee report 
e) a report agreed to by one or both Houses of Parliament 
f) a resolution of one or both Houses of Parliament 
g) a literal Code, such as each House’s Code of Conduct for Members 
h) a statement in the House of Lords’ Companion to Standing Orders 
i) words in Erskine May 
j) a Standing Order 
k) an Act of Parliament99 
Conventions in relation to governmental behaviour have accordingly been included in non-
statutory publications such as the Ministerial Code, the Guide to the Rules Relating to the Conduct 
of MPs, The Civil Service Code, the Code of Practice on Access to Government Information,100 and 
The Cabinet Manual – which expressly published for the first time all of the conventions relating to 
the operation of government – whilst others have been placed on a statutory footing under the 
Constitutional Reform and Governance Act 2010 and the Fixed-term Parliaments Act 2011. 
The popular but inaccurate claim that the British constitution is unwritten stems from that fact 
that its many constitutional conventions remain predominantly unwritten i.e. lacking a definitive 
or authoritative written source.101  Given the fact that conventions are traditionally unwritten, 
concerns have therefore been raised over their codification on the grounds that it will lead to 
greater rigidity and legalism.102  The Joint Committee on Conventions was certainly of the opinion 
that the phrase ‘codifying conventions’ was ‘a contradiction in terms’ because conventions ‘by 
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their very nature, are unenforceable’ and codification, they claim, implies ‘rule-making, with 
definitions and enforcement mechanisms.’103  On this argument, codification implies enforcement, 
and enforcement implies law.  Contrary to the opinion of the committee, however, it is submitted 
that codification does not risk transforming Britain into a more legal constitution.104  As Dicey 
argued: 
 The distinction [between law and convention] differs essentially, it should be noted, 
 from the distinction between “written law” (or statute law) and “unwritten law” (or 
 common law).  There are laws of the constitution, as, for example, the Bill of Rights, the 
 Act of Settlement, and Habeas  Corpus Acts, which are “written law,” found in the 
 statute-books – in other words, are statutory enactments.  There are other most 
 important laws of the constitution (several of which have already been mentioned) 
 which are “unwritten” laws, that is, not statutory enactments.  Some further of the laws  of 
 the constitution, such, for example, as the law regulating the descent of the Crown, which 
 were set one time unwritten or common law, have now been written or statute law.  The 
 conventions of the constitution, on the other hand, cannot be recorded in the statute-
 book, though they may be formally reduced to writing.  Thus the whole of our 
 parliamentary procedure is nothing but a mass of conventional law; it is, however, 
 recorded in written or printed rules.  The distinction, in short, between written and 
 unwritten law does not in any sense square with the distinction between the law of the 
 constitution (constitutional law properly so called) and conventions of the constitution.  
 This latter is the distinction on which we should fix our whole attention, for it is of vital 
 importance, and elucidates the whole subject of constitutional law.105 
Although codification, by virtue of reducing conventions to writing, gives the appearance of 
positive law,
106
 codified conventions can still be distinguished from laws where they remain 
judicially unenforceable.  In order for codification to transform a convention into a law, therefore, 
it must be codified in a justiciable statute.107  This can be seen in relation to the Constitutional 
Reform and Governance Act 2010, where the conventions that traditionally governed the actions 
of the civil service108 and the ‘Ponsonby Rule’ – the requirement for ministers must put before the 
House of Commons treaties before ratifying them109 – were placed on a statutory footing.  This has 
had the effect of transforming the ‘Ponsonby Rule’ from a convention into a ‘legal obligation on 
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Government,’110 thereby effectively abolishing it and replacing it with law.  This transformative 
effect can be avoided, therefore, where conventions are included, either in non-statutory 
publications, or in statute but as 'non-justiciable declarations of principle,’111 such as with the 
Fixed-term Parliaments Act 2011.  Given the fact that codification in Britain has been primarily 
non-statutory, it is therefore submitted that the recent surge in codification does not mark a move 
away from reliance upon political accountability, but instead, as argued below, a potential 
strengthening of it. 
4.2 Clarity, Legitimacy, and Accountability 
It is submitted that reducing regulatory conventions to writing has a number of advantages which 
have the potential to strengthen their effectiveness as political constraints on government power.  
As Bogdanor and Vogenauer argue, both the content and scope of conventions is far from clear.
112
  
It is therefore submitted that, where conventions are unclear or doubtful, codification could have 
the effect bringing greater clarity and certainty to some of the most important rules governing the 
Constitution.113  Much of the uncertainty surrounding the existence of the requirement for 
parliamentary approval for the use of armed forces can be attributed to the fact that a proposed 
House of Commons' resolution of the convention, although promised in a 2008 White Paper,114 
has to date never been brought,115 although the convention was eventually stated in The Cabinet 
Manual.116  By contrast, a draft version of The Cabinet Manual published in March 2010 arguably 
brought greater clarity and certainty to the rules regulating what to do in the event of a hung 
Parliament, thereby helping to ensure that a government could be properly formed following the 
general election of May 2010.117  Codification, therefore, has the potential to improve executive, 
parliamentary, and public knowledge of the restrictions on government power, thereby enabling 
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governments to perform their functions with greater confidence, whilst simultaneously enabling 
MPs, the media, and citizens to better judge the behaviour of the government.   
It is submitted also that codified conventions, where approved by Parliament, can accord even 
well-established conventions greater democratic legitimacy.  During Australia’s codification 
experiment, questions were raised over the authority of the Constitutional Convention, set up 
initially to recommend constitutional changes, to recognise and declare Australia’s conventions. 118  
Its authority, after all, would impact upon the authority of the recognised and declared 
conventions.119  Because the recognised and declared conventions are not law, their acceptance as 
a source of convention is dependent upon acquiescence by politicians, which in turn is dependent 
upon the authority of the body that made the codification.  As Sampford explains, ‘[t]he text 
[written convention] merely restates existing rules so that the rules retain whatever authority they 
already had – the declaration merely adds whatever authority the body [the institution codifying 
the convention] itself has.’120  In the case of Australia, the authority of the Constitutional 
Convention tasked with recognising and declaring Australia’s conventions is unclear.  It did, 
however, consist of politicians.  As a result, Sampford concludes that ‘[p]oliticians are likely to 
accord them [written conventions] greater authority as politicians have has a hand in drafting 
them and been responsible for recognizing and declaring them.’121 
A convention approved by the Westminster Parliament, therefore, would assumedly be endowed 
with the democratic authority of Parliament.  As a result, the moral authority of the convention 
may be strengthened, thereby simultaneously strengthening the obligation upon government to 
follow it, as well as the potential for negative political consequences for non-compliance.  The 
Ministerial Code is a good example of this.  Although published by the Cabinet Office, the 
provisions of The Ministerial Code relating to the Convention of Ministerial Responsibility and the 
duty it imposes upon ministers were approved by a resolution of both Houses of Parliament.122  
The result is a degree of entrenchment not too dissimilar to that accorded to Standing Orders and 
other parliamentary rules.  As Adam Tomkins remarks: 
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No longer is ministerial responsibility merely an unwritten constitutional convention.  No 
longer is it even a doctrine of political practice formally written down only in the 
government’s own documents.  It is now a clear parliamentary rule, set down in 
resolutions by both Houses of Parliament ... [T]he government acting on its own cannot 
now change the terms of ministers’ responsibility to Parliament in the way that the 
Conservative government did throughout its period in office.123   
The approval by resolution of duty upon ministers to make themselves accountable to Parliament 
under the Convention of Ministerial Responsibility, as Fenwick and Phillispon note, gave the 
convention ‘far greater significance than mere guidance from the executive to its own.’124  The 
accountability of the government to Parliament is undisputedly strengthened as a result.   
Despite this, however, Andrew Blick has expressed doubts over the desirability of codifying 
conventions on the grounds that, because the existence and content of many conventions is 
unclear and subject to various interpretations, drafters 'must express themselves in such general 
or balanced terms as to add little value, or else impose particular interpretations.'125  Because non-
statutory codifications to date have been drafted by the government, Blick argues also that 
codification subverts the role conventions play in limiting government.  This is because 
government, in disseminating a document which codifies conventions, are permitted to 'frame the 
overall terms of debate about conventions'126 concerning their interpretation of 'the nature of the 
constraints on itself,'127 which may not be in the best interests of everyone.  Consequently, even 
where parliamentary approval is secured, the codified convention may nevertheless be 
disproportionately favourable to government.  It is submitted, however, that codification as part 
of non-justiciable statute could resolve this issue because, unlike with non-statutory codifications 
issued by the government, Parliament can play an active role in drafting the codification, thereby 
infusing it with even greater legitimacy, and preventing the government from dominating the 
debate on conventions.  Although executive dominance of the House of Commons remains an 
issue, thereby granting it 'the power of initiative'128 even in relation to the drafting of legislation, 
reforms have recently been enacted with the purpose of weakening the executive's dominance 
over the House. 
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4.3 The Wright Committee Reforms 
The Convention of Ministerial Responsibility, by making ministers accountable to Parliament, has 
resulted in the development of a series of parliamentary procedures designed to give the 
Convention practical effect.  As Tomkins argues, ‘[i]t would all very well having rules and 
conventions of ministerial responsibility, but without adequate parliamentary means to apply 
those rules in practice, the doctrines would be useless.’129  These procedures include, but are not 
limited to, parliamentary debates, opposition days, oral questions (both Prime Minister’s and 
Departmental Questions), written questions, and – most importantly – select committees.   
Concerns have been expressed over the effectiveness of these procedures, however, with legal 
and political constitutionalists alike citing the influence of party whips in the Commons as the 
principal reason for their unreliability.130  As noted above, the dominance of political parties within 
the House of Commons has, at the very least, cast doubt over the their ability to hold the 
government to account for breaches of convention.  Far from abandoning these methods in favour 
of more legal checks, however, successive Parliaments have in fact sought to reform the 
effectiveness of these political controls in an attempt to strengthen the Convention of Ministerial 
Responsibility.  
Significant reforms were initiated recently in order to implement the findings of the Wright 
Committee, which aimed ‘to make the Commons matter more, increase its vitality and rebalance 
its relationship with the executive, and to give the public a greater voice in parliamentary 
proceedings.’131  Established in the wake of the MPs’ Expenses Scandal,132 the Committee focused 
on considering reform options to both the composition of select committees and the scheduling of 
business within the House of Commons,133 both of which are discussed below.   
The membership of Select Committees traditionally consisted of backbenches chosen by the 
Committee of Selection.  It was felt, however, that the membership of the Committee of Selection, 
because it was determined by the party whips, granted the government too great an influence 
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over them, particularly in respect to the appointment of the Committee Chairs, which threatened 
to undermine their role as ‘independent monitors of government.’134  This was made abundantly 
clear after the 2001 General Election when the Blair Government tried to remove two select 
committee Chairs – Gwyneth Dunwoody  of the Transport Committee and Donald Anderson of the 
Foreign Affairs Committee – because they were deemed to be too critical of Government policy.  
Although the Blair Government’s motions for altering the composition of both the Foreign Affairs 
and Transport Committees failed due to a Labour rebellion, the incident nevertheless helped to 
popularise the issue of Select Committee reform amongst parliamentarians and thus helped to 
pave the way for the establishment of the Wright Committee.135 
In considering the issue, the Wright Committee concluded that ‘[t]he credibility of select 
committees could be enhanced by a greater and more visible element of democracy in the 
election of members and Chairs.’136  As a result, the Committee proposed that the Chairs of 
departmental and similar Select Committees should be elected by the House as a whole, with the 
remaining committee members being elected by secret ballot by each political party according to 
their share of seats in the House.137   
The Committees proposals were duly implemented with the support of the Commons,138 and the 
first elections for the Chairs of the Select Committees was successfully held on June 9th 2010.  The 
change, it is submitted, helped to distance select committees from both the government and party 
politics, thereby strengthening their independence.  As Meg Russell remarks, the election of Chairs 
‘should give them a greater sense of legitimacy and more confidence to speak for the chamber as 
a whole’ with the election of members making them ‘answerable to all of their party colleagues, 
rather than just the whips.’139  As a result of this increased independence, the Convention of 
Ministerial Responsibility can be more effectively enforced. 
The second change concerned the crucial issue of the timetabling if business.  By virtue of Standing 
Order 14, government business takes precedence in the House of Commons.140  Prior to reform, 
backbenchers who wanted to hold a debate and a vote designed to hold the government to 
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account would first have to receive the government's permission to do so.  Unsurprisingly, 
therefore, non-governmental business was left largely unheard.141                   
In order to shift the balance of power away from the executive and back towards the House, the 
Wright Committee recommended the creation of a new category of backbench business, which 
would be scheduled by a newly created Backbench Business Committee.  In addition to this, the 
Committee recommended also the creation of a House Business Committee.  Although the Wright 
Committee maintained a distinction between governmental and non-governmental business 
(therefore rejecting calls for the creation of an all-encompassing Business Committee responsible 
for the scheduling of all of the House’s business), it did recommend the creation of a House 
Business Committee.  Comprising of members of the Backbench Business Committee and others, 
the House Business Committee, though unable to overturn the government’s schedule for 
business, would provide a platform by which the government’s agenda could be discussed.              
Upon forming government, the Conservative-Liberal Coalition decided to act upon the 
recommendations of the Wright Committee.  As a result, they amended Standing Order 14 in 
order to establish both a category of backbench business and a Backbench Business Committee 
responsible for its scheduling, and promised the creation of a House Business Committee by the 
Parliament’s third year.142  Now, although the time available for backbench business varies 
monthly and the government decides which days of the week will be given over to backbench 
business, the Backbench Business Committee meet once a week in order to hear requests for 
debates and allocate the parliamentary time made available to them.  This change, it is submitted, 
helps to break the government’s monopoly over the scheduling of business, thereby significantly 
strengthening the power of the Commons in relation to the executive in a way which may prove 
irreversible.143  As Russell remarks: 
[T]he amendment to standing order 14 to create ‘backbench time’ ends the government’s 
effective stranglehold over the Commons’ agenda ... [T]he new arrangements ... create an 
opportunity for backbenchers, including committees, to put issues onto the agenda that 
the frontbenches (sometimes jointly) find uncomfortable.  The main result may be greater 
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frontbench responsiveness to backbench opinion at an early stage.  But the new 
mechanism offers an important safety valve.  It also means that backbenchers can in 
future bring forward their own proposals for procedural change via the newly elected 
Procedure Committee, rather than relying on government to provide the parliamentary 
time ...  Government can no longer keep such issues off the agenda.144     
The establishment of the Backbench Business Committee has also made Select Committees more 
effective because it can timetable debates concerning Select Committee reports and 
recommendations which are contrary to the government’s interests.  This was seen in July 2012 
when a motion in favour of the recommendation of the Public Administration Select Committee 
concerning the powers of the Advisor on Ministers’ Interests were put to the House of Commons 
for debate and ultimately accepted.  Currently, the Advisor may only investigate alleged breaches 
of the Ministerial Code when asked to do so by the Prime Minister.  The recommendation was to 
empower the Advisor to investigate potential breaches of the Ministerial Code on his own accord, 
thereby increasing his independence from government.  Although the government may still 
choose not to act on the recommendation, it is nevertheless unable to silence or stifle the issue as 
they once could by refusing to award it any parliamentary time.145  By exposing government 
unwillingness to engage with specific issues, the government and its Ministers can now be greater 
held to account, not just for what it does, but also for what it refuses to do, thereby strengthening 
the Convention of Ministerial Responsibility, and thus the ability of the Commons to hold 
government to account for breaches of convention.   
David Foster, in an article critiquing the effectiveness of the Backbench Business Committee during 
the 2010-2012 parliamentary session, certainly affirms the view that the Backbench Business 
Committee is 'an excellent method of holding government to account.'146  He notes that the 
Backbench Business Committee: 
 [S]howed considerable effectiveness in meeting the hopes expressed by the Wright 
 Committee ... , increasing the transparency of scheduling non-government business and 
 improving the topicality of, and public interest in, parliamentary debates.  Furthermore, 
 the Committee has proved to be 'an excellent method of holding the executive to 
 account,' scheduling debates that would not have come to light under the former 
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 system and influencing government policy in a number of areas (HC Deb, 12 March 
 2012, 52).  Linked to this, the Committee demonstrated its potential to alter the 
 institutional context of parliament, reducing the partisan nature of security in the 
 Commons and thereby improving its effectiveness.147 
The Wright Committee Reforms, therefore, can be seen to demonstrate Britain’s commitment to 
improving the parliamentary rules and mechanisms by which the Convention of Ministerial 
Responsibility is made effective and the political enforcement of conventions made possible. 
5. Conclusion 
It has been demonstrated that conventions, because they are incapable of judicial enforcement, 
are both distinct from laws and of particular normative value to political constitutionalists who 
prefer political accountability over legal accountability.  It has been shown also, however, that 
whilst it is true to say that the British constitution remains primarily political as a result of its heavy 
dependency upon conventions, its over-reliance upon foundational conventions exaggerates the 
role of political accountability within the constitution.  Although conventions within the 
constitution continue to be regularly observed, it is clear that the reliability of conventions as 
effective checks on executive power is weakened by the fact that executive compliance with 
convention remains at the discretion of government, motivated neither exclusively nor heavily by 
a fear of political sanctions for non-compliance, but for a multitude of different reasons.  Despite 
this, however, recent attempts at codification have the potential to bring greater clarity and 
legitimacy to conventions, thereby making compliance with them more likely.  In addition to this, 
the recently initiated Wright Committee Reforms appear to strengthen Parliament’s ability to hold 
the executive to account, thereby strengthening the Convention of Ministerial responsibility, and 
in turn the ability of the House of Commons to hold the government to account for breaches of 
convention.  
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Chapter Five 
THE HUMAN RIGHTS ACT 1998 
1. A British Bill of Rights? 
1.1 Law and Politics:  Protecting Rights on Two Fronts 
Because Britain took a different path towards constitutionalism than the majority of Western 
states, it has historically been suspicious of the supposed benefits of having an entrenched Bill of 
Rights which empowers the courts to strike down primary legislation.1  However, due to Britain 
being a signatory to the European Convention on Human Rights 1950 (ECHR), as well as increased 
fears during the seventies and eighties of what Lord Hailsham in 1976 referred to as ‘elective 
dictatorship,’ the second half of the twentieth century saw a fevered but sustained debate over 
the merits of and potential for both a British Bill of Rights and the domestic implementation of the 
ECHR.2    
In response to this debate, the Blair Government, in the wake of Labour's victory in the 1997 
General Election, successfully passed through Parliament the Human Rights Bill 1997.  The Human 
Rights Act 1998 (HRA) came into force on October 2 2000 in order to give 'further effect’ to the 
rights contained under the ECHR within domestic law.3  The aim of this reform, as stated in the 
Green Paper Bringing Rights Home, was ‘to change the relationship between the State and the 
citizen, and to redress the dilution of individual rights by an over-centralising government that has 
taken place over the past two decades.’
4
  Despite this, however, the HRA was enacted as an 
ordinary statute only, and does not empower the courts to strike down incompatible legislation.  
The reason for this, according to the Government, was because entrenchment ‘could not be 
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reconciled with our own constitutional traditions, which allow any Act of Parliament to be 
amended or repealed by a subsequent Act of Parliament.’5   
Consequently, the HRA was designed to protect human rights without undermining the 
sovereignty of Parliament.  This was to be achieved on both the political and legal fronts, with the 
latter informing the former, but without dominating it.  As Murray Hunt observes: 
 The scheme of the Act envisages that both Parliament and the courts should have a role in 
 ensuring that law, policy and practice respect, protect and fulfil human rights.  It embodies 
 a model of human rights protection which aims to provide practical and effective 
 guarantees through judicial enforcement of rights without detracting from the UK's 
 very strong tradition of representative parliamentary democracy.
6
  
On the political front, s 19 was to encourage greater governmental engagement and compliance 
with rights at the pre-legislative stage by requiring ministers, when introducing a bill into 
Parliament, to issue a statement pertaining to the bills compatibility with the Convention Rights.  
In so doing, Parliament's ability to scrutinise governmental compliance with the Convention Rights 
would also be strengthened.  Although independent of the HRA, the Joint Committee on Human 
Rights (JCHR) was thus established in order to assist Parliament in this task by scrutinising 
Government bills for their compatibility with human rights, probing ministerial reasoning behind 
issuing s 19 statements of compatibility, and considering s 10 remedial orders.       
On the legal front, although the courts are unable to declare invalid an Act of Parliament,
7
 they are 
nevertheless instructed under s 3 to interpret legislation in order to bring it into conformity with 
the Convention Rights ‘[s]o far as is possible to do so.’8  When the courts find themselves unable 
to do so,
9
 however, they are empowered under s 4 – what Hilaire Barnett describes as ‘a peculiarly 
British device’10 – to issue a declaration of incompatibility which, crucially, ‘does not affect the 
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validity, continuing operation or enforcement of the provision in respect of which it is given,’11 
thereby leaving the final say on the matter to Parliament, not the courts.     
Although the HRA – via s 19 and the JCHR – clearly seeks to strengthen Parliament's role in 
enforcing human rights against the executive, thereby reinforcing the constitution's traditionally 
political foundations, it nevertheless expands the role of the judiciary under the constitution into 
the realm of constitutional review as a result of ss 3 and 4.  As Klug notes: 
The courts are clearly given powers of judicial review under the HRA that they did not 
have before.  They can review the decisions and actions of ministers and officials in 
substantive, human rights terms and they can even consider the compatibility of primary 
legislation with the Convention rights in the HRA, something they were effectively 
constitutionally barred from doing before.
12
 
The HRA, therefore, has been correctly identified as ‘a turning point in the UK’s legal and 
constitutional history.’13  As a result, the HRA may be seen to be pulling in opposite directions – 
one towards political constitutionalism, the other towards legal constitutionalism.  As discussed 
below, however, such expansive powers were accorded to the courts in order to help facilitate the 
development of a parliamentary culture of rights.  Sections 3 and 4 were thus designed to inflict 
political costs sufficient to compel Parliament and the government to take rights seriously when 
drafting legislation, although without undermining Parliament's role in the protection of rights nor 
its right to the final say.  Because the HRA purports to grant greater legal protection to human 
rights without compromising parliamentary sovereignty, therefore, some have argued that the 
HRA constitutes an example of what Francesca Klug describes as ‘third wave’ Bills of Rights,
14
 
which form part of what Stephen Gardbaum calls the 'new Commonwealth model of 
constitutionalism.’15 
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1.2 Weak-form Judicial Review 
Unlike ‘strong-form judicial review’ typified by Bills of Rights found under legal constitutions, ‘third 
wave’ Bills of Rights adopt what Mark Tushnet dubs ‘weak-form judicial review.’16  This is said to 
embody the notion of constitutional or democratic dialogue,17 which was first championed by 
Peter Hogg and Allison Bushell in relation to the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms 1982.
18
  
The crux of the idea is as follows: 
Where a judicial decision is open to legislative reversal, modification or avoidance, than it 
is meaningful to regard the relationship between the courts and the competent legislative 
body as a dialogue ... the judicial decision causes a public debate in which the Charter 
values play a more prominent role than they would if there had been no judicial decision.  
The legislative body is in a position to devise a response that is properly respectful of the 
Charter values that have been identified by the Court, but which accomplishes the social 
and economic objectives that the judicial decision has impeded.
19
 
Because the ruling of the court goes on to inform a public debate and heavily influence the 
legislature’s formal response to it,20 constitutional dialogue can be seen to permit at least a 
degree of judicial interference with the democratic decision-making process.  Such interference, 
however, should not be viewed as necessarily contradictory to the political school.  As Alison 
Young argues, ‘[d]emocratic dialogue has a specific aim – to provide for a protection of rights that 
does not damage democracy.’
21
  As a result, constitutional dialogue, despite requiring the courts 
to engage with issues previously seen to fall within the special competence of Parliament, remains 
respectful of the underlying values of the political school.  When seeking to protect human rights, 
therefore, Hogg and Bushell’s dialogical model is more than capable of providing a theoretical 
framework from which the courts may be ascribed a role in protecting these values without 
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threatening or undermining Parliament’s sovereignty, an example, therefore, of complementary 
constitutionalism.22   
Despite this, however, Tushnet theorised that systems of weak-form judicial review may be prone 
to instability: 
 That is, they may well be transformed in either direction – reducing their scope so that 
 weak-form systems are actually systems of parliamentary supremacy (and thereby 
 reproducing the worry about inadequate protection of liberal rights), or expanding their 
 scope so that weak-form systems are actually strong-form systems (and thereby 
 reproducing the worry about interfering with democratic self-governance).
23
 
The two oldest examples of 'third wave' Bills of Rights – the Canadian Charter of Rights and 
Freedoms 1982, and New Zealand’s Bill of Rights Act 1990 – can be seen to provide some 
vindication for Tushnet's theory.24   
The Canadian Charter, as stipulated by s 52 of the Constitution Act 1982, is given supreme status 
as higher law.25  Taken in conjunction with s 24(1) of the Canadian Charter, this means that the 
courts are empowered to rule on the constitutionality of Acts of the Canadian Parliament, and 
strike down any Act it deems to be unconstitutional.
26
  As a result, it is the courts, not Parliament, 
which, as Janet Hiebert notes, ‘determine the constitutional meaning as well as appropriate 
remedies for rights violations;’27 the adoption, in other words, of ‘strong-form judicial review.’  
However, in order to appease certain Canadian provinces who feared the loss of parliamentary 
sovereignty,
28
 the Canadian Charter included s 33 – the so-called ‘notwithstanding clause’ – which 
enables the Canadian Parliament, through the use of express words, to override the Charter, albeit 
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subject to renewal.29  As a result, the Canadian Charter marks a dramatic departure from ‘strong-
form judicial review’ by preserving Parliament’s right to the final say on issues of human rights.  
Despite the significance of s 33 on paper, however, it has been infrequently used, and never at the 
Federal level.
30
  Although the reasons for this are perhaps too numerous and complex in order to 
ascertain with any degree of certainty,31 it is nevertheless clear that the use of s 33 to either 
override judicial pronouncements or pre-empt negative judicial rulings,
32
 is widely viewed as being 
illegitimate, serving only to subvert and invalidate the separation of powers inherent to the 
constitution.33  Although there is nothing to prevent its use in the future,34 s 33 is at present a 
dead letter.
 35
  Doubts must accordingly be raised over the Canadian Charter’s ability to produce 
constitutional dialogue.36  Without the political option to use s 33, legislators, save for 
constitutional amendment, cannot escape the judgment of the court.  They may respond to it, but 
any such response must show acceptance of the court’s decision.  Despite its best efforts, 
therefore, the Canadian Charter can be seen to collapse into 'strong-form judicial review.'   
Gardbaum distinguishes New Zealand's Bill of Rights Act from the Canadian Charter on the 
grounds that the former is an ‘interpretive’ Bill of Rights, whilst the latter is an ‘overriding’ Bill of 
Rights.  Under ‘overriding’ Bills of Rights, so he argues, ‘the protective legal force lies in the court’s 
power to set aside conflicting statutes,’ whilst under ‘interpretive’ Bills of Rights, such protective 
                                                     
29
 Under s 33, the Canadian Parliament may override the rights and freedoms contained under sections 2 
and 7-15 subject to renewal by Parliament every five years. 
30
 See Davis, F.F. 'Parliamentary Supremacy and the Re-Invigoration of Institutional Dialogue in the UK' 
(2014) 67(1) Parliamentary Affairs 137, 144. 
31
 For a breakdown and discussion of some of the potential reasons, see Goldsworthy, J. Parliamentary 
Sovereignty: Contemporary Debates (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 217-222. 
32
 Gardbaum, n 2, 723 n 61.  Gardbaum notes that s 33, although s 33 was designed in order to prevent the 
courts from having the final say on issues of fundamental rights, s 33 ‘also permits preemptive overrides; 
i.e., immunizing legislative provisions from judicial review under the Charter.’ 
33
 Hiebert, n 27, 20: ‘There is little public or political acceptance for the proposition that invoking the 
notwithstanding clause represents a legitimate Charter interpretation.  Most Canadians construe the use of 
the notwithstanding clause both as an unjustifiable violation of rights in the particular circumstance, but also 
as act of defiance of the Charter project.’  See also Gardbaum, n 2, 722.  The Canadian Charter was intended 
to be a fully entrenched component of the constitution, hence its status as supreme law under s 52 of the 
Constitution Act 1982, which is further reinforced by the fact that the Charter can only be amended via 
special procedures under ss 38-49 of the Constitution Act 1982.   
34
 See Goldsworthy, n 31, 221: 'It is still possible that s. 33 will be resuscitated sometime in the future.' See 
also Gardbaum, S. 'How Successful and Distinctive is the Human Rights Act? An Expatriate Comparativist 
Assessment' (2011) 74(2) MLR 195, 203:  '[W]ere the Supreme Court of Canada to decide a case that 
triggered the degree of controversy marked by certain judicial decisions in other countries with full 
constitutional supremacy, there is good reason to think that the relevant legislature would seriously 
consider and perhaps use the override power.' 
35
 Hogg and Bushell, n 18, 83.  Hogg and Bushell concede that s 33 is now unimportant in practice to the 
operation of the Canadian Charter. 
36
 Ibid, 19-20 and 27. 
 156 
legal force resides in ‘its interpretive power to force a legislature to pay the political costs of clear 
and explicit rights violations.’37  The New Zealand’s Bill of Rights Act, unlike the Canadian Charter, 
is not supreme law, but instead an ordinary Act of the New Zealand Parliament, and thus, like the 
HRA, subject to ordinary repeal.  The courts, therefore, can neither strike down legislation it 
deems to be incompatible with the s 1 rights, nor can they impliedly repeal any inconsistent 
legislation passed prior to the Act.
38
  Instead, the courts are empowered to protect rights through 
s 6, which states that ‘[w]herever an enactment can be given a meaning that is consistent with the 
rights and freedoms contained in this Bill of Rights, that meaning shall be preferred to any other 
meaning.’  Despite initial suggestions that s 6 would be given a wide interpretation,
39
 Cooke P. in 
Ministry of Transport v Noort asserted a restrained approach whereby a rights-friendly meaning 
would only prevail where reasonable,40 thereby successfully curbing the scope of s 6.41  Given the 
limited scope of s 6 situations whereby statutes are incapable of being given a rights-friendly 
meaning are quite common.42  In such situations the New Zealand courts are not empowered to 
issue a declaration of incompatibility, but are instead obliged under s 4 to uphold the offending 
legislation as stipulated.43   
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Because of the relatively limited role it accords to judicial review, Hiebert has argued that New 
Zealand’s Bill of Rights Act aimed to protect human rights by way of what she describes as 
‘political rights review’ – ‘a two-pronged concept that involves executive-based review of 
proposed bills from a rights perspective.  This is combined with a requirement of alerting 
parliament about inconsistencies, thereby creating the stage for broader rights-based political and 
public scrutiny’44 – the aim of which is ‘to prevent rights abuses from actually occurring.’45  This 
was to be achieved by the requirement under s 7 for the Attorney-General to ‘bring to the 
attention of the House of Representatives any provision in the Bill that appears to be inconsistent 
with any of the rights and freedoms contained in this Bill of Rights.’  As Andrew Geddis notes, 
however, a  government bill attracting a section 7 report almost always will become law in its 
original form.'
46
  As of 2012, there have been 59 reports of inconsistency, 28 of which involved 
government bills,
47
 the majority of which 'became law without any change to the apparently 
NZBORA-inconsistent measure.'48  Consequently, section 7 reports appear to provide little 
incentive to either Parliament or the government to take human rights seriously.
49
  This is because 
the s 6 interpretive duty and the absence of a power to formally declare legislation as inconsistent 
with the s 1 rights do not inflict political and legal costs sufficient to compel political compliance.
50
  
As a result, the New Zealand Parliament has felt confident enough to knowingly and publically 
flout human rights,51 thus suggesting that New Zealand’s Bill of Rights Act has prioritised 
parliamentary sovereignty at the expense of human rights protection. 
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1.3 A Complementary Balance? 
Some commentators, therefore, have come to view the HRA’s compromise between 
parliamentary sovereignty and fundamental human rights with suspicion.  As Tom Campbell et al 
note, scepticism surrounding the legal protection of human rights can be seen to fall within one of 
two broad categories: ‘ideological scepticism,' which concerns the existence and content of human 
rights, and ‘institutional scepticism,' which concerns the mechanisms for protecting human 
rights.
52
  Both types of scepticism have been directed towards the HRA by political 
constitutionalists, who see the HRA as a vehicle through which Parliament’s democratic authority 
may be usurped.53  Keith Ewing, for example, has criticised the HRA for amounting to:  
[A]n unprecedented transfer of political power from the executive and legislature to the 
judiciary, and a fundamental restructuring of our ‘political constitution’... [I]t is 
unquestionably the most significant formal redistribution of political power in this country 
since 1911, and perhaps since 1688.54   
Likewise, Colin Turpin and Adam Tomkins identify the HRA as one of three contemporary 
challenges to parliamentary sovereignty after the European Communities Act 1972 and the rise of 
‘common law radicalism.’
55
  The Conservative Party is now also firmly committed to repealing the 
HRA and replacing it with a UK Bill of Rights in order to put a stop to what they see as 'the legal 
abuse of human rights legislation in our courts.'56 
Given the apparently inherent instability of 'third wave' Bills of Rights, as well as the concerns 
expressed by political constitutionalists about the HRA and its impact upon the traditional British 
constitution, the aim of this chapter, therefore, will be to critique the extent to which the HRA 
achieves a complementary balance between parliamentary sovereignty and the judicial protection 
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of rights.  Although an analysis of the Convention rights and their compatibility with the political 
constitution would be of unquestionable value to this thesis, the complexity and magnitude of 
such a task place it beyond its scope and limits.  It will therefore be presumed for the purposes of 
this chapter that the substantive rights protected by the HRA are of value to the political school or, 
at the very least, of no threat to it.  The focus will therefore be on the manner by which such rights 
are enforced, not the rights themselves.  As a result, this chapter will conduct a thorough analysis 
of both political and legal mechanisms adopted under the HRA to facilitate greater protection for 
human rights.  The impact of s 19 and the JCHR will therefore be considered along with the 
relationship between ss 3 and 4.  It will be argued that s 19 and the JCHR, because they seek to 
achieve constitutional democracy by imbedding human rights norms within the legislative process 
using Parliament as the primary mechanism of enforcement, envisage a model of human rights 
protection which is firmly in line with the ideals of political constitutionalism.  Despite concerns 
regarding their influence upon government legislation, it will be shown that s 19 and the JCHR 
have succeeded in facilitating the development of a culture of rights within Parliament, thereby 
enabling Parliament to play a more central role in the protection of rights.  It will also be argued 
that ss 3 and 4, although representing a shift towards constitutional review of primary legislation 
which is at odds with political constitutionalism, is nevertheless necessary in order for a culture of 
rights within Parliament to flourish.  Although it is conceded that the inclusion of ss 3 and 4 within 
the scheme of the HRA has the potential to destabilise the otherwise political settlement sought, it 
will shown that the use of both provisions to date, although far from ideal, nevertheless remains 
complementary to the political school. 
2. Legislative Rights Review 
2.1 Fostering a Culture of Rights 
Because the HRA denies the courts the ability to strike down incompatible legislation and instead 
empowers them to interpret legislation compatibly with the Convention rights, the HRA, like New 
Zealand's Bill of Rights Act, can similarly be described as an ‘interpretive’ Bill of Rights.  
Consequently, because of the limited role accorded to the judiciary in comparison to Canada, the 
HRA also sought to secure greater protection for human rights by fostering a political culture of 
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rights across all institutions of governance57 whereby Parliament would engage more with human 
rights issues and play a more active role in ensuring government compliance with human rights.   
The scheme of the HRA, therefore, was designed to help foster this culture of rights by 
encouraging the legislature to review the compatibility of proposed legislation with human rights 
as seen under New Zealand's Bill of Rights Act.  Although Hiebert calls this phenomenon 'political 
rights review'58 – because the executive is also encouraged to consider the compatibility of its 
proposed bills with rights at the pre-legislative stage – this thesis prefers the term 'legislative 
rights review,' as it emphasises more the central role of played by Parliament in protecting and 
promoting human rights, thereby clearly distinguishing it from its conceptual rival – judicial rights 
review – which is the traditional and most common mechanism for protecting human rights 
globally.  Constitutional democracy can thus be achieved without resort to the courts by 
imbedding human rights norms within the legislative process itself, thereby theoretically 
preventing human rights abuses from ever arising.  It is submitted, therefore, that the aim of the 
HRA to place Parliament and not the courts at the centre of human rights protection coincides 
strongly with the aims and values of political constitutionalism.  Such legislative rights review was 
to be achieved under the HRA by facilitating  greater legislative engagement with human rights 
issues.  This goal, as Francesca Klug and Helen Wildbore observe, is reflected in three main 
provisions of the HRA – s 4, s 10, and s 19.59 
As will be discussed in greater detail below, declarations of incompatibility issued under s 4 are 
not legally binding upon Parliament.  As Klug and Wildbore therefore note, '[i]t is ... open to 
Parliament to disagree with the courts that a provision is incompatible with the rights in the HRA 
and to decide that the legislation in question should remain in force or be amended differently.'60  
By preserving its right to the final say, however, s 4 declarations compel Parliament to engage with 
the human rights issues it raises.  Section 10 of the HRA is a ‘Henry VIII’ clause which grants 
Ministers the power to amend primary legislation in order to remove any incompatibility following 
the issuing of a s 4 declaration of incompatibility subject to parliamentary approval.61  As a result, 
Parliament is invited to scrutinise the reasoning of the executive in making a remedial order, 
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thereby further enveloping Parliament within the human rights debate and giving it the 
opportunity to further hold the government to account for its actions.   
Both s 4 and s 10, therefore, by promoting greater legislative engagement with human rights, have 
the potential to contribute towards the development of a culture of rights within Parliament.  
Despite this, however, it is submitted that s 19, along with the JCHR, are the principal drivers of 
legislative review under the Act.  Both, therefore, are discussed in greater detail below, followed 
by an assessment of their effectiveness in facilitating a culture of rights.     
2.2 Section 19 and the Joint Committee on Human Rights 
Under s 19, before the second reading of a Bill, the Minister responsible for the Bill is obliged to 
issue, either ‘a statement of compatibility’ expressing his or her belief that the proposed Bill is 
compatible with the Convention Rights,62 or ‘a statement to the effect that although he is unable 
to make a statement of compatibility the government nevertheless wishes the House to proceed 
with the Bill.’63  In either instance, the statement must be in writing and published ‘in such a 
manner as the Minister making it considers appropriate.’64  By placing upon Ministers a duty to 
declare before Parliament whether, in their view, a proposed piece of legislation is or is not 
compatible with the Convention rights, s 19 is designed to force a minister (and thus the 
government) to seriously consider compatibility issues at the pre-legislative stage.  The risk of a 
court ruling that a piece of government legislation infringes the Convention Rights should act as an 
incentive for governments to ensure that its legislation conforms with the ECHR and that their 
conclusion on Convention compliance is well supported.  As Murray Hunt observes, however, this 
is not all that s 19 was designed to do: 
 [A]s well as disciplining the Government to conduct proper scrutiny of a Bill's compatibility 
 with Convention rights at departmental level before its introduction, it [s 19] provides a 
 firm legal foundation for parliamentary scrutiny of a Bill's compatibility.65 
In issuing either a statement of compatibility under s 19(1)(a) or a 'negative' statement of 
compatibility under s 19(1)(b), the government exposes its reasoning to scrutiny by Parliament.  
Section 19 statements, therefore, help to inform Parliament’s deliberations regarding the 
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proposed Bill66 and force the government to defend its decision, thereby strengthening 
Parliament's ability to hold the government to account on human rights issues and ensuring that 
Parliament, in passing a law accompanied by a negative s 19 statement, is fully aware of the fact 
that it infringes rights.  As Hunt therefore concludes: 
 The Human Rights Act ... commits the UK to a distinctively democratic human rights 
 culture.  It sets up mechanisms for the transparent scrutiny of the adequacy of public 
 justifications for interferences with, or failures to protect, human rights: in other words, a 
 culture of democratic justification.67  
However, as Carolyn Evans and Simon Evans have noted: 
 [C]ircumstances within parliaments make it difficult for parliamentarians adequately to 
 analyse and raise human rights issues in parliamentary debate.  A crowded parliamentary 
 agenda, combined with bills of ever greater length and complexity, which often need to be 
 passed within short time-frames, means that it is difficult for parliamentarians to grasp the 
 rights implications of all pieces of legislation.  Many, perhaps most, members of 
 parliaments lack the expertise that would allow them to make an assessment of the 
 human rights implications of legislation, even if they had the time or interest to do so.68  
In order to further strengthen Parliament’s ability to scrutinise the government’s adherence to 
human rights and facilitate this culture of rights, therefore, Parliament established the Joint 
Committee on Human Rights (JCHR). 
Although there were indications in the Green Paper Bringing Rights Home that a joint committee 
on human rights would be established,69 the JCHR did not form part of the scheme of the HRA.  Its 
creation was instead announced by the then Leader of the House of Commons on 14 December  
1998 over a month after the HRA had received Royal Assent,70 and it did not meet until over a year 
after the HRA came into force on 31 January 2001.  The JCHR is a permanent non-departmental 
select committee whose members are drawn from both the House of Lords and the House of 
Commons.  The aim of establishing the JCHR was to assist in the development of a parliamentary 
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culture of rights by 'enhancing the role of Parliament in protecting and promoting human rights.'71  
Consequently, the Committee has a broad mandate to consider 'matters relating to human rights 
in the United Kingdom (but excluding consideration of individual cases),' along with a duty to 
oversee s 10 remedial orders.72  As Klug notes, therefore, it was clear from the outset that the 
Committee itself would be given the discretion to decide what matters to pursue as well as to 
determine its own working practices.73  The Committee quickly decided that it would scrutinise the 
compatibility of proposed Bills with human rights, in particular the Convention Rights, with priority 
being given to Government Bills and their attached s 19 statement of compatibility.74  Parliament's 
ability to hold the government to account on matters of human rights, therefore, should be greatly 
strengthened as a result of the JCHR.75  As Evans and Evans argue: 
 When functioning properly and adequately resourced, such scrutiny committees can 
 provide valuable assistance to parliamentarians (and others) in identifying the rights 
 implications of Bills.  In addition, such committees encourage governments to be more 
 cautious about infringing rights, and allow for a more focused dialogue about rights, and 
 allow for a more focused dialogue about rights between the executive and the 
 legislature.76 
Determining the success of s 19 and the JCHR in facilitating a culture of rights within Parliament, 
therefore, is clearly important in understanding whether the HRA complements Britain's primarily 
political constitution, especially in light of ss 3 and 4.  Despite this, however, it is submitted that 
the type of parliamentary rights culture facilitated by s 19 and the JCHR is just as important as the 
existence of a rights culture itself, if not more so. 
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2.3 Striking a Balance between Compliance and Contestability 
In 2004, Danny Nicol outlined two distinct types of human rights cultures which could emerge in 
Parliament following the enactment of the HRA: a 'culture of compliance'77 or a 'culture of 
controversy.'78  As Nicol notes, the former culture of rights 'casts the legislature in the role of the 
adjunct of the courts.  Parliamentarians ... police government legislative proposals for their 
compatibility with judicially interpreted rights.'79  Under such a culture, therefore, the judiciary, 
not Parliament, is dominant.80  Under the latter culture, rights are held to be contestable.  It 
expects politicians and the wider public, therefore, 'to seek a more active role in defining them 
rather than hanging on the lips of the judicial oracle.'81  As a result, Parliament, not the courts, 
retains the final say on matter of human rights.  It is submitted that the two potential cultures 
identified by Nicol are each underpinned by a radically different view of the role and purpose of 
the HRA which reflect the wider debate within the British constitution between political and legal 
constitutionalism.   
Under a culture of compliance, Parliament, although actively engaged with scrutinising 
Government Bills for compliance with human rights, is nevertheless debarred from developing and 
applying its own view on human rights.  Because it privileges judicial interpretations of rights over 
those of Parliament, therefore, a culture of compliance denotes a view of the HRA which differs 
little from those of traditionally entrenched Bills of Rights advanced under legal constitutionalism.  
Such a view is held by Philip Sales and Richard Ekin, who argue that compliance with judicial 
pronouncements on rights was the purpose of the HRA, not the facilitation of democratic 
dialogue.  According to Sales and Ekin, ‘[t]he notion of “democratic dialogue” overlooks the 
primary function of the HRA, which is to provide a domestic remedial regime in relation to the 
rights to which the United Kingdom is subject under international law by its adherence to the 
ECHR, which are authoritatively interpreted by the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR).’82  As 
they note: 
 By entering into its obligations under the ECHR, the United Kingdom has chosen to identify 
 an authoritative body for interpreting the meaning and effect of Convention rights, 
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 namely the ECtHR.  Under the scheme of the ECHR there is no further need for, and no 
 space for, identifying a different theory of authority for determining the content of 
 Convention rights.83  
It is accordingly the role of the courts under the HRA, they argue, to ‘assess what an international 
court has stipulated (or would stipulate) rights to mean under the ECHR.’84  Sales and Ekin, 
therefore, dismiss the argument that Parliament has a real choice in deciding whether or not to 
follow judicial determinations on the Convention Rights: 
 [U]nder the HRA the courts are identified as the body which can authoritatively determine 
 the content of Convention – or human – rights, and do not have to accept the view of 
 Parliament on the issue ... 
 The practical effect of this, coupled with the rhetorical force associated with the giving of a 
 ruling that legislation violates human rights, is to create major political pressure for 
 government and Parliament to amend statutes to accommodate the courts' view ...  This 
 means that the HRA has created a system which is closer to a constitution in which the 
 courts have the power to strike down legislation than is often supposed.85 
Under this reading of the HRA, it is submitted that the role of the JCHR, as pioneered by Robert 
Blackburn,86 would be a purely technical one whereby the Committee would attempt to anticipate 
and predict what the courts would rule regarding the compatibility of legislation with the 
Convention Rights.87  There is little to no room, therefore, for parliamentary deviation from judicial 
rulings on legislative compliance with the Convention Rights both domestically and at Strasbourg.  
Parliament would be actively engaged in protecting rights against the executive, but its right to the 
final say would be in doubt. 
Under a culture of contestability, Parliament is free to develop and apply its own interpretations 
on human rights when scrutinising the executive which may differ from those of the judiciary.  As 
Evans and Evans note, this can be both a positive and a negative: 
 Unlike judges, parliamentarians are not bound by precedent or detailed rules in 
 developing conceptions of rights.  At best, parliamentarians could develop a conception of 
 human rights that is responsive to community conceptions of rights.  They could 
 demonstrate a familiarity with international human rights standards and also the local 
 interests and needs of the community which they serve.  At worst, parliamentarians could 
 adopt an incoherent or severely constrained conception of rights.  The conceptions of 
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 human rights adopted by parliamentarians will have a significant influence on the value 
 and impact of their scrutiny of proposed legislation for rights compliance.88 
Parliament would unquestionably retain its right to the final say, but this may be at the expense of 
human rights protection.  Despite the risks, however, it is clear that enabling Parliament to 
develop its own independent view on human rights corresponds strongly with the view of political 
constitutionalism that human rights are subject to reasonable disagreement and, as a result, 
should not be determined solely by the courts whose judgment the legislature should follow.  This 
envisages a role for the HRA which, as Nicol notes, is atypical of Bills of Rights,89 and characteristic 
of constitutional dialogue embodied by 'third wave' Bills of Rights.  Under this reading of the HRA, 
therefore, the JCHR, as proposed by the Constitution Unit, would be free to conduct 'an 
examination of how the legislation has succeeded in balancing competing interests, and applying 
the doctrine of proportionality.'90  By enabling it to consider the merits of the legislation in 
question, the JCHR is not debarred from departing from judicial rulings on human rights 
compliance.  The role of the Committee, therefore, is not to ensure strict compliance with the 
judicial interpretation of rights, but to assist is developing Parliament's own view on human rights. 
As noted above, the aim of the HRA was to protect human rights without undermining 
parliamentary sovereignty.  Because the HRA is an 'interpretive' Bill of Rights which restricts the 
judiciary's role in protecting rights in comparison to 'overriding' and traditional Bills of Rights, a 
gap in human rights protection inevitably emerges which the HRA expects Parliament to fill.  The 
HRA, therefore, encourages Parliament to engage with human rights issues in the various ways 
outlined above in order to facilitate a culture of rights whereby Parliament would play an active 
role in ensuring executive compliance with rights.  As Hiebert notes, however, the creation of a 
culture of rights is dependent upon there being a real risk of political loss for non-compliance with 
rights:   
 Where costs are significant, bureaucratic and governmental actors have a strong incentive 
 to protect legislation from the risk of being declared unconstitutional, incompatible, or 
 altered through judicial interpretation, and will incorporate case law into the legislative 
 process in order to lower the risk of judicial censure.  Two factors affect the perception of 
 costs: the willingness of courts to interpret rights and remedies broadly; and the extent to 
 which prior judicial rulings have compelled significant legislative changes (either through 
 rulings that directly alter or invalidate legislation or from a treaty obligation that elevates 
 judicial rulings to the status where they cannot easily be ignored.)  These costs will be 
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 amplified if political legitimacy for determining the scope of rights and how they should 
 guide or constrain legislation resides with courts rather than parliament, but will be 
 diminished if legitimacy resides with Parliament.91 
As noted above, New Zealand's Bill of Rights Act has arguably failed to instil greater political 
respect for human rights due to the absence of sufficient political costs for non-compliance.  In 
order for legislative rights review under the HRA to be effective, therefore, ss 3 and 4 must have 
the capacity to inflict political costs sufficient to compel greater respect for the Convention Rights.  
As the White Paper Rights Brought Home reveals: 
 Enabling the Convention rights to be judged by British courts will also lead to closer 
 scrutiny of the human rights implications of new legislation and new policies.  If legislation 
 is enacted which is incompatible with the Convention, a ruling by the domestic courts to 
 that effect will be much more direct and immediate than a ruling from the European Court 
 of Human Rights.  The Government of the day, and Parliament, will want to minimise the 
 risk of that happening.92 
This necessitates a degree of compliance with judicial pronouncements on Convention Rights, 
therefore, which on first inspection appears to undermine the dialogical aims of the HRA.  Given 
the international dimensions of the HRA identified by Sales and Ekin, compliance with judicial 
pronouncements on Convention Rights was most likely expected in the majority of cases.  Because 
parliamentary sovereignty, and thus Parliament's right to disagree with the courts, was expressly 
preserved under the Act, however, it was clearly not expected in every instance.93  Although 
Parliament, by virtue of its sovereignty, can exercise its right whenever it so wishes, it is submitted 
that the political pressure exerted by Strasbourg means that Parliament is only realistically likely to 
exercise this right in exceptional circumstances.94  The HRA, therefore, should be seen to blaze a 
path between the two opposing views on the HRA which generates a culture of rights within 
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Parliament that strikes a balance between compliance and contestability proportionate to its 
overall aims.95     
The HRA's success in achieving the correct balance, however, is dependent upon several factors.  
Firstly, although ss 3 and 4 must be capable of inflicting political costs sufficient to compel political 
compliance with rights in the majority of instances, they must also remain respectful to the 
underlying themes of the political school of thought in order to constitute an example of 
complementary constitutionalism.  Should s 3 be used too expansively, or s 4 declarations of 
incompatibility complied with automatically, Parliament's role in the protection of rights may be 
marginalised and its right to the final say undermined, thereby frustrating the HRA's aim of placing 
Parliament, not the courts, at the centre of human rights protection.  Secondly, although the JCHR 
should be sensitive to the pressures exerted upon both Parliament and the executive to conform 
with judicial pronouncements on rights, and advise compliance where appropriate, it must not be 
an ersatz of the judiciary.  The Committee must be willing and able to explore the issue of human 
rights more broadly and, crucially, form its own view on human rights96 in order to better enable 
Parliament, when scrutinising the executive, to make an informed decision on whether or not to 
adopt a view which differs from that of the judiciary.  To do otherwise, it is submitted, would have 
the effect of undermining Parliament's ability to make up its own mind on human rights in such a 
way as to make its right to the final say meaningless.  As Klug notes: 
 For a select committee to adopt a "quasi-judicial role" in legislative scrutiny is to miss the 
 point of the "dialogue model" which is said to characterise the HRA.  Without the 
 engagement of Parliament, the dialogue about the operation and development of the 
 rights in the Act is missing a significant voice.  Parliamentary select committees have an 
 essential role to play in helping Parliament to develop its "voice" on human rights ... Whilst 
 the HRA retained "parliamentary sovereignty," it is now for Parliament, and its select 
 committees, to ensure that this does not become "executive sovereignty" in all but 
 name.97   
Whether the JCHR has succeeded in developing its 'own voice'98will now be considered as part of 
an assessment of the extent to which the JCHR and s 19 have succeeded in facilitating greater 
legislative engagement with human rights and strengthening parliamentary control over the 
executive. 
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2.4 Legislative Rights Review in Practice  
As noted above, the obligation upon ministers to issue either a positive or a negative statement of 
compatibility under s 19 was designed with two goals in mind: first, to compel ministers to 
consider compatibility issues at the pre-legislative stage in order to increase the likelihood that 
Government Bills will be Convention-compliant; second, to provide a platform from which 
Parliament could then scrutinise the executive on human rights grounds. 
Because the issuing of either a positive or a negative statement of compatibility is mandatory for 
all Government Bills, it is clear that s 19 has increased government engagement with human rights 
issues.  Despite this, however, the quality of this engagement remains dubious, with the 
government appearing unwilling to advance its own view on rights compatibility free from legal 
influence.  Hiebert’s research reveals a strong presumption against governments issuing negative 
statements of incompatibility under s 19(1)(b),99 even where there is a high risk of it being 
declared incompatible by the courts,100 with only one government bill to date – the 
Communications Act 2003 – having received a negative statement.101  This strongly suggests a 
culture of compliance within government of second-guessing what a court might say regarding the 
compatibility of a proposed Bill with the Convention rights, and amending it accordingly in order to 
avoid confrontation with them.  As Hiebert observes: 
 Governments in Canada and the United Kingdom are able to take advantage of their 
 hegemony in the legislative process to insulate legislation from unwelcome policy and 
 fiscal consequences that could accompany a negative judicial ruling, by utilizing case law in 
 the pre-legislative evaluation process to anticipate  and avoid possible judicial 
 objections.102 
This is as a result of reliance by ministers upon the advice of Government lawyers who, as Hiebert 
observes, conduct a risk assessment of the likelihood that a proposed Bill will be held incompatible 
by the courts.103  This appears to remain the case despite changes in guidelines issued by the 
Cabinet Office permitting a minister to issue a s 19 statement where 'in her or his view the bill's 
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provisions are compatible with the Convention rights,104 and no longer only where there is 
sufficient legal opinion in support of compatibility.105  As Hiebert notes: 
 [L]egal officials have suggested that it is extremely unlikely that a minister will claim that a 
 bill is compatible if this contradicts the clear legal advice he or she received, and is even 
 more unlikely if the Attorney general believes the bill is not compatible.106  
Hiebert's research also suggests that the JCHR has little impact on government at the pre-
legislative stage.  As she notes, '[a]nticipation of potential JCHR criticism might influence a 
legislative initiative in the pre-introduction stage ... its opinion on compatibility appears too late in 
the process to be effective, because it is presented after the government has already committed 
itself to a bill.'107  By contrast, the courts appear to be the primary influence on government, albeit 
indirectly.  As James Allan notes: 
 Statements of Compatibility have collapsed into a wholly legalized account of how some 
 right or other has been treated in various domestic and overseas courts, or how they are 
 likely to be treated by the top judges.  And once that happens, whether intended or not, 
 yet more weight will be put on what the unelected judiciary thinks about rights.  Their 
 power, albeit indirectly and pre-emptively this time, will be increased yet again because of 
 the enactment of the statutory bill of rights.108 
Greater compliance with rights may be assured as a result, but it is achieved in a manner which 
undermines, rather than bolsters, Parliament's role in the process. 
Following the 2006 Klug Report on the Working Practices of the JCHR, however, this may be in the 
process of changing.  Whereas the Committee had seldom reported upon any Green Papers, 
White Papers or draft Bills up until 2006,109  Hunt argues that the Committee now engages more 
regularly with pre-legislative scrutiny, 'usually by corresponding with the relevant department 
about a policy proposal, e.g. in a Green or White Paper or other policy document, before the 
policy has been finalized, and feeds that pre-legislative scrutiny work into its scrutiny of the 
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subsequent Bill.'110  A recent example of this can be seen with the JCHR's report on the Justice and 
Security Green Paper.111  Should this refocus on legislative proposals and early draft Bills continue, 
we may yet see the JCHR have an impact upon Government Bills before they are introduced into 
Parliament, thereby further strengthening Parliamentary control over the executive on matters of 
human rights. 
It is submitted that s 19, with the help of the JCHR, has also enhanced Parliament's ability to 
scrutinise the executive on human rights grounds.  Although s 19 was designed to enhance 
Parliamentary scrutiny of Government Bills, the minimalistic nature of one-line s 19 statements of 
compatibility made this more difficult.112  If the government is neither obliged nor willing to 
explain its decision, how then can Parliament be expected to effectively scrutinise that decision?  
Although unable to convince the Government to provide a "Human Rights Memorandum" with 
every Government Bill, the JCHR's continued criticism of the Government's reluctance to explain 
their reasons behind issuing a statement of compatibility nevertheless resulted in the Government  
providing more detailed reasons in the Explanatory Notes of proposed bills.113  Cabinet Office 
guidelines on the making of legation now stipulate that the Explanatory Notes of a Government 
Bill must indicate that a s 19 statement has been issued and give details on the human rights 
issues it raises.  Crucially, it requires the government's assessment of the Bill's compatibility with 
the Convention Rights in the Explanatory Notes to be 'as detailed as possible setting out any 
relevant case law and presenting the Government's reasons for concluding that the provisions in 
the bill are Convention compatible.'114   
This change in practice, which, as Hunt argues, 'reflects a generally more conscientious 
engagement by departments with human rights implications of legislation,'115 should provide 
Parliament with the information it needs to effectively scrutinise the executive on human rights, 
thereby going some way towards rebalancing the relationship between Parliament and the 
executive in favour of the former.  Crucially, however, it demonstrates that the work of the JCHR, 
although perhaps unable to impact significantly upon Government Bills at the pre-legislative stage, 
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is nevertheless capable of both influencing governmental behaviour and enhancing Parliamentary 
scrutiny.   
As noted above, the JCHR decided very early on that it would prioritise the scrutiny of Government 
Bills, and it is clear from the evidence so far that it has not shrank from this commitment.  The 
Committee routinely screens all legislative proposals and examines in detail any and all that raise 
what they consider to be significant human rights issues.116  As Hunt notes, the JCHR has also been 
relentless in its efforts to make its legislative scrutiny more effective: 
 It [the JCHR] now regularly recommends amendments to Bills to give effect to its 
 recommendations and reports on Bills before Report stage in the first House, which 
 provides members with an opportunity to table those amendments and to initiate a 
 debate on the human rights issue raised by the Committee's report.117 
The JCHR continues to devote considerable time and energy to scrutinising anti-terrorism 
measures with at least some degree of success.  The JCHR's highly critical reports on the Anti-
Terrorism, Crime and Security Bill early on in the Committee's life,118 for example, were utilised 
during the parliamentary debates and ultimately compelled the Government to make some 
changes to the Bill.119  Despite this, however, it is generally accepted that the government rarely 
accepts JCHR recommendations.120  Hiebert, therefore, although initially expressing strong support 
for the work of the JCHR,121 has subsequently expressed scepticism over the JCHR's success in 
enhancing parliamentary scrutiny of legislation, concluding that 'the HRA has not enhanced the 
power of Parliament vis-à-vis the executive.'122   
Hiebert observes that 'JCHR reports might ... lead to minor changes made after a bill is introduced,' 
but only if they 'do not significantly alter the legislative objective or delay the legislation,'123 
thereby suggesting that the JCHR's influence on government is only 'relatively modest.'124  Priority 
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is instead given to legal advice because JCHR reports on Government Bills, as noted above, arrive 
too late in the process to influence the government.125  As she notes: 
 Once an initiative has been deemed compatible in the complex pre-legislative (that can 
 include review by the Attorney General), the government is unlikely to change its position 
 on the basis of a single but contrary parliamentary committee report.  Legal advisors and 
 ministers accept that valid differences of opinion  can arise on the question of whether a 
 proposed measure is compatible with Convention rights.  By the time the JCHR Reports, 
 the minister and cabinet will already have consulted their advisors, reached their decision, 
 and are extremely reluctant to revisit the judgment.  Consequently, they treat the JCHR's 
 judgment as simply another opinion; and one that does not warrant overriding the earlier 
 interpretation.126   
Hiebert, therefore, believes that Parliament is ineffectual at giving effect to JCHR 
recommendations, primarily because of the continued dominance of party discipline within the 
House of Commons which make government defeats are a rarity.127  If the MPs of the ruling party 
continue to vote along party lines, the ability of the Commons as a whole to influence the 
government is severely curtailed, and there is then less of an incentive for governments to 
endorse or even acknowledge human rights arguments presented by the JCHR.  As Hiebert notes: 
 If the government subsequently agrees to more substantive amendments, this decision is 
 most likely to occur because the government anticipates a realistic chance that a bill will 
 be defeated.  This is far more likely to occur in the House of Lords than in the Commons, 
 and it says more about the government's determination to save its legislation, than its 
 acceptance of the merits or justification of redressing the JCHR's concerns.  The admission 
 that rights-based pressures from the House of Commons rarely prompts amendments to 
 government legislation also confirms that, as a general rule, neither the HRA nor JCHR 
 reports influence political behaviour in the sense of utilising rights-based concerns as a 
 basis for supporting amendments.128 
Hiebert also claims that parliamentarians are generally uninterested in scrutinising legislation for 
compliance with the Convention Rights,129 and even if they were interested, she argues, the JCHR's 
frequent and lengthily reports, because they 'draw upon legalistic analysis better suited to an 
audience of constitutional legal scholars or judges than to members of Parliament,'130 make it 
difficult for MPs to 'take advantage of the committee's work.'131  She is therefore of the opinion 
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that the JCHR performs a technical role whereby it encourages compliance with judicial 
interpretations on rights and second-guesses the court on the compatibility of legislation – 
another reason why the government may view JCHR reports as adding little else to the advice they 
have already received from their lawyers.132 
It is submitted, however, that although the dominance of Parliament by both the executive and 
political parties does indeed inhibit Parliament's scrutiny of the executive, this fact should not 
overshadow the JCHR's success in increasing Parliament's overall engagement with human rights.  
As Hunt observes, the JCHR has sought to increase parliamentary engagement beyond legislative 
scrutiny by monitoring human rights institutions, reviewing the operation of the HRA, and by 
scrutinising UK compliance with international human rights treaties other than the ECHR.133  The 
JCHR have thus published reports, for example, on the Equality and Human Rights Commission,134 
the interpretation of public authorities under the HRA,135 and the International Covenant on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights.136  The JCHR has also conducted a number of thematic 
enquiries on major human rights issues in the hope of sparking debate within Parliament.137  As a 
result, areas which raise serious issues of human rights have been brought to the attention of 
Parliament such as: adults with learning disabilities;138 the use of restraint in secure training 
facilities;139 the Bill of Rights debate;140 policing protest;141 children's rights;142 human rights and 
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the private sector;143 facilitating peaceful protest;144 the UK's extradition policy;145 the rights of 
disabled people to independent living;146 the human rights of unaccompanied migrant children 
and young people;147 and the implications for access to justice of the Government's proposals to 
reform both legal aid and judicial review.148  The JCHR's most recent inquiry, announced on 29 
January 2014, explores violence against women and girls.149   
In the spirit of its duty to oversee the use of s 10 remedial orders, the JCHR has crucially sought to 
enhance Parliament's scrutiny of government responses to negative judicial rulings.  As Hunt 
notes: 
 The JCHR has ... pressed the Government to keep Parliament fully and regularly informed 
 about what it is doing to change law, policy or practice in the light of a judgment; asking 
 detailed questions of the relevant ministers in both correspondence and oral evidence 
 sessions; involving civil society in its scrutiny of the Government's responses; and 
 reporting regularly to Parliament about the swiftness and adequacy of that response and 
 on any shortcomings in the system for responding.  It has brought about debates in 
 Parliament about the Government's responses, both generally, and by proposing 
 amendments to Bills to give effect to certain judgments.150    
Reviewing responses to negative judicial rulings, as Hiebert notes, 'increases pressure on the 
executive to introduce or justify remedial action or inaction.'151  Although Jonathan Morgan 
identifies the JCHR as a ‘main driver’152 of a political trend towards compliance with s 4 
declarations,
153
 it is clear from the ongoing prisoner voting rights saga that Parliament is not 
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always convinced by the JCHR's arguments.154  In any event, the JCHR's work in this area has 
ensured that Parliament plays an active role in responding to judicial rulings, thereby safeguarding 
Parliament's right to the final say from both the executive and the courts.   
Despite Hiebert's contention to the contrary, it is also submitted that the JCHR, although it still 
frequently recommends compliance with judicial rulings, no longer performs an exclusively 
technical role.  In her 2006 report to the JCHR, Klug argued that the JCHR had adopted a ‘quasi-
judicial’ approach in the performance of its duties, 155 whereby the JCHR provided de facto ‘legal 
advice to Parliament’156 which, she concluded, ‘sits uncomfortably with the scheme of the HRA 
which was intended to allow Parliament the ‘final say’ on legislation.’157  As she noted: 
The current approach to scrutiny of published bills relies primarily on an estimation of the 
‘degree of risk’ that a court will find legislation incompatible.  The focus is on predicting 
how the domestic courts are likely to judge the legislation in question, based mainly on 
the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights or case law from the domestic 
courts interpreting the ECHR.  The Committee only rarely makes judgments for itself on 
whether legislation is compatible or not.  This is despite that fact that the courts not 
infrequently ‘defer’ to ‘elected representatives’ in making discretionary human rights 
judgments, on the grounds that they have greater legitimacy and capacity, in particular 
when rights collide or are limited on the grounds of meeting an important social 
purpose.158  
Following Klug's 2006 Report, however, the Committee expressed some interest in reaching its 
own view on human rights.159  Although Klug, in a 2007 follow-up to her report, noted that it was 
too early to tell whether the JCHR had started to develop its own view on human rights,160 Hunt 
argues that the practice had become firmly established by 2010, although he notes that it had 
taken some time to emerge.161  This is an encouraging development which substantially increases 
the chances of a balance being struck between a culture of compliance and a culture of  
contestability envisaged by the HRA.  One can now say with greater certainty that if and when the 
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Committee recommends compliance with a judicial interpretation, it does so having examined the 
issue itself and reached the same conclusion.  As a result, Parliament may also be more willing to 
develop its own voice on human rights, something which Ewing claims has already started to 
emerge.162   
It is therefore submitted that the JCHR's apparent inability to consistently influence legislation at 
both pre-legislative and legislative stages does not in any way indicate the failure of legislative 
rights review under the HRA.  As David Feldman has argued, the preservation of parliamentary 
sovereignty means that 'human rights can only gradually be built into the political process.'163  The 
JCHR's aim of engaging Parliament, the Government, and the wider public in human rights 
discussions, therefore, 'is a slow process.'164  Both the HRA and the JCHR have only been apart of 
the British constitution for a relatively short period of time, and it is thus still too soon to condemn 
the political settlement sought by the HRA as a failure.  Processes are just as important as 
outcomes, and it is clear from the above analysis that s 19 and the JCHR have played a significant 
role in shifting the attention of both Parliament and the government towards human rights issues.  
Section 19, as Hunt notes, has proven to be an 'effective catalyst' for greater parliamentary 
scrutiny,165 which the JCHR has consistently sought to cultivate through its various lines of inquiry.  
Consequently, 'it can be said unequivocally that, by engaging with human rights ... Parliament's 
role in relation to human rights has increased not decreased since the passage of the Human 
Rights Act.'166  A culture of rights, therefore, can be seen to be taking root within Parliament, thus 
forming the foundations upon which Parliament may better scrutinise the executive on human 
rights issues.  As a result, Parliament may yet convert its increased engagement with human rights 
into regular action and perhaps even displace the courts as the primary influence on government 
when drafting legislation. 
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3. Judicial Rights Review 
3.1 Sections 2 and 6 of the Human Rights Act 1998 
Before engaging with the analysis of ss 3 and 4, the exclusion of ss 2 and 6 from the chapter will 
first be addressed.  Section 2 has been excluded on the grounds that its constitutional significance 
can be seen to hinge upon ss 3 and 4, whilst s 6 has been excluded on the grounds that it deals, 
not with the review of legislation as with s 3, but instead with the review of executive action.   
When determining whether a Convention right has been breached or not under the HRA, judges 
under s 2(1) are obliged to take into account Strasbourg jurisprudence.  Strasbourg authority has 
persuasive, but not binding authority.  On the face of it, therefore, judges are given discretion 
under s 2 to either apply or disapply jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) 
depending on the circumstances of the case before them.167  Since the HRA came into force, 
however, courts have appeared unwilling to exercise their discretion, thereby preventing the 
development of a 'distinctively British contribution to the development of the jurisprudence of 
human rights in Europe.’
168
  Instead, courts have generally chosen to follow what Jonathan Lewis 
describes as the ‘mirror principle,’ whereby s 2 is interpreted as providing a ceiling to the scope of 
Convention Rights, not a floor.169  Consequently, the courts, in the absence of ‘special 
circumstances,’
170
 have sought merely to apply any ‘clear and constant jurisprudence’ of the 
ECtHR.171   
It is clear from the wording of s 2, however, that the courts are given the discretion to determine 
the precise scope of the Convention Rights they are obliged to enforce under ss 3, 4, and 6.  
Parliament must, therefore, be taken to have foreseen the possibility of the courts adopting either 
an expansive or a minimalistic interpretation of the Convention Rights.  Although an expansive 
interpretation of Convention Rights may result in more parliamentary legislation and executive 
acts being held to be incompatible than envisaged by its drafters, it is submitted that the 
application of Convention Rights nevertheless remain subject to the restrictions imposed by ss 3, 
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4, and 6.  As will be shown below, the s 3 interpretative power is not an unlimited one.  
Consequently, the scope of the Convention Rights, although determinative of whether a breach 
has occurred, does not automatically result in a change in the law.  However, while an expansive 
interpretation of the Convention Rights does not necessarily equate into an increased use of s 3, 
the same cannot be said of s 4.   
As noted above, if a breach is incapable of being remedied by way of judicial interpretation, the 
court may then issue a declaration of incompatibility under s 4.  Should the courts adopt an 
expansive interpretation, therefore, more statutes may be deemed incompatible with the 
Convention Rights, and more s 4 declarations of incompatibility issued as a result.  The extent to 
which this undermines the dialogical aims of the HRA depends upon the political response to such 
declarations.  As argued below, however, s 4 declarations, although highly persuasive, do not 
themselves change the law.  Theoretically, therefore, the political branches should be able to 
respond to any excessive use of s 4 declarations as a result of an expansive interpretation of the 
Convention Rights by merely deciding not to act in accordance with them.  Should the government 
and Parliament show deference towards any and all s 4 declarations of incompatibility, however, 
constitutional dialogue would be severely undermined.  It is submitted, therefore, that the 
significance of this scenario to the question of whether the British constitution continues to 
resemble a political one nevertheless hinges more upon s 4 than s 2.   
Section 6(1) states that ‘[i]t is unlawful for a public authority to act in a way which is incompatible 
with a Convention right,’ thereby extending the traditional grounds for judicial review of executive 
action to include failure to comply with the Convention rights.  This may be seen in the 
replacement of the Wednesbury unreasonableness test with a test of proportionality in R (on the 
application of Daly) v Secretary of State for the Home Department,172 which has the effect of 
subjecting executive decisions in relation to human rights issues173 to a higher standard of judicial 
scrutiny.  As a consequence of this, Helen Fenwick is correct in identifying s 6 as being ‘the central 
provision of the HRA.’174  Despite this, however, the focus of s 6 is not on influencing the 
legislature’s understanding or appreciation of human rights, but of public authorities such as 
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government departments.175  Although this subjects discretionary executive powers to judicial 
constraints, 6(3), in defining what amounts to a ‘public authority,’ categorically states that it ‘does 
not include either House of Parliament or a person exercising functions in connection with 
proceedings in Parliament.’  By empowering the courts to ensure that public authorities do not act 
contrary to the Convention rights, s 6 can therefore be seen to easily fit within the ultra vires 
model of judicial review.  Should a public authority act contrary to the Convention rights, it can be 
seen to have acted beyond the powers granted to it by Parliament.  In order for a breach of 
Convention rights to be legal, therefore, it must be permitted by primary legislation.
176
  Because 
the ultra vires model of judicial review, as noted in Chapter Two, is an example of complementary 
constitutionalism, the same can likewise be said of s 6.177    
3.2 Section 3 of the Human Rights Act 1998 
Although the HRA sought to strengthen Parliament's role in the protection of human rights – and 
thus prevent human rights from becoming the exclusive domain of the courts to whom Parliament 
must adhere to –  it was nevertheless necessary for the development of a culture of rights within 
Parliament for the courts to be able to inflict political costs sufficient to compel greater respect for 
rights.  The HRA, therefore, empowers the courts to review the compatibility of primary legislation 
with the Convention rights, thereby marking a significant departure from political 
constitutionalism's prohibition on  constitutional review.  Section 3, therefore, enables judges to 
interpret legislation in order to bring it into conformity with the Convention Rights ‘[s]o far as is 
possible to do so.’  Compared to s 6 of New Zealand’s Bill of Rights Act, therefore, the s 3 
interpretative obligation is much stronger.  This is best illustrated by the decision of the New 
Zealand Supreme Court in Hansen.178  Whereas the House of Lords in R v Lambert were able to use 
s 3 in order to render a reverse onus provision compliant with the Convention rights, 179 the 
Supreme Court in Hansen declined to use s 6 to reinterpret a similar provision on the grounds that 
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it would require a departure from Parliament's clear and unambiguous intention.180  Following 
Hiebert’s reasoning, therefore, s 3 may have the potential, if used often and expansively, to avoid 
a repeat of the situation in New Zealand by providing the government and Parliament with the 
incentive needed to comply with the Convention rights.181  This is because s 3 interpretations 
require positive action by government and Parliament to overturn them.  Theoretically, therefore, 
the more times s 3 is used to alter legislation to achieve compliance, the greater the political cost, 
the more the government and Parliament will be compelled to ensure that they will conform with 
Convention rights in the future. 
Although it was expected that s 3 would be used more often than s 4, and that a s 4 declaration 
would in fact not be needed ‘in 99 percent of cases,’182 case law to date indicates that s 3 has been 
used less frequently,
183
 and s 4 more often,
 184 than anticipated, thereby potentially undermining 
the claim that s 3 is the ‘prime remedial measure’ of the HRA
185
 and s 4 only a ‘measure of last 
resort.’186  This may seem an undesirable development from the point of view of legal 
constitutionalism in so far as s 4 declarations of incompatibility provide no remedy for those 
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whose rights have been infringed,187 and, unlike s 3, can only be issued by the higher courts.188  To 
some supporters of constitutional dialogue, however, this will come as a welcome development.  
Commentators such as Tom Campbell,
189
 Geoffrey Marshall,
190
 and Francesca Klug
191
 have long 
advocated for the use of s 4 because they fulfil one of the key purposes of the HRA: to give the 
final say on questions of human rights to Parliament, not the courts.  It is submitted, however, that 
the purpose of the HRA was more extensive than this.  It sought to preserve parliamentary 
sovereignty whilst also protecting human rights.  Section 4, therefore, as discussed in greater 
detail below, was not designed to provide an escape route for governments wishing to circumvent 
rights arbitrarily, but instead to facilitate greater engagement with and respect for Convention 
rights. 
It is therefore submitted that the HRA's success at facilitating complementary constitutionalism is 
not wholly dependent upon whether s 3 has been used more or less than 4.  As Kavanagh argues, 
what matters is that both s 3 and s 4 are used appropriately.  As she notes: 
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[S]tatistical generalisation alone cannot inform us about the appropriateness of choosing 
between section 3 and section 4 ... 
All one can say is that section 3 should be used when it is appropriate, considering all the 
factors relevant to that issue in the case before the courts, and section 4 should be used 
when it is not.
192
  
The HRA's success at facilitating complementary constitutionalism, therefore, is dependent also 
upon whether the current judicial reading of s 3 and its limits, as discussed below, either 
complement or contradict the underlying themes and values of the political school.  Should it be 
used too expansively, s 3 risks, not only marginalising Parliament's role in the protection of rights, 
but undermining parliamentary sovereignty as well. 
The use of s 3 to date has been far from uncontroversial, with a number of cases seemingly 
blurring the distinction between interpretation and legislation which the inclusion of s 4 was 
designed to prevent.  Admittedly, the distinction between interpreting and legislating is a fine one.  
Some political constitutionalists may therefore question the legitimacy of adopting any 
interpretative measure under the HRA.  Aileen Kavanagh, however, has nevertheless made a 
compelling case for the difference between the two in reference to the application of s 3.  
According to Kavanagh, ‘the activity of interpretation involves, rather than eschews, judicial law-
making.’193  Her argument proceeds as follows: the legal meaning of statutory language, when 
drafted in ‘broad evaluative terms,’194 can often not be determined by recourse to the language 
itself.  In order to establish its legal meaning, a judge must necessarily look beyond linguistic 
meaning, therefore, and make evaluative judgments and draw upon a number of different factors 
in order to reach a conclusion.
195
  The application of specific legislation to cases before judges may 
also be without precedent.  In such a situation, a judge, if he wishes to decide the case, may have 
no choice but to act creatively.   Consequently, as Kavanagh notes, ‘[e]ven under traditional 
doctrines of statutory interpretation, judges have exercised a creative role by elaborating, 
supplementing, modifying and developing statutory meaning.  So, when a court interprets an 
unclear statutory provision, settling its meaning will inevitably mean giving it a meaning.’196  Such 
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‘judicial law-making,’ however, should not, be confused with ‘legislative law-making,’ the former 
of which, Kavanagh claims, is far more ‘limited in scope and effect’ than the latter.197   
Following Kavanagh’s analysis, it can be said that, when judges enforce any Act of Parliament, one 
must come to expect from them a degree of judicial law-making.  Consequently, the appearance of 
judicial law-making under s 3 should not necessarily be seen to undermine Parliament's law-
making monopoly.  Section 3, however, is not without its limits.  Despite the inclusion of judicial 
law-making within the scope of s 3, Kavanagh makes clear that this does not extent to legislative 
law-making.  As she explains: 
In contrast to legislators, who have almost unrestricted choice in the areas of the law they 
can change or improve, it is not open to judges to reform any law they wish: they are 
limited in the decisions they can make by vagaries of litigation.  Even when a case comes 
before them, the issues are presented in the form of a bivalent dispute on a particular 
aspect of the law.  They are confined to resolving that particular issue.  If they stray 
beyond those confines, their pronouncements may be obiter and therefore not binding on 
future courts.  Rarely does a case encompass an entire area of law, or allow for possible 
radical reform of that area.  The fact that judges must operate within existing legal 
structures and can only make law on a case-by-case basis in response to the accidents of 
litigation, makes it difficult for them to provide a blueprint of reform for an entire area of 
law.
198
    
If s 3 was therefore used to interpret law not relevant to resolving the legal issue at hand, the 
court would thus be acting illegitimately.  If the court was of the opinion that Convention-
compliance could not be achieved without an expansive use of the s 3 interpretative power, it 
appears that a court would then need to issue a s 4 declaration of incompatibility instead. 
As a vindication of her distinction between judicial law-making and legislative law-making, 
Kavanagh relies heavily upon the reasoning of Lord Nicholls in Re S, Re W.199  In this case, the 
House of Lords unanimously overturned the decision of the Court of Appeal to use s 3 to read into 
the Children Act 1989 powers and procedures for the judicial supervision of local authority care 
orders.  According to Lord Nicholls: 
For present purposes it is sufficient to say that a meaning which departs substantially from 
a fundamental feature of an Act of Parliament is likely to have crossed the boundary 
between interpretation and amendment.  This is especially so where the departure has 
important practical repercussions which the court is not equipped to evaluate.  In such a 
case the overall contextual setting may leave no scope for rendering the statutory 
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provision Convention compliant by legitimate use of the process of interpretation.  The 
boundary line may be crossed even through a limitation on Convention rights is not stated 
in express terms ... 
I should add a further general observation in the light of what happened in the present 
case.  Section 3 directs courts on how legislation shall, as far as possible, be interpreted.  
When a court, called upon to construe legislation, ascribes a meaning and effect to the 
legislation pursuant to its obligation under section 3, it is important the court should 
identify clearly the particular statutory provision or provisions whose interpretation leads 
to that result.  Apart from all else, this should assist in ensuring the court does not 
inadvertently stray outside its interpretation jurisdiction.200   
As Kavanagh accordingly concludes: 
[I]n Re S, he [Lord Nicholls] felt that this reform could not be brought about by limited and 
piecemeal nature of the judicial law-making power under section 3.  A feature is 
‘fundamental’ therefore, if it is so embedded in the fabric of the statute, that it cannot be 
removed or changed by way of the necessarily piecemeal tool of judicial rectification ... 
Re S clarifies that section 3(1) should not be used as a way of radically reforming a whole 
statute or writing a quasi-legislative code, granting new powers and setting out new 
procedures to replace the existing statutory scheme.  This type of reform requires 
legislative law-making and is therefore best undertaken by Parliament, rather than the 
courts.
201
 
From a political constitutionalist perspective, the decision in Re S, for the reasons Lord Nicholls 
and Kavanagh advance, should be a welcome one.  It would be illegitimate for a court to read into 
a piece of legislation complex provisions without legislative approval, especially where the new 
provisions have the effect of increasing judicial scrutiny.  Kavanagh is correct to conclude, 
therefore, that the decision to forgo a s 3 interpretation and instead issue a s 4 declaration of 
incompatibility in both International Transport Roth GmbH v Secretary of State for the Home 
Department202 and Bellinger v Bellinger203 were done so on the grounds that Convention-
compliance in each instance required radical reform.204   
Despite this, however, s 3 has proven controversial due to the fact that, following the decisions of 
the House of Lords in R v A (No. 2),205 Ghaidan v Godin-Mendoza,206 and Secretary of State for the 
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Home Department v AF (No. 3),207 courts may rely upon their interpretative power to achieve 
Convention compliance even in the face of seemingly clear and unambiguous statutory language 
to the contrary.  This expansive use of s 3 has led to the claim that, despite the best efforts of the 
HRA to strike a complementary balance between parliamentary sovereignty and the judicial 
protection of rights, 'the balance of power has ... gone a little too far in the judicial direction.'208 
R v A (No. 2),
 
more commonly known as the rape shield case, concerned a challenge to s 41(3)(c) 
of the Youth Justice and Criminal Evidence Act 1999.  Section 41(1) of the Act prevented a 
complainant from having evidence presented of, or being questioned about, their previous sexual 
behaviour with the person accused of having committed a sexual offence against them.  This was 
subject to a number of exceptions under s 41(3).  Section 41(3) (c) permitted evidence of the 
complainant’s previous sexual history with the accused to be presented where: 
[I]t is an issue of consent and the sexual  behaviour of the complainant to which the 
evidence or question relates is alleged to have been, in any respect, so similar –  
(i) to any sexual behaviour of the complainant which (according to evidence 
adduced or to be adduced by or on behalf of the accused) took place as part of the 
event which is the subject matter of the charge against the accused, or 
(ii) to any other sexual behaviour of the complainant which (according to such 
evidence) took place at or about the same time as that event, 
that the similarity cannot reasonably be explained as a coincidence. 
Section 41 was challenged on the grounds that its general prohibition in rape cases against a 
woman being questioned about any previous sexual relationship with the defendant was in breach 
of the defendant’s right to a fair trial under Article 6.  Although it was claimed by some that s 41 
was passed with the intention of protecting a woman’s right to privacy under Article 8,209 and thus 
that a s 4 declaration of incompatibility should be issued, their Lordships, despite the reiteration 
by Lord Hope that s 3 ‘is only a rule of interpretation.  It does not entitle judges to act as 
legislators,’210 nevertheless held unanimously that their interpretative power under s 3 could be 
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used in order to achieve compliance with Article 6.  As a result, s 41(3)(c) was read, as Lord Steyn 
noted: 
[S]ubject to the implied provision that evidence on questioning which is required to 
ensure a fair trial under article 6 of the Convention should not be treated as inadmissible.  
The result of such a reading would be that sometimes logically relevant sexual experiences 
between a complainant and an accused may be admitted under section 41(3)(c).  On the 
other hand, there will be cases where previous sexual experience between a complainant 
and an accused will be irrelevant, e.g. an isolated episode distant in time and 
circumstances.  Where the line is to be drawn must be left to the judgment of the trial 
judges.211 
In so doing, the House of Lords granted themselves discretion in instances where it had been 
excluded, 212 thereby seemingly contradicting the express intention of Parliament.213 
In Ghaidan v Godin-Mendoza, the question at issue was whether paragraph 2(2) of Schedule 1 of 
the Rent Act 1977, which enabled ‘a person who was living with the original tenant as his or her 
wife or husband’ to succeed to the tenancy following the death of their spouse, could be read 
under s 3 HRA to included same-sex couples.  After unanimously agreeing that paragraph 2(2) 
violated the respondent’s Convention rights under Article 14 taken in conjunction with Article 8, 
their Lordships, by a majority of four to one, held that the terms ‘husband’ and ‘wife’ were not 
gender-specific and that s 3 could be used to read paragraph 2(2) so as to include same-sex 
couples.214  As a result, the provision now read as follows: ‘living together as if they were his or her 
wife or husband.’  Compared with R v A (No. 2), however, the departure from Parliament's 
intention in Ghaidan can be seen to be a relatively modest one.  Although there was evidence that 
Parliament, in enacting the infringing legislative provision, did not intend for it to apply to same-
sex couples,215 the ambiguity surrounding the statutory language nevertheless made the 
provision's applicability to same-sex linguistically possible.  In addition to this, although Parliament 
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had enacted paragraph 2(2) with the intention that it not apply to same-sex couples, it appears 
unlikely that this remains the case.  In using s 3, therefore, the House of Lords, although ignoring 
Parliament's enacted intention, could be viewed as enforcing what is likely Parliament's current 
intention.  Paragraph 2(2) had already been amended by Parliament in 1988 to bring survivors of 
long-term heterosexual partnerships within the ambit of the Act and, as Lord Rodger observed, 
'society has moved on since 1988.'216  Consequently: 
 In this particular context, even if there once was, there is no longer any reason in 
 principle for not including within the concept of "spouse" someone who had lived with 
 the original tenant in an equivalent long-term, but homosexual, relationship.  To 
 interpret paragraph 2 so as to include such a person would, of course, involve extending 
 the reach of paragraph 2(2), but it would not contradict any cardinal principle of the 
 Rent Act.  On the contrary, it would simply be a modest development of the extension  of 
 the concept of "spouse" which Parliament itself made when it enacted paragraph 2(2) in 
 1988.  The position might well have been different if Parliament had not enacted 
 paragraph 2(2) and had continued to confine the right to succeed to the husband or wife 
 of the original tenant.  But that bridge was crossed in 1988.217 
In Secretary of State for the Home Department v AF (No. 3), the fair hearing provisions of the 
Prevention of Terrorism Act 2005 were challenged on the grounds that they infringed the right to 
a fair trial under Article 6 of the ECHR.  The 2005 Act empowered the Secretary of State to make 
control orders against individuals suspected of being involved with terrorism.218  Under s 3 of the 
Act, the High Court was tasked with ensuring that a decision by the Secretary of State to make a 
control order satisfied the criteria for doing so under s 2.  In deciding to make a control order, 
however, the Secretary of State could rely either partly or wholly upon 'closed material' – evidence 
the government deems too sensitive to disclose to either the suspect or his legal representatives.  
In addition to this, the court was also forbidden under the scheme of the 2005 Act to disclose 
material it thought to be 'contrary to the public interest.'219  As Phillipson notes, this arrangement 
'subordinated fair trial rights to the public interest,'220 thereby infringing the right to a fair trial 
under Article 6.  In order to combat this, Special Advocates – lawyers with security clearance – 
were permitted to review the 'closed material' on behalf of the suspect.221  Having seen the 'closed 
material,' however, Special Advocates were prevented from receiving instructions from the 
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suspect.222  In the case, the House of Lords had to decide whether the use of Special Advisors in 
this manner 'was sufficient to counterbalance the lack of an open adversarial hearing,'223 thereby 
ensuring compliance with Article 6.  Applying the decision of the ECtHR in A v United Kingdom,224 
the House of Lords held that, where the Secretary of State's decision to make a control order was 
based wholly or mainly upon 'closed material,' there would be an infringement of Article 6.225  In 
order to remedy this infringement, therefore, their Lordships, despite Parliament's clear intention 
to the contrary, used s 3 of the HRA to read into the 2005 Act a requirement for limited disclosure 
of information.  As Lord Phillips noted: 
 [T]he controlee must be given sufficient information about the allegations against him to 
 enable him to give efficient instructions in relation to those allegations.  Provided that this 
 requirement is satisfied there can be a fair trial notwithstanding that the controlee is not 
 provided with the detail or the sources of the evidence forming the basis of the 
 allegations.226 
Despite departing from clear and unambiguous statutory language, however, their Lordships in R v 
A (No. 2) and Ghaidan were in no doubt that their respective actions fell within the expansive 
scope of their s 3 interpretative duty.  In R v A (No. 2), Lord Steyn argued that: 
[T]he interpretative obligation under section 3 of the 1998 Act is a strong one.  It applies 
even if there is no ambiguity in the language in the sense of the language being capable of 
two different meanings… The White Paper made clear that the obligation goes far beyond 
the rule which enabled the courts to take the Convention into account in resolving any 
ambiguity in a legislative provision ...  The draftsman of the Act had before him the slightly 
weaker model in section 6 of the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 but preferred 
stronger language. Parliament specifically rejected the legislative model of requiring a 
reasonable interpretation.  Section 3 places a duty on the court to strive to find a possible 
interpretation compatible with Convention rights.  Under ordinary methods of 
interpretation a court may depart from the language of the statute to avoid absurd 
consequences: section 3 goes much further …  In accordance with the will of Parliament as 
reflected in section 3 it will sometimes be necessary to adopt an interpretation which 
linguistically may appear strained.  The techniques to be used will not only involve the 
reading down of express language in a statute but also the implication of provisions.227   
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Echoing Lord Steyn’s judgment in R v A (No. 2), Lord Nicholls in Ghaidan likewise declared that ‘the 
interpretative obligation decreed by section 3 is of an unusual and far-reaching character.’228  
Section 3, he argued, ‘enables language to be interpreted restrictively or expansively.  But section 
3 goes further than this.  It is also apt to require a court to read in words which change the 
meaning of the enacted legislation, so as to make it Convention-compliant.’
229
  As a result, s 3 
‘may require the court to depart from this legislative intention, that is, depart from the intention 
of the Parliament which enacted the legislation.’230  Once this is accepted, he claimed, ‘it becomes 
impossible to suppose Parliament intended that the operation of section 3 should depend critically 
upon the particular form of words adopted by the parliamentary draftsman in the statutory 
provision under consideration.’231  Apart from Lord Scott's minor reservation,232 however, the 
question of whether s 3 could be used to ignore clear statutory language was not discussed in AF 
(No. 3). 
This expansive use of s 3 has drawn criticism from  political constitutionalists for exceeding the 
limits of statutory interpretation envisaged by Parliament in enacting the HRA,233 thereby 
spearheading the popular view that the HRA, as Stephen Gardbaum notes, is now 'less distinctive 
from US-style constitutionalism than initially claimed or hoped; that it has created what might be 
thought of as de facto judicial supremacy.'234     
The political constitutionalist objection to this expansive approach towards s 3 is certainly not 
difficult to recount.  Because Parliament’s intention is expressed in clear and unambiguous 
language, there is by definition no room for the court to interpret in a Convention-friendly 
manner.  The courts' role in such an instance would have to be purely applicative, not interpretive.  
To act otherwise would therefore be to ignore Parliament’s will as expressed in the language of 
the infringing statute, thereby undermining the doctrine of Parliamentary sovereignty, as well as 
Kavanagh’s justification for judicial law-making altogether which, as seen above, appears to hinge 
greatly on the ambiguity of enacted legislation.  As Lord Bingham argued in defence of the House 
of Lords' decision to issue a s 4 declaration of incompatibility in R (on the application of Anderson) 
v Secretary of State for the Home Department: 
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 To read section 29 [of the Crime (Sentences) Act 1997] as precluding participation by 
 the Home Secretary, if it were possible to do so, would not be judicial interpretation but 
 judicial vandalism: it would give the section an effect quite different from that which 
 Parliament intended and would go well beyond any interpretive process sanction by 
 section 3 of the 1998 Act.
235
 
Departure from 'original intent' should instead only be permitted – if at all – where such intent is 
ambiguous –  in other words, where the statutory language is also ambiguous.  In such instances, 
the courts could legitimately use s 3 to read in or read down legislation, but only because there is 
absent a strong countervailing intention.  If such a contrary intention where to be manifested 
clearly and expressly, s 4 would be the appropriate section to rely on.   
The difficulty with this reasoning, however, is that the courts, in ignoring Parliament’s original 
intention as expressed in the infringing statute, are in fact enforcing the will of Parliament as 
expressed in s 3.  Therefore, although the expansive approach towards s 3 adopted by the House 
of Lords in R v A (No. 2) and Ghaidan can be seen to contradict, rather than complement, the 
underlying themes of the political school of thought, it is submitted that this contradiction is 
mitigated by the fact that such an approach was envisaged by the drafters of the HRA and, 
crucially, approved by Parliament.  As Gavin Phillipson therefore argues, 'the judges, in using 
section 3 in far-reaching ways, are simply doing Parliament's bidding.'236  It is thus 'strange for 
those who cavil against any judicially imposed limits on what Parliament may instruct to be so 
critical of mere judicial obedience to Parliament's will.'237   
When one examines the text of s 3, it also becomes apparent that the provision in no way 
expressly precludes the reinterpretation of clear and unambiguous statutory language.  The White 
Paper Rights Brought Home reveals that the operation of s 3 was always intended to depart from 
traditional forms of statutory interpretation.238  It can be concluded, therefore, that s 3 of the HRA 
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was designed, not to emulate s 6 of New Zealand’s Bill of Rights Act, but instead to depart from it.  
Parliament even rejected a proposal which, like New Zealand’s Bill of Rights Act, would have 
expressly required interpretations under s 3 to be reasonable, not merely possible.239  As Phillipson 
notes, '[w]hen Parliament deliberately rejects an amendment limiting the courts to only 
reasonable reinterpretations ... it must be taken to have intended some pretty strong rereadings 
of other legislative provisions.'240  Kavanagh is correct, therefore, in arguing that s 3 is designed to 
permit departure from parliamentary intention.  As she notes, ‘[i]f the courts were not 
empowered to go against the ‘original intention’ to some degree, then section 3(1) would be 
rendered otiose.’
241
  Given the political aspirations for s 3 noted above, it seems highly unlikely 
that s 3 was designed to function as a dead letter.  Express terms, therefore, cannot be said to 
prohibit the use of s 3,242 although they may, as Kavanagh argues, be used in order to ascertain 
what the fundamental feature of legislation is, and thus if a s 3 interpretation is possible or not.243 
Despite this, it is clear that s 3 was not intended to completely circumvent the doctrine of 
parliamentary sovereignty.  As Jack Straw MP commented during the passage of the Human Rights 
Bill through Parliament: 
We decided to reject Canada's approach, which was, in effect, to establish a fundamental 
law that, in certain circumstances, took precedence over laws passed by its Parliament. 
We also considered the New Zealand model. We came up with our own approach--it is a 
British answer to a British problem--fundamental to which is the sovereignty and 
supremacy of Parliament.244 
He was therefore of the opinion that, in the fulfilment of their duty under s 3, the courts would 
not ‘contort the meaning of words until they lose their meaning altogether.’ 245  As he noted: 
[W]e [the Government] want the courts to strive to find an interpretation of legislation 
that is consistent with convention rights, so far as the plain words of the legislation allow, 
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and only in the last resort to conclude that the legislation is simply incompatible with 
them.246 
Following this, the HRA is perhaps best characterised as an attempt to find a middle-ground 
between a New Zealand-style ‘interpretive’ Bill of Rights and a Canadian-style ‘overriding’ Bill of 
Rights.  It must be weaker than the Canadian Charter, but stronger than New Zealand’s Bill of 
Rights Act if it wishes to defy Tushnet's instability thesis and achieve workable 'weak-from judicial 
review.'  One could therefore conclude that the courts may use s 3 to reinterpret even clear and 
unambiguous statutory language with the only legitimate limitation on its scope being the natural 
limits of judicial law-making – the ‘fundamental feature’ limitation advanced above.  As Kavanagh 
argues, ‘[t]he legitimacy or illegitimacy of an interpretation does not hinge on whether the courts 
depart from legislative intent, but rather on the extent to which it so departs.’
247
  How radical the 
reform required in order to achieve Convention-compliance, therefore, remains the deciding 
factor. 
Kavanagh certainly reconciles the decision in Re S with R v A (No. 2) on the grounds that the 
change facilitated by s 3 in R v A (No. 2) ‘did not depart substantially from a fundamental feature’ 
of the Youth Justice and Criminal Evidence Act 1999.
248
  Following Kavanagh’s definition of judicial 
law-making and legislative law-making, her conclusions in this regard appear sound.  The fact that 
s 3 enables the reading down and reading in of word is not in and of itself significant, as it can be 
seen to be an inevitable if not necessary part of judicial law-making.  All that matters is that s 3 
was not used in R v A (No. 2) ‘as a way of radically reforming a whole statute or writing a quasi-
legislative code granting new powers and setting out new procedures to replace the existing 
statutory scheme,’249 whilst it arguably was in Re S. 
Ghaidan is also distinguished from Re S along similar lines.  Although Lord Nicholls was of the 
opinion that s 3 could be used to ‘modify the meaning, and hence the effect, of primary 
legislation,’250 he was nevertheless of the opinion that s 3 should not be used to ‘adopt a meaning 
inconsistent with a fundamental feature of the legislation,’251 with Lord Rodger noting that any 
interpretation should ‘go with the grain of the legislation.’252  Lord Nicholls also noted that s 3 
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should be avoided by judges in circumstances which required ‘legislative deliberation,’253 as they 
would require the courts ‘to make decisions for which they are not equipped.’254  To act 
otherwise, ‘would be to cross the constitutional boundary section 3 seeks to demarcate and 
preserve.’
255
  As Kavanagh concludes, these arguments made by Lord Nicholls and Lord Rodger 
appear to echo strongly the ‘fundamental feature limitation’ advanced in Re S.256  As a result, the 
use of s 3 in Ghaidan to include same-sex couples within the scope of the Rent Act 1977, despite 
the fact that words were read into the statute, can be seen to be a relatively modest linguistic 
change which pales in comparison to the changes envisaged by the Court of Appeal in Re S.  On 
such grounds, the decision in Ghaidan can be seen to fall within the scope of s 3.    
The decision in AF (No. 3), however, is harder to reconcile.  According to Kavanagh, the case shows 
that the courts can use 'creative methods of interpretation to stretch ... provisions to their limit.'257  
She is therefore of the view that the 'reading down' of the Prevention of Terrorism Act 2005 by the 
House of Lords, although severe, nevertheless fell within the scope of s 3.  As she argues: 
 The degree of departure from the original statutory meaning (or intent) is one important 
 factor the courts take into account when considering whether to adopt a Convention-
 compatible interpretation under s 3 on the one hand, or a declaration of incompatibility 
 under section 4 on the other.  In general, the more radical the departure is, the less likely 
 the courts are to rely on section 3.  However, cases such as AF show that this concern is 
 not determinative in every case.  The courts may be prepared to countenance a 
 substantial  departure from the original meaning of the statute if it would achieve the 
 aim of complying Convention rights and give the litigants before them a remedy.258 
In 'reading down' 2005 Act, however, their Lordships not only departed from Parliament's clear 
and unambiguous intention, but initiated a reform so radical that it arguably went against the 
grain of the legislation, and thus beyond the scope of s 3.  As Phillipson argues: 
 [T]he House of Lords was reversing what was arguably a 'fundamental feature' – a 
 fundamental principle even – of the legislation: the principle that the suspect's rights of 
 disclosure were to be subordinated to the public interest, with (the government  claimed) 
 the ultimate aim of upholding national security in combating the terrorist threat.  This 
 might fairly be said to be a key feature of the legislation, since the whole raison d'être of 
 'pre-emptive' measures like control orders is precisely to avoid the disclosure of evidence 
 to suspects that criminal prosecution in open court would require ...  Moreover, this basic 
 non-disclosure principle was made crystal clear by the  relevant provisions of the ... 
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 [Prevention of Terrorism Act 2005] ... which precluded the judge from allowing  evidence 
 to go into the open case that would be 'contrary to the public interest,'  regardless of the 
 impact on procedural fairness.  For this reason it is strongly arguable that AF (No. 3) 
 was, for this reason, the most radical use of section 3 yet.259 
The JCHR has also concluded that, in 'reading down' the 2005 Act, the House of Lords 'effectively 
rewrote the statutory regime.'260  As a result, it is perhaps surprising that that a s 4 declaration of 
incompatibility was not issued.261  As noted above, however their Lordships in the case did not 
engage in a detailed discussion of the appropriate limits of s 3 as they had in both R v A (No. 2) and 
Ghaidan.  The House of Lords appeared instead to treat the use of s 3 as a non-issue, with only 
Lord Scott expressing any reservations about the legitimacy of its use in the case: 
 My Lords, I am not sure that, if the point had been taken on these appeals, I would have 
 agreed with my noble and learned friend’s reading-down of the statutory power to 
 make control orders.  It seems to me very well arguable that the detail in which and the 
 precision with which the statutory procedure for the judicial hearings is laid down in the 
 2005 Act makes it impermissible to argue that compliance with the express statutory 
 requirements is not enough to ensure the validity of control orders and that, in addition, 
 other requirements of a “fair hearing” for Article 6(1) purposes must also be met.262 
In reaching their decision, the Government's preference for a s 3 reinterpretation over a s 4 
declaration appears to have been a significant, if not overriding, factor.263  As Kavanagh observes: 
 [W]hilst the courts are not legally obliged to follow the views of the parties (including 
 those of the Crown) on the issue of whether to adopt a section 3 interpretation or a 
 section 4 declaration, in reality, if no party is prepared to argue in favour of a 
 declaration of incompatibility, the courts are reluctant to issue one.  This may simply be  a 
 consequence of the fact that the courts tend not to decide an issue on which there has 
 been no argument at the hearing of the case.264 
The expansive use of s 3 in AF (No. 3) clearly undermines the argument that the decision in R v A 
(No. 2) constituted a 'high point of interpretative power'265 that the courts had since climbed down 
from.  Given the absence of any meaningful discussion of s 3, however, it is difficult to ascertain 
with any certainty the long-term implications of the decision.  Although it clearly sets a precedent 
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that the lower courts are bound to follow, it would be premature to conclude that it marks a 
general departure from the limits of s 3 established by previous case law until the Supreme Court 
is given the opportunity to consider the matter again.  
Because it both undermines both parliamentary sovereignty and Parliament's role in the 
protection of rights, the expansive interpretation of s 3 can be seen to clearly contradict the 
underlying themes of the political school of thought.  Morgan, echoing the above view of Lord 
Bingham in Anderson,266 therefore advocates the repeal and replacement of s 3 ‘with a provision 
that makes clear that interpretation cannot distort the meaning of statutory language.’
267
  Under 
such a provision, Parliament would, retain the final say, and the court's role in the protection of 
rights, not Parliament's, would instead be marginalised.  Despite this, however, it is nevertheless a 
contradiction that has been endorsed by Parliament.  It also remains the case that s 3, along with 
any cases decided under it, are technically subject to legislative reversal by Parliament.   Section 3 
is thus unable to usher in judicial supremacy on matters of human rights.  Because the courts are 
merely enforcing Parliament's clear intention, therefore, s 3 must be seen as complementary, 
rather than contradictory, to the political school.  Despite this, however, it is submitted that the 
absence of express words as a limitation on the application of s 3, if not contradictory to the 
political school due to its enactment by Parliament, is certainly not as complementary to the 
political school as it could be.  By empowering the courts under s 3 to ignore Parliament's clear 
and unambiguous intention in other statutes, despite retaining the final say, Parliament 
nevertheless appears to be undermining its own authority.  If the courts shrink from their 
responsibility to achieve Convention-compliance in spite of clear and unambiguous statutory 
language to the contrary, however, Parliament's authority would almost certainly be undermined.  
The expansive interpretation of s 3 endorsed by the HRA and followed in both R v A (No. 2) and 
Ghaidan, therefore, is perhaps best seen as an area of unresolved tension between the legal and 
political schools of thought which pushes the boundaries of complementary constitutionalism to 
its limits.   
3.3 Section 4 of the Human Rights Act 1998 
Unlike their New Zealand colleagues, British judges are also expressly empowered under s 4 of the 
HRA to issue a declaration of incompatibility in relation to any infringement.  According to 
Morgan, the effect of s 4 ‘is that the court is not declaring what the law is, but rather what the law 
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isn’t.  In effect, the court is empowered to issue legal advice, without binding legal effect, to 
Parliament and the government.’268  As Tom Hickman – a critic of this argument – recounts: 
Those who praise the Human Rights Act’s dialogic character believe that the role of the 
courts under the Human Rights Act is to propose to other branches answers to substantive 
questions of justice.  It envisages courts proposing arguments of principle to the political 
branches, and so will here be termed ‘principle-proposing dialogue.’  It is said that, in this 
way, the Human Rights Act provides for an effective synthesis of parliamentary democracy 
and human rights by forging a partnership between legislature, executive and judiciary.  
Importantly it is implicit in this view that the Government can legitimately deviate from 
declarations of incompatibility on competing grounds of principle as well as of expediency. 
This reveals a deeper feature of arguments that rely on section 4 to ‘reconcile 
parliamentary democracy and human rights.’  Behind such arguments lies a radical 
reconceptualisation of the separation of powers, according to which the courts are 
transformed from arbiters of rights, albeit subject to legislative overrule, to a form of 
privileged pressure group whose function it is to raise good reasons why a litigant’s 
interests should be respected.  It abandons the idea that the courts should hold 
government to fundamental principle and the law, and repositions the courts within the 
forum of ordinary politics, providing not a check or balance, but counsel.
269
    
If so, s 4 could be seen to embody the idea of ‘constitutional dialogue’ underpinned by ‘third 
wave’ Bills of Rights, the idea that the courts should be allowed to participate in the human rights 
debate without dominating it.
270
  Following a declaration of incompatibility, the impetus should be 
placed upon both Parliament and the government to correct any incompatibility identified by the 
courts either via ordinary legislation or remedial order.271  As noted above, s 4 declarations of 
incompatibility are legally non-binding.  Consequently, Parliament and the government are under 
no legal obligation under the HRA to respond positively to declarations.  Once issued, the response 
to the decision of the court, regardless of the eventual outcome, should theoretically have been 
subject to political scrutiny, and thus influenced by political pressure.  In this regard, the ‘weak-
form judicial review’ or ‘principle-proposing dialogue’ embodied by s 4 would appear to give 
expression to complementary constitutionalism.  Declarations of incompatibility are only issued in 
order to remind the executive and Parliament of their obligations under the ECHR, the final say on 
the matter is reserved for democratically elected legislators. 
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However, as Hickman argues, by reducing court rulings to mere ‘provisional determinations,’272 
principle-proposing dialogue ‘affords courts a weak role in the constitutional system.’273  The aim 
of the HRA was not solely to preserve Parliament’s right to the final say, but to ensure greater 
conformity with the Convention Rights by preventing abuses from ever arising – the creation of a 
parliamentary culture of rights.  The HRA, therefore, must be capable, through the issuing of a s 4 
declaration of incompatibility, to generate an effect not too dissimilar to soft law, laws which, as 
Aileen McHarg notes, ‘attempt to influence constitutional behaviour rather than generating 
binding norms.’
274
   
Because the successful creation of a parliamentary culture of rights, as Hiebert argues, is highly 
dependent upon the political and legal cost for non-compliance, principle-proposing dialogue 
offers little incentive to both the government and Parliament to respond positively, if at all, to 
declarations of incompatibility, therefore providing a stark contrast to s 3.  As Hiebert remarks: 
In Canada, parliament and the provincial legislatures have to act assertively to disagree 
with judicial rulings, to ensure that their legislative objectives can be realised despite a 
judicial finding of unconstitutionality ...  The assertive requirement for political 
disagreement contrasts with the other jurisdictions, where parliament can disagree by 
simply maintaining the status quo.  In New Zealand, the UK and the ACT, parliament 
generally must legislate only if it wishes to give effect to a judicial decision and pass 
remedial measures.  The exception to this is if the judiciary has altered the intention or 
effects of legislation, in an attempt to render legislation compatible with judicial 
interpretations of rights.  Such judicial action would require an affirmative parliamentary 
response to restore the original intention or scope of legislation.
275
     
Under both ss 3 and 4, Parliament ultimately retains the final say.  Of this there can be little 
doubt.276  Whereas positive action is required by both Parliament and the government in order to 
overturn a s 3 interpretation, s 4 should exert less pressure upon Parliament and the government 
to comply with rights than s 3.  Parliament and the government may merely ignore declarations 
should they disagree with the court’s decision.  Given that fact that s 4 ‘decouples rights from 
remedies,’277 it should come of little surprise therefore that s 3 was intended by its drafters to be 
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the first port of call for judges.278  It is submitted, however, that s 4 should not be dismissed as 
being of little value to the development of a culture of rights within Parliament.  Although 
comparatively weaker than s 3, the ability of the courts to formally declare legislative 
inconsistencies with rights, as Hiebert argues,
279
 could nevertheless place the government and 
Parliament under significant pressure to remedy the alleged infringement.280  Given the ambitious 
aims of the HRA, this should in fact be seen to be one of the intended purposes of s 4.  In order to 
prevent s 4 from being little more than a dead letter which dresses judicial supremacy in the 
garments of Parliamentary legitimacy, however, Parliament must be capable of disagreeing with 
the courts where it strongly disagrees with its judgment.  Section 4 declaration of incompatibility, 
therefore, must not be treated as binding authority, but only as highly persuasive authority.  As 
Gardbaum notes in general about 'third wave' Bills of Rights: 
 [T]he best understanding and operation of legislative final words under the new model  in 
 general is a presumption that legislatures will abide by court decisions and not routinely 
 ignore them – but where there is reasonable disagreement on matters of major principle 
 after high quality debate, it should be considered legitimate for legislatures to exercise 
 their independent legal power of having the final word.281 
As noted in the previous section, the courts have issued more s 4 declarations of incompatibility 
than initially expected.  Despite s 3 being applied expansively, therefore, Parliament's role in the 
protection of rights does not appear to have been completely bypassed.  However, according to 
the Ministry of Justice, as of 31 July 2013, there have been a total of 28 declarations of 
incompatibility, of which 19 have become final and not subject to an appeal, 8 have been 
overturned on appeal, and 1 remains subject to further appeal.282  Of the 19 final declarations: 
 11 have been remedied by later primary legislation 
 3 have been remedied by a remedial order under section 10 of the Human 
Rights Act 1998; 
 4 related to provisions that had already been remedied by primary 
legislation at the time of the declaration; 
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 1 is under consideration as to how to remedy the incompatibility.283     
The government, therefore, has responded positively to all but one of the declarations of 
incompatibility issued,284 thereby suggesting the presence of a 'culture of compliance'285 amongst 
parliamentarians towards s 4 declarations of incompatibility.  By showing deference to the 
judiciary, s 4’s supposed weak-form judicial review may in practice differ little from strong-form 
judicial review, thereby undermining Parliament’s sovereignty irrespective of its express 
preservation.  As Hiebert notes: 
If the political culture develops in a manner that assumes remedial legislation is required 
whenever a court rules under s 4 that legislation is not compatible with rights, the 
retention of the principle of parliamentary sovereignty may be no more significant than is 
the inclusion of a notwithstanding clause in Canada for preserving a political ability to 
disagree with judicial rulings.  Moreover, if political compliance with the judicial rulings 
becomes the model of choice, the potential for judicial rulings to alter policy choices can 
occur even without judicial declarations of incompatibility or remedial legislation.  This is 
because of the considerable latitude in how the judiciary approaches its interpretative 
obligations under section 3.
286
 
For human rights sceptic James Allan, the government’s apparent deference towards s 4 
declarations comes as no surprise.  In his view, because the wording of s 4 implies that ‘the judges’ 
decisions about rights are to be treated as somehow the correct or right or indisputable and 
certainly the authoritative ones,’287 the impression is therefore created that the issuing of a 
declaration of incompatibility means beyond all doubt that that a Convention right has been 
infringed.
288
  Allan therefore claims that the wording of s 4 is factually incorrect ‘as regards what is 
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often dispute between the judiciary and the legislature,’289 thereby making it very difficult for 
Parliament to ignore s 4 declarations.  As he notes: 
In many, many instances the elected legislature and the unelected judiciary (or, rather, a 
majority of the former and a majority of the latter) simply disagree over a highly 
contestable decision about how best to respect rights and about what limits on them are 
reasonable ...  And so it is grossly misleading in terms of a characterisation of what is in 
fact happening and in dispute to portray the legislature (and indeed to force them to 
portray themselves) as wanting to take people’s rights away.  They are, in fact, disagreeing 
about the scope, reach, and limits of rights in a way that happens every day, all the time, 
amongst smart, well-informed, reasonable people.
290
 
The wording Allan identifies as being chiefly responsible for the empowering of judges are those 
found under s 4(2), which states that ‘[i]f the court is satisfied that the provision is incompatible 
with a Convention right, it may make a declaration of that incompatibility.’  It is submitted, 
however, that Allan’s reading of s 4 is incorrect.  The phrasing of the provision instead makes it 
clear that the issuing of a declaration of incompatibility is anything but irrefutable.  A declaration is 
instead the learned opinion of the court, and should therefore not be treated as binding authority 
but as persuasive authority.  Allan’s claim that the wording implies that the judges’ opinion on the 
matter is to be treated as irrefutable fact is accordingly without legal basis.     
Support for Allan’s claim may yet rest, however, with s 10 of the HRA.  Because s 10 places the 
impetus on government and not Parliament to initiate legislative changes in response to s 4 
declarations, Parliament’s role is not only severely undercut,291  but the perception that responses 
to s 4 declarations must be both positive and prompt is further perpetuated.  Despite this, 
however, s 10 has only been used in response to a declaration of incompatibility in order to 
amend an incompatibility a total of three times, with primary legislation being used a total of 
eleven times.292  As a result of this, one may reasonably conclude that s 10 is also blameless in 
encouraging deference towards s 4 declarations.  The reason behind Parliament’s apparent 
deference, therefore, must lie elsewhere.       
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Similarly concerned with the deference being shown towards judicial pronouncements on 
legislative incompatibility with the Convention rights, Morgan argues that it is the result, not of s 
4’s drafting per se, but instead of the fact that the HRA incorporates the ECHR.  As he notes:  
[I]f Parliament refused to amend the legislation, the losing party would proceed to the 
European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) in Strasbourg, and almost certainly win.  The 
government would then have little option but to pass remedial action.
293
  
As a result of this, Morgan claims that, regardless of the fact that s 4 declarations are not legally 
binding, ‘the political pressure exerted by this ‘advice’ [s 4 declarations of incompatibility] is 
extraordinarily potent.’
294
  Morgan’s argument is highly persuasive.  Decisions of the ECtHR are, 
after all, binding on the State involved,
295
 and it is accordingly necessary that they be 
implemented under international law.  Consequently, following the issuing of a s 4 declaration of 
incompatibility, Parliament ‘would really have no option but to amend the law in order to comply 
with the Convention,’296  thereby making the HRA, as Morgan concludes, ‘just as potent as the 
Canadian Charter of Rights.’
297
 
Research conducted by Hiebert also provides support for the ECHR being the principal driving 
force behind political deference towards s 4 declarations of incompatibility.
298
  Because ECtHR 
judgments must be complied with, the only circumstance whereby Parliament and the 
government could legitimately depart from a s 4 declaration would be where there was no ruling 
by the Strasbourg Court on the issue in question.  Even in such an event, a ruling by Strasbourg on 
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the matter, as Morgan notes above, would most likely not be too far behind and, although there is 
always the chance that Strasbourg will rule in favour of the State, the only certainty is that 
Parliament and the government would be obliged to amend the law should they lose.  It is 
therefore easier for s 4 declaration of incompatibility to be followed, than to defend incompatible 
legislation at Strasbourg.  As a result, the non-binding nature of s 4 becomes little more than a 
dead letter which on paper preserves Parliamentary sovereignty, but in practice does not. 
It is submitted, however, that the compliance with s 4 declarations of incompatibility as a result of 
pressure from Europe is not in and of itself an indicator of the failure of the HRA.  A high rate of 
compliance with s 4 declarations at present does not  guarantee a high rate of compliance in the 
future.  As Gardbaum notes, '[t]he fact that so far Parliament has not clearly exercised its legal 
power to disagree with and depart from a judicial rights decision is not yet compelling evidence of 
a political inability to use it.'299  Parliament need only refuse to comply with one declaration of 
incompatibility to demonstrate that the non-binding nature of s 4 is not a dead letter but instead a 
legal reality.  Because the HRA has only been in force for thirteen years, '[f]ew ... reasonably 
contestable issues of major principle have really arisen yet in the declaration of incompatibility 
context, which is why it is far too soon to render final judgement.'300  The high rate of compliance 
to date should also not overshadow that fact that one s 4 declaration of incompatibility has yet to 
be complied with. 
The declaration in question was issued in Smith v Scott.301  In this case, s 3 of the Representation 
of the People Act 1983 (RPA) was held to be incompatible with Article 3 of the First Protocol and 
an individual’s right to free and fair elections because it imposed a blanket ban on convicted 
prisoners from being able to vote in elections to Parliament.  The court accordingly issued a s 4 
declaration of incompatibility.  The judgment largely followed the reasoning of the ECtHR in Hirst v 
United Kingdom (No. 2),302 where the Grand Chamber, by majority of 12 to 5, also held that the 
blanket ban on prisoner voting in Britain infringed Article 3 of the First Protocol.   
The ECtHR reached its decision in Hirst on the grounds that a blanket ban was disproportionate.  
As the ECtHR noted, '[i]t applies automatically to ... prisoners, irrespective of the length of their 
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sentence and irrespective of the nature or gravity of their offence and their individual 
circumstances.'303  The decision of the ECtHR was also motivated by the fact that Parliament had 
not debated the issue of disenfranchisement following the enactment of the HRA.  As they noted, 
'it cannot be said that there was any substantive debate by members of the legislature on the right 
of prisoners to vote.'304  As Colin Murray notes: 
 The absence of any relevant debate separated the UK from the majority of ECHR states, 
 which also maintained restrictions on the prisoner franchise at the time Hirst was 
 decided.  These other states could draw upon their legislative debates as efforts to 
 assess their restrictions in light of human rights concerns, because of the Court's 
 discretion to vary the application of the ECHR to respect particular national policies and 
 practices ...  Hirst made it clear that, in the absence of any efforts by Parliament to 
 consider the UK's restrictions in light of the human rights at issue, the provisions of the 
 RPA 1983 lay outside any potential margin of appreciation.'305 
However, despite further pressure from the ECtHR, and more recently the Supreme Court, 
successive governments have been reluctant to implement the decision in Hirst.  Although the 
Government had issued two consultation documents in the wake of the ruling in Hirst,306 it still 
had not taken any legislative action to remedy the infringement by 2010.  As a result, the decision 
in Hirst was reaffirmed in the pilot judgment of the ECtHR in Greens & MT v United Kingdom.307  
The Court held also that legislative proposals designed to achieve Convention-compliance needed 
to be brought forward within six months of the judgment becoming final.308  In response to this, a 
debate was held on 10 February 2011 in the House of Commons, where a majority of 234 to 22 
MPs309 backed a backbench motion moved by David Davis MP which stated that 'legislative 
decisions of this nature should be a matter for democratically elected lawmakers; and supports 
the current situation in which no prisoner is able to vote except those imprisoned for contempt, 
default or on remand.'310   
With the ECtHR soon to address the issue of prisoner voting rights again in Scoppola v Italy (No. 
3),311 the Government, emboldened by the House of Commons' refusal to comply with Strasbourg, 
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successfully petitioned the Court to revisit their decision in Hirst and extend the deadline set in 
Greens & MT v United Kingdom to six months after their judgment in Scoppola v Italy (No. 3).312  
Despite the Government's argument that prisoner disenfranchisement was a matter for individual 
member states,313 the ECtHR again reaffirmed the ruling in Hirst.314  Consequently, in November 
2012, the Government introduced into Parliament the Voting Eligibility (Prisoners) Draft Bill and 
charged a joint committee of both Houses to scrutinise and make recommendations on three 
potential legislative responses to the ECtHR's decision, including the option to maintain the 
current ban.315  In December 2013, the Joint Committee published its report, recommending 
compliance with the judgment in Hirst and allow convicted prisoners serving a sentence of 12 
months or less to retain the right to vote.316  In R (Chester) v Secretary of State and McGeoch v The 
Lord President of the Council & another,317 where Britain's blanket ban on prisoner voting was 
challenged yet again, the Supreme Court affirmed that it would not depart from Strasbourg's clear 
and consistent view on prisoner disenfranchisement.318  In so doing, the Court made it clear that it 
was for Parliament to decide what to do next, declining to issue another s 4 declaration of 
compatibility on the grounds that Parliament was already considering the matter.319 
Murray has criticised the political resistance to Hirst as being founded upon the misunderstanding 
that the judgment was an 'assault on centuries of settled practice,'320 as opposed to a 'request that 
Parliament reconsider the UK's disenfranchisement of prisoners in light of human rights ... 
bounded only by the requirement that any restrictions resultant from this reconsideration be 
proportionate to the crimes in question.' 321  Despite this, however, it is submitted that the issue of 
prisoner voting rights demonstrates unequivocally that both Parliament and the government, 
where they strongly disagree with the  ECtHR, will not automatically follow declarations of 
incompatibility, regardless of the pressure from Strasbourg to do so.  As Fergal Davis argues in 
agreement, 'the prisoner disenfranchisement debates perhaps demonstrate that Parliament is 
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willing to take a principled stand against the judgment of a court and in so doing assert its own 
supremacy.'322  The issue of prisoner voting rights, therefore, may be the exception which proves 
the rule.  Although it remains to be seen whether the financial cost for defying the ECtHR will 
eventually compel the current Coalition Government comply with their consistent ruling on the 
matter
323
 – thereby confirming Sales and Ekins’ interpretation of the HRA – the non-binding 
nature of s 4 cannot yet be dismissed as a dead letter provision which only preserves Parliament’s 
right to the final say on paper, but in practice delivers it to the judiciary and the Strasbourg Court.  
4. Conclusion 
The HRA seeks to secure greater protection for human rights without ushering in judicial 
supremacy.  It achieves this by protecting rights both politically and legally, with the latter 
informing, but without dominating, the former.  On the political front, the HRA seeks to facilitate a 
parliamentary culture of rights whereby Parliament plays an active role in protecting human rights 
against the executive, primarily by reviewing the compatibility of Government Bills with the 
Convention rights.  On the legal front, the HRA empowers the courts to either correct or identify 
human rights infringements in order to provide an incentive for Parliament and the government to 
respect rights when drafting legislation whilst also preserving Parliament's right to the final say on 
human rights.  Ensuring that the aims of the HRA are achieved without the legal controls 
undermining the political ones, is essential if the HRA is to considered an example of 
complementary constitutionalism.  From the above analysis, it can be seen that judicial and 
political activity under the HRA, although mixed, is nevertheless in broad conformity with the 
HRA's twin aims.   
Section 19 has arguably heralded a culture of compliance within government on matters of rights 
whereby the courts, not Parliament, has the most influence on the formation of government 
legislation.  Despite this, s 19 has also spearheaded greater parliamentary scrutiny of government 
compliance with human rights, assisted greatly by the JCHR.  Although its direct influence on 
government legislation has so far been minimal, the JCHR has nevertheless compelled the 
government to justify its human rights record before Parliament and has crucially facilitated 
greater parliamentary engagement with human rights issues.  Evidence also suggests that the JCHR 
no longer performs a purely technical role in the performance of its duty, but instead reports in its 
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'own voice,' thereby ensuring that Parliament is capable of reaching its own conclusions on human 
rights and of disagreeing with the courts where it feels it is necessary. 
Although the expansive approach to s 3 adopted in R v A (No. 2) and Ghaidan is contradictory to 
the values of the political school and has arguably had the effect of marginalising Parliament's role 
in the protection of rights, it is nevertheless an approach which was sanctioned by Parliament.  
Because the courts are merely enforcing Parliament's clear intention, therefore, s 3, although 
resulting in an area of unresolved tension at the very heart of the HRA, must nevertheless be seen 
as complementary, rather than contradictory, to the political school.  Crucially, the fact that more 
s 4 declarations of incompatibility have been issued than anticipated means that Parliament's role 
in the protection of rights has not been completely bypassed.  Despite the political responses to s 
4 giving the appearance of deference towards judicial pronouncements on matters of human 
rights, it is clear that automatic compliance with s 4 declarations is not always assured.  It would 
therefore be premature to conclude that the non-binding nature of s 4 is a dead letter.  The rule 
on paper is that Parliament remain sovereign and may refuse to comply with s 4 declarations of 
incompatibility.  If it does so successfully only once, it nevertheless demonstrates that the non-
binding nature of s 4 is not a dead letter but a legal reality.  The continued refusal by both the 
government and Parliament to respond positively to the declaration of incompatibility issued in 
Smith v Scott, therefore, may prove to be the exception which proves the rule.   
Overall, therefore, the HRA can be seen to constitute an example of complementary 
constitutionalism which provides support for the claim that that the British constitution, although 
unquestionably more dependent upon legal methods of accountability, nevertheless remains 
primarily political. 
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Chapter Six 
CONCLUSION 
1. The Political Constitution No More? 
Over the last half-century, the British constitution has undergone some dramatic changes which 
have unquestionably ushered in greater reliance upon judicial forms of accountability.  Whereas 
Vernon Bogdanor claims that Britain’s ‘old’ political constitution – which relies primarily on 
political forms of accountability – is therefore in the process of being replaced by a ‘new’ more 
legal constitution,1 this thesis offers an alternative account of the contemporary constitution 
premised upon a new middle-ground between the legal and political schools: complementary 
constitutionalism. 
This thesis has shown that the differences between the legal and the political schools have been 
largely exaggerated.  Both schools, rely upon elements of both the legal and the political schools, 
most notably their respective mechanism of accountability, and disagree with one another 
primarily, although not exclusively, on emphasis.  It is submitted, therefore, that a real world 
constitution may be characterised as either primarily legal or primarily political in character, but 
the predominance of one school's normative preferences does not necessarily negate the 
importance of its rival's under the constitution, nor do they necessary operate in contradiction to 
one another.  Both legal and political methods of accountability instead support and sustain each 
other in order to achieve better government accountability than either methods could achieve on 
their own, thereby resulting in a more balanced constitution.     
Although the expansion of legal controls tests orthodox views on both the British constitution and 
the political school of constitutionalism, this thesis has thus sought to demonstrate that the 
expansion of law is not necessarily contradictory to the political school.  By demonstrating the 
constitution's continued dependency on, and preference for political methods of accountability, as 
well as the complementary effect of its increasing reliance upon legal methods on the underlying 
principles of the political school, this thesis has proven that the British constitution, although 
unquestionably more legal, nevertheless remains primarily political in nature. 
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2. Strengthening Political Controls 
Although Britain's reliance upon legal methods of accountability and control has clearly increased 
in recent years, such increased reliance has not been at the expense of its political methods.  
Much of Britain's 'old' political constitution has not only survived the judicial expansionism of the 
last forty years, but in some instances has even been strengthened.  This can be seen most acutely 
with constitutional conventions. 
Because they substitute judicially-enforceable rules with political ones, thereby enabling the 
regulation of democratically-elected politicians without judicial interference with the political 
decision-making process, constitutional conventions are of particular normative value to the 
political school which prefers political forms of accountability over legal ones.  The British 
constitution also continues to depend heavily upon constitutional conventions for the regulation 
of political behaviour which a primarily legal constitution would perhaps reserve for law.2  Because 
it renders entire swathes of the constitution non-justiciable, therefore, British dependency upon 
convention, although not of normative value to the political school in every instance,3 is 
nevertheless indicative of a general preference for political as opposed to legal methods of 
accountability.   
Although the executive's historic dominance over the House of Commons unquestionably 
weakened Parliament's ability to hold it to account, thereby potentially undermining the 
effectiveness of conventions as politically-enforceable constraints on public power, recent 
attempts at codification have the potential to bring greater clarity and legitimacy to conventions, 
thereby making compliance with them more likely.  In addition to this, the recently implemented 
Wright Committee Reforms4 have had the effect of weakening the government's hold over the 
Commons whilst simultaneously strengthening the ability of backbenchers to more effectively 
hold the government to account.  As a result, the Convention of Ministerial Responsibility has 
been strengthened, along with the ability of the Commons to hold the government to account for 
breaches of convention. 
                                                     
2
 Blick, A. 'The Cabinet Manual and the Codification of Conventions' (2014) 67(1) Parliamentary Affairs 191: 
'Within uncodified constitutions, of which the UK provides one of the few examples internationally, 
conventions can be even more prominent than in their codified counterparts.' 
3
  This is due to the distinction this thesis draws between regulatory and foundational conventions.  See 
Chapter Four, 131-133. 
4
 See House of Commons Reform Committee, First Report of Session 2008-09, Rebuilding the House, HC 117, 
November 2009. 
 210 
The British constitution's continued preference for political controls, however, is not restricted to 
the retention and strengthening of conventions – a key feature of Britain's 'old' political 
constitution – but can be seen also by the extension of political controls into new and previously 
unregulated areas of the constitution.  The royal prerogative – another key feature of Britain's 'old' 
political constitution – has until recently operated with immunity from both legal and political 
controls.  Although the courts have sought to bring the royal prerogative under control by 
expanding judicial review, Parliament has instead sought to plug the gap in accountability by 
bolstering political controls via legislation.  The Fixed-term Parliaments Act 2011, for example, 
abolishes the Crown's controversial power of dissolution and replaces it with a system of fixed-
terms.5  The Prime Minister can no longer call an election at his or her discretion, thereby 
weakening his or her hold over Parliament.  Crucially, the Act also transfers the power to call an 
early election from the executive to Parliament, thereby strengthening parliamentary, rather than 
judicial, controls over the government.6        
Political accountability has also been extended to include the protection of human rights – a 
relatively new phenomenon to British public law – which is traditionally left to the courts in 
countries with an entrenched 'higher law' constitution.  The principal aim of the Human Rights Act 
1998 (HRA), however, was to achieve greater human rights protection without judicial supremacy.  
It thus sought to place Parliament, not the courts, at the centre of human rights protection by 
fostering a culture of rights in which Parliament would play a more active role in scrutinising 
Government Bills on their compatibility with the Convention rights.  The scheme of the HRA, 
therefore, was designed to facilitate this, most notably s 19, which places a duty upon a minister 
introducing a bill to issue statement as to the bill's compatibility with the Convention rights.  
Although s 19 statements were designed to compel the government to take rights into 
consideration at the pre-legislative stage in order to prevent any legislative incompatibility with 
rights from ever emerging, they were also meant to provide a platform from which Parliament 
may then better scrutinise the government.  The Joint Committee on Human Rights (JCHR) was 
also established in order to assist Parliament with its scrutiny of government on human rights 
grounds. 
Although the courts appear to exert greater influence over government, albeit indirectly, than 
either the JCHR or Parliament, thereby ushering in a culture of compliance within government, s 
19, with the help of the JCHR, has nevertheless forced the government to explain its reasons 
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behind their statement, thereby exposing it to greater levels of parliamentary scrutiny.  Although 
evidence suggests that the JCHR's influence on Government Bills is minimal at best, and that 
Parliament is either unable or unwilling to give effect to JCHR recommendations due to the 
continued dominance of party discipline within the House of Commons, the Committee has 
nevertheless succeeded in increasing Parliament's overall awareness of and engagement with 
rights, thereby helping to lay the foundations for a culture of rights within Parliament.  Where 
human rights once occupied only the peripherals of parliamentary activity, they can now be seen 
to take centre stage.  Parliament's increasing engagement with rights, therefore, as well as the 
changing practices of the JCHR, may yet increase its impact upon government and dilute the 
indirect influence of the courts.  It is now also the case that the JCHR regularly reports in its 'own 
voice' rather than that of the judiciary.  Its recommendations, therefore, offer an alternative to 
purely technical legal advice which enables Parliament's to make an informed decision on whether 
or not to disagree with the courts, thereby enabling it to reach its own conclusions on rights in 
such way as to give its right to the final say meaning. 
3. A Complementary Constitution 
Where there has been an increased reliance upon legal methods of accountability, this thesis has 
sought to demonstrate that such reliance complements, rather than contradicts, the underlying 
values of the political school.  In so doing, it has demonstrated that determining whether 
something is complementary is seldom clear-cut, thus highlighting the necessarily fine line 
complementary constitutionalism straddles between legal and political constitutionalism. 
The House of Lords expanded judicial review in Bancoult (No. 2)7 to include Orders in Council 
issued under the prerogative, thereby plugging one of the gaps in reviewability left by the GCHQ 
case.8  Judicial review of prerogative powers, because they are not derived from statute, cannot be 
justified by recourse to the ultra vires model of review.  This is because the courts, in reviewing the 
actions of the executive based on non-statutory powers, cannot possibly be enforcing Parliament's 
will.  The extension of judicial review, therefore, unquestionably strengthens legal as opposed to 
political controls.  In Bancoult (No. 2), however, judicial review was expanded in order to protect 
Parliament's democratic authority against the executive's use of the royal prerogative.  The 
expansion of judicial review to include the royal prerogative, although undermined by the courts’ 
unwillingness to interpret prerogative powers narrowly and abandon deference to the executive 
                                                     
7
 R (Bancoult) v Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs (No. 2) [2008] UKHL 61. 
8
 Council of Civil Service Unions v Minister for the Civil Service [1985] AC 374. 
 212 
on matters of colonial governance and national security, can nevertheless be seen to protect, 
rather than contradict, the underlying values of the political constitution.  Although it fails to bring 
the prerogative under control, therefore, the decision, at least in principle, can be seen to provide 
evidence of complementary constitutionalism.   
Although it is contended that Bancoult (No. 2) strengthens legal controls over the prerogative in a 
complementary manner, earlier case law has certainly tested the boundaries of complementary 
constitutionalism.  In the Fire Brigades Union case,9 for example, the House of Lords' decision to 
prevent the executive from using the prerogative to subvert Parliament's will unquestionably  
readdressed the balance between Parliament and the executive in favour of the former.  By 
implying a limitation upon the Home Secretary's seemingly unlimited discretionary power to 
decide both when and whether to introduce the statutory scheme, however, this rebalance was 
arguably achieved by the House of Lords in a manner more akin to legal constitutionalism and thus 
less complementary than that adopted by the Court of Appeal.10  Here, the majority merely extend 
the principle in De Keyser's Royal Hotel 11 to include statutory provisions not yet in force, thereby 
avoiding the need for creative statutory construction which blurs the distinction between judicial 
interpretation and legislative lawmaking. 
Although the HRA sought to place Parliament, not the courts, at the centre of human rights 
protection, it nevertheless empowered the courts to review the compatibility of legislation with 
the Convention rights albeit without the power to strike down incompatible legislation.  Section 3 
empowers the courts to interpret legislation in order to bring it into conformity with the 
Convention Rights ‘[s]o far as is possible to do so,’12 whilst s 4 empowers the courts to issue a non-
binding declaration of incompatibility when they are unable to do so.  Under both provisions, 
therefore, parliamentary sovereignty is expressly preserved,13 thereby achieving 'weak form 
judicial review.'14  This was done in order to provide an effective incentive for the government and 
Parliament to engage and comply with rights, thereby avoiding a repeat of the situation in New 
Zealand where respect for human rights has arguably failed to take root due to the absence of 
sufficient political costs for non-compliance.  Legal mechanisms of accountability, therefore, are 
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used in order to bolster political controls, and supposedly in a manner which is complementary to 
the underlying values of the political school.  Whether ss 3 and 4 has this complementary effect, 
however, is clearly dependent upon their appropriate usage.  Should s 3 be used too  expansively, 
or s 4 declarations complied with automatically, they risk undermining, rather than bolstering, the 
HRA's aim of placing Parliament, not the courts, at the centre of human rights protection. 
An expansive approach towards s 3 has been adopted by the House of Lords in both R v A (No. 2)15 
and Ghaidan,16 which arguably marginalises Parliament's role in protecting rights and, because it 
permits the courts to interpret incompatible primary legislation despite clear parliamentary words 
to the contrary, contradicts the values of the political school.  Despite this, however, it is clear that 
such an expansive approach was sanctioned by Parliament, thereby making it complementary.  
This is because the courts, in ignoring Parliament's clear intention in incompatible legislation 
passed either before or after the HRA, are merely enforcing Parliament's clear intention as 
expressed in s 3.  Should the courts adopt a more restrictive approach towards their interpretative 
duty under s 3, they would ultimately be acting contrary to Parliament's will, thereby undermining 
what they were seeking to safeguard.  Section 3, therefore, poses a unique paradox which can be 
seen to test the acceptable limits of complementary constitutionalism.  Because s 4 has been used 
more often than expected, the expansive approach adopted by the courts towards s 3 has ensured 
that Parliament's role in the protection of rights has not been bypassed.  Although the political 
responses to s 4  give the appearance of deference towards judicial pronouncements on matters 
of human rights, thereby casting doubt over Parliament's right to the final say on matters of 
human rights, it would be premature to conclude that the non-binding nature of s 4 is a dead 
letter.  The continued refusal by both the government and Parliament to respond positively to the 
declaration of incompatibility issued in Smith v Scott
17
 may yet prove be the exception which 
proves the rule.  
4. A Primarily Political Constitution 
Although complementary constitutionalism, as the above examples illustrate, necessarily treads a 
fine line between legal and political constitutionalism, it demonstrates clearly that the debate in 
public law discourse between legal and political constitutionalism fails to capture the subtlety and 
nuance of the interplay between law and politics under real world constitutions.  It is therefore 
                                                     
15
 [2002] 1 AC 45 
16
 Ghaidan v Godin-Mendoza [2004] 2 AC 557. 
17
 Smith v Scott [2007] CSIH 9. 
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submitted that, whilst different examples may produce different conclusions, consideration of the 
royal prerogative, constitutional conventions, and the HRA combined justifies the conclusion of 
complementary constitutionalism reached by this thesis, and that this conclusion provides highly 
persuasive authority as to the general character of the British constitution.  The British 
constitution, although unquestionably more legal, nevertheless remains primarily political.  The 
history of the British constitution, however, is that of gradual change.  So far, it has retained long-
held political values and ideas whilst also embracing newer more legal ones, and can thus can best 
be seen as a fusion of the old and the new; the past and the present.  Whether its increasing 
reliance upon legal methods of accountability will one day tip the balance of the constitution away 
from that of a primarily political constitution and towards that of a primarily legal one remains to 
be seen.  Much will depend, as it always has, upon the actions of both politicians and judges, not 
just in relation to the three areas addressed by this thesis, but across every facet of the 
constitution. 
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